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 This dissertation focuses on the transcendental unity of apperception in the work of two 
major German philosophers: Kant and Hegel. The transcendental unity of apperception was first 
described by Kant in the ​Critique of Pure Reason​, where he gave it pride of place in his system of 
transcendental idealism. There, it was posited as a condition on the subject’s representations, 
such that they must form a necessary unity in order to constitute experience of an object. While 
Hegel does not make the phrase ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ a central one his work, he 
and other post-Kantian German idealists can be read as transforming this central Kantian 
insight. Specifically, as I argue in my second chapter, Hegel criticizes Kant’s construal of the 
unity of apperception as a condition among representations alone, and several commonly 
distinguished Hegelian criticisms of Kant can be understood as consequences of this central 
objection. Hegel’s criticism of Kant on this point also creates a valuable point of entry into his 
own sometimes-obscure positive philosophical claims. In the third chapter, I make use of this by 
identifying Hegel’s conception of Thought as the successor concept to the transcendental unity 
of apperception in Kant. By reading Thought as a transformation of the unity of apperception - a 
transformation that takes it from a condition on representations to a condition on reality as a  
vii 
 whole - I am able to provide a reading of Hegel that does justice to his more 
metaphysically-loaded texts as well as to his claims to be doing properly post-Kantian 
metaphysics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Kant and Hegel disagree on their answer to the question: what  is  the unity of apperception?”  1
- Béatrice Longuenesse 
 
The aim of this dissertation is simple: to describe the transformation of an idea. More 
specifically, that idea is the transcendental unity of apperception originally put forward by Kant. 
My aim is to study how Hegel takes this idea and transforms it from a condition on the subject’s 
representations to a condition on reality as a whole.  That Kant and Hegel are philosophers 2
worthy of study is a claim that needs no defense; both could legitimately claim to among the 
most influential thinkers in history. Kant’s ideas, in particular, continue to be of importance 200 
years after his death in fields as disparate as computer science, philosophy of perception, and 
metaethics. And while Hegel’s influence is perhaps less explicit, his ideas have impacted the vast 
majority of philosophers in the continental tradition, and the analytic tradition, too, was in part 
born out of Russell and Moore’s reaction to Hegel’s British disciples. And that is to say nothing 
of his student, Karl Marx, whose ideas have literally shaped the world in a quite tangible way. 
Perhaps more important, then, is the question: why the transcendental unity of 
apperception? This esoteric phrase disguises, with its obscure terminology, one of the most 
important concepts in Kant’s philosophy.  Indeed, Kant himself describes it as “the supreme 3
principle of all use of the understanding.”  Yet it is less clear that the concept has anything to do 4
with Hegel. To be sure, Hegel does describe it as “one of the most profound principles for 
1 Longuenesse,  Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics , 187. 
2 There is, in the second chapter, a brief consideration of other German Idealists and their approaches to 
the transcendental unity of apperception, but for the most part I focus entirely on these two philosophers. 
3 The reader will, I hope, forgive me for not explaining what exactly this concept is just yet - that will be 
made more clear in the first chapter. At this point it is sufficient to simply note that it is explicitly one of 
Kant’s central concepts. The aim of this dissertation is to make clear the central role it plays in Hegel’s 
thought as well. 
4 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B136. 
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speculative development,” while at the same time claiming that Kant’s “further development, 
however, did not live up to this beginning.”  But that in itself does not demonstrate that a study 5
of the transcendental unity of apperception could have any bearing on Hegel’s positive 
philosophy. 
That such a connection does exist is something that I aim to demonstrate in the course of 
this dissertation. In the first chapter, I outline the basic structure of Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy, paying particular attention to the role of the transcendental unity of apperception. 
That done, the second and third chapters explore this point of connection. In the second, I show 
how many of Hegel’s criticisms of Kant can be understood as rooted in Kant’s specific way of 
conceiving the unity of apperception. This serves to establish the existence of a connection on 
this point, indeed a connection of central importance. Based on this connection, my third 
chapter shows how modifying the transcendental unity of apperception in accordance with 
Hegel’s criticism yields the essential elements of the Hegelian system. Seen this way, the 
transcendental unity of apperception acts as a kind of key through which to read both Hegel’s 
positive philosophy and his criticism of his predecessor. The value of the project, then, is 
demonstrated by carrying it out, since the result is, I hope, an illuminating and interesting view 
of Hegel and his relation to Kant.  6
Just as important as what I  am  doing in this project is what I am  not . I do not, for 
example, take myself to be presenting Hegel’s own view of his relation to Kant. I present the 
transcendental unity of apperception connection as a helpful tool for understanding Hegel’s 
philosophy and as valuable point of comparison between the philosophers. I remain agnostic as 
to whether Hegel himself would have seen his project as a modification of Kant’s central 
5 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.22. 
6  In this sense, then, one could say that the proof is in the pudding. 
2 
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concept.  More generally, this work is not intended as a historical reconstruction of Hegel or 7
Kant’s philosophy; the emphasis is not on the biographies of these thinkers or their personal 
formative experiences. Instead, I aim to give a philosophical reconstruction of how to 
understand their key ideas and the connections between them. As such, I try to stay true to the 
most charitable interpretation of their texts. But within the limits of these texts, it is more 
important to me to find the best arguments and highlight the relevant points of connection than 
to capture precisely what Hegel the man might have been thinking in his study. For this reason, 
I largely leave aside biographical details and questions of other philosophical influences.  
I also set aside, for the purposes of this study, the ethical philosophy of my two central 
philosophers. The transcendental unity of apperception plays its most important role in Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy; it has, arguably, only a tangential relation to his ethical works.  On the 8
other hand, Hegel’s moral philosophy is deeply rooted in his modification of Kant’s principle. 
Here, however, we focus on that root, not the leaves: on the modification of the principle itself, 
not its ramifications for Hegel’s ethics.  
I am not the first to study the transition between Kant and Hegel, nor do I hope to be the 
last. I owe much to others who have studied this issue, and there are any number of diverse 
approaches to it, many of which I will take the time to present and criticize in the chapters to 
come. Sally Sedgwick, for example, focuses her account of the Kant-Hegel transition on the issue 
of intellectual intuition. For her, the important difference between these thinkers is that Hegel 
takes seriously the existence of this key faculty that Kant would deny to us. Béatrice 
7 There are passages where Hegel connects his philosophy to Kant’s directly, and does so with reference to 
the transcendental unity of apperception. Still, I doubt he would agree that his philosophy is entirely or 
only a modification of this central principle, and he clearly has philosophical motivations that lie outside 
his concern with the transcendental unity of apperception. 
8 That connection is nonetheless important, insofar as Kant’s theoretical philosophy arguably lays the 
foundation for his ethics. Not all commentators agree, however, that there is a necessary connection 
between them at all. Paul Guyer, for example, believes that Kant’s ethics can be salvaged, even if his 
theoretical philosophy is hopelessly flawed. 
3 
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Longuenesse, on the other hand, believes the central transition point to be the issue of truth. 
Should truth be understood as a correspondence between representations and reality, or are 
there deep problems with such a conception that require us to rethink the nature of truth itself? 
Kant, according to Longuenesse, would claim the former, but Hegel would argue for the latter. 
And there are yet other interpreters as well, each of whom would identify a different point of 
discrepancy between Kant and Hegel: Stephen Houlgate sees Hegel as carrying the epistemically 
critical goals of Kant’s philosophy to their logical conclusion, Terry Pinkard sees Hegel as adding 
to Kant the social element that the latter overlooked, Michael Forster sees Hegel as concerned 
with Pyrrhonian skepticism where Kant focused on metaphysical skepticism, and the list could 
go on.  9
The unique thing about the study presented here is the emphasis on the transcendental 
unity of apperception. In what follows, I hope to show how many of these other approaches can 
be understood as dealing with consequences arising from Hegel’s critique of Kant’s 
transcendental unity of apperception. But even should the transcendental unity of apperception 
be only one of many points of contact between these two thinkers, without any particular 
primacy, a study of the matter would still yield an interesting and fruitful perspective from 
which to understand these major philosophers of the past. 
This last is the case because how one reads the transition from Kant and Hegel will 
impact how one reads Hegel himself. It is a common strategy in reading Hegel to take his 
criticism of Kant as a point of departure, and that strategy is followed here. For us, tracing 
Hegel’s criticism of the transcendental unity of apperception yields a picture of Hegel that sees 
him as not merely concerned with the structure of the mind, but with the metaphysical structure 
9 See Houlgate, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant”; Pinkard,  The Sociality of Reason ; Forster,  Kant and 
Skepticism ; Forster,  Hegel and Skepticism . Forster does not believe that Kant did not pay attention to 
Pyrrhonian skepticism at all, but does present Kant as emphasizing metaphysical skepticism over other 
forms of skepticism. 
4 
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of the world as a whole. The result is that our reading of Hegel is at odds with a number of more 
mind-focused readings such as those put forth by Terry Pinkard, Robert Pippin or Robert 
Brandom. Indeed, much of contemporary analytic philosophy, insofar as it is explicitly engaged 
with Hegel at all, has tried to sterilize many of his more grandiose claims by interpreting them as 
elements of a theory of mind. While such a reading can be interesting and enlightening for 
modern-day philosophers of mind, it does not do full justice to Hegel’s texts, nor does it fit well 
with his criticisms of Kant. This dissertation hopefully does a better job of attending properly to 
Hegel’s texts, while also clarifying to some extent the meaning of his more enigmatic and 
obscure claims. In presenting this more metaphysically-oriented interpretation of Hegel, I am 
aligning myself with a more recent trend in the study of his work, among whom Stephen 
Houlgate, Sebastian Rödl, and Sally Sedgwick could be counted. 
Because of the bulk of this study focuses on presenting and defending a reading of 
Hegel’s connection to Kant, some of the more fine-grained ramifications of that reading are left 
underexplored. In the final chapter there was only room to present the major outlines of Hegel’s 
system as a modification of the transcendental unity of apperception, and not enough space to 
look more closely at some of the consequences of that modification. In particular, one 
interesting point to look more closely at would be Hegel’s theory of judgement. For Kant, the 
transcendental unity of apperception is involved in all judgements; indeed it is a condition for 
the possibility of judgement. Hegel, too, spends many pages discussing the forms of judgement 
and deriving them from one another. It would be interesting to see how Hegel’s conception of a 
judgement connects to Kant’s, and how his more metaphysically-oriented conception of the 
unity of apperception modifies his theory of judgement. Some indications of this are given when 
5 
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he claims, for example, that “all things are a judgement,” but it would be worthwhile to examine 
the matter farther.  10
Another point worthy of further investigation would be a comparison between the ethics 
of the two thinkers. I have set aside ethical issues in this dissertation largely because they would 
complicate an already complex issue. Nonetheless, there is reason to expect that Hegel’s 
modification of the transcendental unity of apperception would affect his ethics - after all, his 
modification undermines the distinction between understanding and reason that is an essential 
element to Kant’s ethical philosophy. For this reason, it would be worth comparing the ethical 
systems of the two philosophers. On the one hand, Hegel is able to grant us a more robust 
knowledge of our freedom compared to Kant. On the other hand, however, it is not clear that the 
dialectical system is able to incorporate a real ethical distinction between right and wrong 
actions; it could be that all actions are ‘right’ insofar as they are part of the dialectic. It may turn 
out that Hegel has granted us freedom only to render it meaningless. Tracing out the roots of 
these differences between Kant and Hegel could reveal structural connections relevant to any 
metaethical theory. At the very least, it is a topic I’d consider worth looking at more closely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 167.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception 
 
The principal aim of this chapter will be to present in detail Kant’s theory of the 
transcendental unity of apperception. In doing so, I take stands on a number of interpretive 
issues in Kant scholarship. I will flag these issues as they arise, but these are not the central 
concern of this chapter. Rather, my aim is primarily to present a clear and charitable 
interpretation of Kant’s ideas. This will set the stage for an examination of internal tensions in 
Kant’s position, tensions that Hegel will bring out in his criticisms and modifications of Kant’s 
work. With this goal in mind then, I begin by presenting Kant’s goals and basic assumptions. 
From there, I will explore the transcendental unity of apperception itself, showing how, from 
these basic assumptions, Kant builds a theory that can adequately address what he takes to be 
the most important philosophical issues of his time.  
 
1 Kant’s Primary Goals in the  Critique 
Understanding any philosophical author is made easier if one has an understanding of 
that author’s goals. For this reason, instead of beginning immediately with an examination of 
Kant’s theory of the transcendental unity of apperception itself, I begin with a brief presentation 
of the aims Kant had in mind when developing that theory. As the title suggests, Kant’s  Critique 
of Pure Reason  is an attempt to use reason itself to make sense of how reason could be used 
purely, that is, without relation to anything merely sensory. In Kant’s hands, reason’s 
self-criticism, as it could be called, ultimately breaks into three general aims. First, Kant will try 
to provide a response to skepticism about our knowledge of pure metaphysical principles such as 
that every alteration has a cause. Second, Kant will attempt to put an end to the Pyrrhonian 
7 
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skepticism motivated by the long history of unresolved debates on metaphysical issues.  Third, 11
in response to contemporary attacks on God, free will, and the immortal soul, Kant aims to 
defend the legitimacy of our faith in these (though his positive argument in favor of that faith 
comes only in other texts).  I examine each of these in turn. 12
Metaphysical skepticism aims to undermine our knowledge of metaphysical truths such 
as that every alteration has a cause or that there are substances with properties. These claims are 
meant to describe the necessary structure of our world, and the metaphysical skeptic denies that 
we have the ability to know this structure. The argument for this kind of skepticism begins by 
observing that while we may have direct sensory experience of colors and sounds, we have no 
direct sensory experience of things like causation. If one falls and gets a bruise, for example, 
what they experience is first a fall, and then a bruise. They do not, however, experience any 
further thing that might be the causal connection between the fall and the bruise. In other 
words, our senses present us with objects and their properties, but not with causality. More 
generally, our senses do not provide us any direct experience of necessity; they only provide us 
with experiences of various contingent objects.  But then, if we add to this the empiricist idea 13
that our knowledge of the world must be built on the foundation of experience, the result is that 
we cannot have any knowledge of necessary truths; necessity is simply not something that is 
11 In much of what follows, I draw from Michael Forster’s discussion of Kant’s relation to different forms 
of skepticism in his book  Kant and Skepticism . Roughly speaking, the Transcendental Analytic can be 
read as focusing on the problem of metaphysical skepticism and the Transcendental Dialectic can be read 
as focusing on Pyrrhonian skepticism. 
For Kant’s stated interest in metaphysical skepticism, see Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , 
A9/B13-A10/B19. For Pyrrhonian skepticism, see Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , Avii-ix, Bxiv-xv. 
12 See for example Kant’s discussion in the  Critique of Pure Reason , Bxxvii-xxxi, where he discusses his 
famous claim to “deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.” See also Bxxxiv, where he writes that 
“Through criticism alone can we sever the very root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, of freethinking 
unbelief, of enthusiasm and superstition, which can become generally dangerous, and finally also of 
idealism and skepticism, which are more dangerous to the schools and can hardly be transmitted to the 
public.” 
13 “Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be 
otherwise.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B3. 
8 
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given through the senses. It is Hume, in the famous argument of ‘Hume’s Fork,’ who is most 
strongly identified with this kind of skepticism. 
To see the importance of metaphysical skepticism to Kant’s project, it is helpful to 
introduce a bit of Kantian terminology. Kant often speaks of what he calls ‘synthetic a priori 
judgments.’  Now, providing a precise definition of ‘synthetic’ as opposed to ‘analytic’ is 14
famously difficult, and some commentators have even claimed that Kant himself had no clear 
conception of the distinction.  Nonetheless, a judgment that is analytic can be understood, 15
roughly, as one wherein the predicate is a conceptual part of the subject.  For example, the 16
concept <fish> contains as a part the concept <animal>, since being an animal is part of what it 
is to be a fish. Accordingly, whenever we think of something as a fish we must at the same time 
think of it as an animal; the latter concept is included in the former. An analytic judgment such 
as “all fish are animals” merely makes explicit this conceptual containment. The truth of an 
analytic judgment is thus grounded in the concepts involved, and can be verified simply by 
analyzing those same concepts.  Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, have no such 17
grounding, and cannot be verified in this way; in them, the predicate adds something to the 
subject concept which is not already contained in it.   18
14 This terminology is introduced very early on in the text and is used throughout. See  Critique , A6/B10 for 
Kant’s earliest introduction of the term and definition of it. 
15 Peter Strawson,  The Bounds of Sense , 42-43. 
16 In describing analytic judgments in this way, I am opting for an interpretation of analyticity that takes 
concept-containment to be its primary feature. Rival ways of characterizing analytic judgments exist, 
however. Henry Allison, for example, takes analytic judgments to be better described as those which are 
true on the basis of the law of identity alone. See Allison,  Kant’s Transcendental Idealism , 89-94. Lanier 
Anderson, argues (I think compellingly) against Allison on this point in his book  The Poverty of 
Conceptual Truth . Finally, I should mention that although I have chosen this concept-containment 
interpretation of analyticity, I do not believe the interpretative decision at this juncture to be of particular 
importance for understanding Hegel’s relation to Kant.  
17 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A6/B10-A7/B11. 
18 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A6/B10-A7/B11. 
9 
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For this reason, synthetic judgments cannot rely only on the concepts they contain for 
their truth, and so require something beyond the concepts themselves.  In many cases this 19
additional element can be provided by our sensory experience, in which case we have a synthetic 
judgment known a posteriori. Yet not all synthetic judgments depend on sensory experiences. 
Thus there is a second class of synthetic judgments which Kant calls synthetic a priori 
judgments.  Included in this class are metaphysical claims such as that every alteration has a 20
cause.  On the face of it, there may seem to be no way that these claims could be true, since their 21
truth can be grounded neither in their concepts, nor in the data we receive from our senses. This 
is precisely the point pressed by the metaphysical skeptic when they deny our knowledge of 
necessary truths about the world. Reframed in Kantian terminology, then, the metaphysical 
skeptic can be understood as denying the legitimacy of our synthetic a priori judgments, e.g., 
they are denying that the concept of causation has any real application to objects.  Kant makes 22
answering this form of skepticism a central issue of the  Critique , writing in the introduction that 
“the real problem of pure reason is now contained in the question: how are synthetic judgments 
a priori possible?”   23
Pyrrhonian skepticism, on the other hand, has its roots deeper in history than Hume, 
and can be traced as far back as Ancient Greece. This form of skepticism is unique in that it does 
not have a characteristic argument or major claim. Instead, Pyrrhonian skepticism is best 
understood as a method of approaching knowledge claims. When faced with an interlocutor who 
19 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A8/B11-A10/B24. 
20 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A9/B13. Tellingly, Kant goes on to raise the issue of metaphysical 
skepticism immediately after defining synthetic a priori judgments. 
21 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A9/B13. See also the Second Analogy (Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , 
A188/B232-A211/B256). For Kant, the concept of an alteration does not contain the concept of cause.  
22 In what sense we are to understand the word ‘object’ here is an issue that Kant will take up in his 
attempt to address this skeptical worry. I will say more about Kant’s conception of objects later in this 
chapter and the next. 
23 A few sentences later, he goes on to say that “On the solution of this problem, or on a satisfactory proof 
that the possibility that it demands to have explained does not in fact exist at all, metaphysics now stands 
or falls.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B19.  
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claims to know X, the Pyrrhonian skeptic aims to show that not-X is at least as justified as X. In 
other words, for each assertion, this kind of skepticism presents equally powerful arguments 
both for and against that assertion. The result is a suspension of judgment, where no decision 
can be reached in favor of one side or the other. Ancient skeptics saw this as a desirable state of 
equanimity, but later philosophers, including Kant, saw the presence of equal and opposite 
arguments on all sides as a threat to the possibility of making any real claims to knowledge. 
Kant feels strongly that philosophy, and especially metaphysics, has not achieved the 
concrete results that the natural sciences had in his day. Instead, metaphysicians seem to him to 
be eternally engaged in arguing over the same points, with both sides of these debates having 
strong arguments in favor of their positions.  These seemingly irresolvable disputes only 24
strengthen the Pyrrhonist’s claim, providing concrete evidence that there is in fact no reason to 
prefer one side over the other. Kant wants to account for these disputes, explain why they seem 
intractable, and, if possible, end them. His attempt to do so comes in the Transcendental 
Dialectic, where he explains how a variety of metaphysical debates arise from extending the use 
of our concepts beyond their scope of legitimate application. As a result, philosophers engaged 
in these debates can make no progress; the questions they are trying to answer rest on false 
assumptions about our concepts and are badly formed, so that ultimately they have no answer.   25
Although skepticism in these forms is a major target of Kant’s in the  Critique , there is 
another goal of his that is in some ways even more important: the defense of freedom and other 
articles of faith. In fact, for some of Kant’s earliest readers, the defense of freedom and faith in 
God against determinism and atheism was seen as the  Critique ’s greatest contribution to 
24 Kant refers to the issue in both the A and B prefaces, and even goes so far as to describe metaphysics as 
a “battlefield of endless controversies.” See Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , Avii-ix, Bxiii-xvi, 
A3/B6-A7/B11. 
25 More specifically, these philosophers deal with questions that “surpass the bounds of experience.” Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason , Aviii. See also Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , Bxiv, B146-148, 
A326/B382-A329/B386. 
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contemporary philosophy.  Kant aims to show that the idea of the human subject as a free 26
moral agent can be compatible with the idea of the natural world as governed by deterministic 
causal laws. More generally, Kant wants to show that the moral dimension of human life, 
including such concepts as freedom, God, right, and wrong, can be smoothly fit in with the 
principles of the sciences, so that neither needs to exclude the other.   27
In sum, then, Kant’s aims are three: to answer skepticism regarding our knowledge of 
necessary truths, bring to an end certain philosophical debates, and to defend the possibility of 
faith against the natural sciences.  
 
2 Kant’s Conception of Experience: a Starting Point 
  To address these issues, Kant’s overall strategy is to provide an account of human 
experience that demonstrates the possibility of our knowing necessary truths, while at the same 
time circumscribing our knowledge in a way that eliminates Pyrrhonian debates, and protects 
the possibility of our being free agents. If this strategy is to succeed, however, it is important that 
Kant’s account of experience not deviate too far from those of his skeptical interlocutors; 
otherwise, he would end up simply speaking past them. Since the skeptics Kant has in mind are 
largely empiricists (e.g., Hume), Kant accordingly begins from a set of basic assumptions about 
the nature of human experience that, while its details might be disputed, would be broadly 
accepted by most empiricist philosophers of his time.  28
26 See for example Karl Leonhard Reinhold, who’s influential  Letters on the Kantian Philosophy  went a 
long way in making Kant’s work better known. In his second letter, for example, he writes that Kant 
“displayed as a chimera the atheism that today more than ever haunts the moral world in the forms of 
fatalism, materialism, and pantheism.” In general, the theme of these letters is the Kantian solution to 
problems of freedom, God, and immortality. See Reinhold,  Letters on on the Kantian Philosophy , 21, 
135-139. 
27 That the defense of God, freedom, and immortality are central concerns of Kant’s is not as contentious 
an issue as is his relation to skepticism, so here I merely mark that concern and do not go into it in greater 
detail. See for example Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , Bxxx, A333/B390-A338/B396, A829/B857. 
28 As I present them here, these assumptions are quite broad, since they are meant to be held in common 
by many quite different philosophers and may even apply to some philosophers not traditionally thought 
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We can isolate at least four key theses that together constitute the conception of 
experience Kant takes as his starting point. First, experience is the result of an interaction 
between two entities, the subject and the object, both of which exist independently of being 
experienced. The precise nature of their interaction Kant leaves unspecified, but he remains 
committed to the existence of these entities which, existing outside of experience, mutually 
produce experience through their interactions.   29
Second, experience always includes some element which is given to the subject by the 
object. Experience is not a free-floating product of the subject’s imagination, but is conditioned 
by the object’s effects on the subject. This given element is construed as a representation 
immediately given to the subject through the senses.   30
The third claim, corresponding to the one before, is that experience also includes some 
component contributed by the subject. In other words, experience is not restricted to the passive 
sensory perception of external objects, but also includes some contribution provided by the 
subject itself; the subject acts (usually unconsciously) on the representations it is given through 
the senses to spontaneously produce other representations that were not immediately given.  31
These representations, which Kant calls concepts, are paradigmatically used to organize and 
categorize the immediately given representations. They thus have a kind of generality in that 
they can be applied to multiple representations, grouping them together and producing an 
ordered classification of them. With these concepts, the subject goes from merely receiving 
representations of the world to actively thinking about the world.  
of as empirists. Kant’s own more specific analysis of the nature of experience will be addressed in the 
following section. 
29 For example, he writes that the object can be given to us only if it “affects the mind in a certain way.” See 
Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A19/B33. That experience begins with this effect of the object on the mind 
seems to imply that both could exist apart from their interaction (i.e. apart from experience). 
30 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A19/B33-A20/B34.  
31 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A26/B42, A68/B93. 
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Fourth and last, experience is seen as being at least  prima facie  an experience of objects. 
Our experience does not present us with merely a chaotic blur of sensory representations, but 
with an ordered universe of unified spatiotemporal objects distinct from ourselves, enduring 
through time and behaving in lawlike ways.  While this feature of our experience may be 32
illusory, its presence must nonetheless be accounted for, and much of Kant’s project is aimed at 
showing how the raw unorganized data of our senses can be organized to produce such an 
apparently ordered world. 
 
2.1 Kant’s Analysis of Experience 
Kant conceives of experience as including a number of different elements: sensations, 
intuitions, concepts, and judgments. In this section I present each of these in turn, and based on 
the picture of experience outlined above, describe Kant’s reasons for including them in his 
account. 
The most basic of these elements Kant calls ‘sensation.’ Sensations can be thought of as 
raw sensory data. They are a kind of representation, and are the most immediate input of the 
senses, the direct result of the way in which the subject is affected by the object.  In the case of 33
vision, for example, the relevant sensations might be an array of colored patches, each one 
unique and individual. On their own, however, these colored patches do not constitute a 
perception of an object; they are merely a colored swirl of sensations. Their only organizing 
principle is that they are arranged in space and time. A perhaps helpful metaphor might be that 
of pixels on a screen. Pixels themselves are nothing but colored spots arranged on a screen, and 
it is only when someone looks at the screen and interprets the arrangement of pixels that they 
32 Kant dismisses the idea of experience that is not at least purportedly of an object, calling it “nothing but 
a blind play of representations, i.e., less than a dream.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A112. 
33 “The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation” 
Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A20/B34. 
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can come to represent anything in particular. Sensations, like the pixels, are only minimally 
related to one another through their arrangement in a space and time. And, like the pixels, they 
depend on our human faculties of interpretation in order to represent an object. At the level of 
sensations alone there is only a chaotic jumble, so that there is no reason to call one group of 
sensations an experience of an object as opposed to another; in fact, properly speaking, 
sensations do not represent objects at all.   34
As a result, sensations alone are not sufficient to account for experience. Instead, a 
collection of sensations (Kant’s term is ‘manifold’) is combined by the subject to form a new kind 
of representation: an intuition.  This act of combination occurs unconsciously in the mind of 35
the subject.  It does not necessarily always occur - it is possible for the subject to have 36
sensations that are not combined to form intuitions - but it must occur if the subject is to have 
any experience properly so called. For without this combination, the sensations could not be 
unified to form any experience of objects, and so one of the key features of experience would be 
left unaccounted for. 
The combination, or synthesis, of sensations, is the act whereby the mind forms an 
intuition.  For example, given various sensations of silver and gray, one might unite them to 37
form the intuition of a fish. In this case, the sensations are the matter, while the fish is the form 
given to them in making them an intuition. Like a sensation, an intuition is singular, but it is 
34 “the combination of the manifold [of sensation] in general can never come to us through the senses” 
Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B129. 
35 See for example, Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A105 and B130. 
36 Kant describes this combination as a “blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we 
would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom conscious.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , 
A78/B103. 
37 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B129-130. The claim that intuitions require an act of synthesis is a 
relatively contentious claim, and the degree to which the mind is involved in creating intuitions, as 
opposed to receiving them passively, is a matter of debate in Kant scholarship. In the reading I present 
here, I bring Kant closer to Hegel, since Hegel too would give an active role to the mind. Alternative 
readings would make the distance between these philosophers greater. That said, in the context of this 
study, which reading one prefers will not ultimately be a salient issue. 
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singular in a slightly different way - it is singular in that it is a representation of a single 
spatiotemporal entity.  Moreover, an intuition can contain other intuitions within itself; an 38
intuition of a house might include at the same time intuitions of the door, the walls, and the 
windows.   39
Intuitions lack any generality; they are always an intuition of one particular object. It is 
an important feature of experience, however, that it includes a general component. After all, it is, 
Kant takes it, an essential part of our way of experiencing the world that we are not only able to 
take in data through the senses, but also able to  think  about this data, i.e., we are able to form 
general judgments that hold of multiple objects at once.  To do this, we need a more general 40
representation that can be applied to more than one object. This kind of representation Kant 
calls a ‘concept.’   41
To form concepts, the mind unconsciously associates intuitions with other intuitions, 
discovering common features and abstracting these out, thereby forming general concepts. 
These concepts apply to many objects collectively, thus enabling us to think the objects of our 
experience rather than simply sense them.  The concept of a fish, for example, contains within 42
its extension all the various fish we could experience, and is connected to these fish by the 
common features of all of the various intuitions of fish (for example, intuitions of scales, fins, 
and gills). Via abstraction, we move from specific intuitions which represent a single object to 
general concepts which represent whole classes of objects and can thus enter into logical 
38 That Kant takes singularity to be a key feature of intuitions is evident in the Transcendental Aesthetic, 
where he uses this fact about intuitions to show that space and time are intuitions and not concepts. Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason , A25/B39, A32/B4. 
39  Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A25/B39, A32/B4. 
40 Not all mental activity would count as thought for Kant - thought must involve concepts. “Cognition 
through concepts is called thought.”  Kant, Lectures on Logic,  591.  
41 Kant describes concepts as functions, and defines this as “the unity of the action of ordering different 
representations under a common one.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A68/B93. See also Kant,  Critique 
of Pure Reason , A19/B33. 
42 The act of forming concepts is, like the synthesis of sensations into an intuition, is usually done 
unconsciously. 
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relationships of inclusion and exclusion that mere intuitions cannot. For example, we can say 
that all fish are animals, thus including the concept of fish under the concept of animal. We 
cannot, on the other hand, say that all of one intuition is included in another in this way - 
intuitions are each unique and non-repeatable, and the only kind of inclusion that is possible in 
their case would be a spatial or temporal inclusion, not the logical inclusion that is necessary for 
thought.  
The relationships of inclusion and exclusion between concepts are expressed in what 
Kant calls ‘judgments.’  An example of a judgment might be the claim that ‘all fish are animals.’ 43
This judgement expresses a relationship of inclusion: the concept of fish is included under the 
concept of animals. Because each of these concepts contains within its extension a set of 
intuitions, this judgment also says something of the intuitions involved, namely, that any 
intuition of a fish must also be an intuition of an animal. Judgments are thus related to 
intuitions by means of the concepts employed in them, and it is at the level of judgment that we 
find full-fledged thought about the world.  44
These four elements - sensation, intuition, concept, and judgment - form the 
fundamental pieces of Kant’s account of experience. But Kant does not simply present them 
without argument. Instead, he argues that any experience, if it is to be experience of an object 
(as opposed to mere sensation, for example) must  necessarily  include these four elements. 
Moreover, he argues that there are certain privileged a priori concepts involved in organizing 
sensations into representations of objects, and that, because they are constitutive of any 
experience of objects, we can be assured a priori that our application of these concepts to the 
43 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A68/B92-A69/B94. 
44 “In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also comprehends 
a given representation, which is then related immediately to the object.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , 
A68/B93. The ‘given representation’ in this quote is an intuition, which, because it is composed of 
sensations provided by the effect of the object on us, is related “immediately” to the object. 
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objects of experience is legitimate. This argument will be presented in the next sections, when 
we turn to the transcendental unity of apperception and its role in Kant’s system. 
But before turning to that argument, it’s worth pausing to clarify a few points. The first of 
these is the sense of the term ‘object’ that is at issue here. The object of our experience, for Kant, 
has two sides to it. On one hand, it can be conceived of as it is in itself, independent of 
representation, in which case it is called the ‘thing in itself.’  The thing in itself is an 45
independent entity, existing regardless of our representations and independent of our mental 
powers.  But the same object can also be considered insofar as it appears to us - this aspect of it 46
is the phenomenal object. Now, since all our knowledge of the object is through representations 
of it, it follows for Kant that we can have knowledge only of the phenomenal object, i.e. the 
object as it is represented by us.  What things are in themselves is impossible for us to know. 47
Moreover, sensations, on their own, do not provide us with any representation of the 
phenomenal object, because they lack the necessary unity characteristic of an object.  Instead, 48
these sensations must be unified by the activity of mind to produce a representation that can 
properly be called a representation of an object, and not merely a blind play of sensations. When 
Kant claims that experience must be experience of an object, he has in mind the phenomenal 
object, not the thing in itself. All experience is in some sense  of  the thing in itself, since it begins 
from sensations that the subject receives through the effect of its interaction with things as they 
are in themselves, outside of experience. But all experience worthy of the name is also 
experience of the phenomenal object, insofar as it involves a unity of representations that is 
referred to an object.  
45 Kant uses this term first in the introduction at  Critique of Pure Reason , Bxx. It is, however, used 
repeatedly throughout the text. See especially Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A235/B294-A260/B315. 
46  Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A235/B294-A260/B315 . 
47 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A255/B310-A256/B311. 
48 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A112. 
18 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 19/182
It is worth noting, however, that in providing this reading of Kant, I am adhering to what 
is called a ‘two-aspect’ interpretation, according to which the noumenal object and the 
phenomenal are two aspects or ways of thinking about one and the same object of experience - 
we can think of it as it is independent of our representing it, and we can think of it as it is 
represented by us. The opposing reading, called the ‘two-worlds’ reading, takes the phenomenal 
object and the noumenal object to be numerically distinct entities. The debate between these 
readings is a complex one, and Kant’s text is not univocal on the issue. In fact, it must be 
admitted that there are some passages that seem to favor the two-worlds reading, such as those 
at A249-253, as well as at A20/B34. Nonetheless, many of these passages were removed in 
Kant’s second edition of the  Critique.  There are other passages, more indicative of Kant’s 
considered view, where Kant characterizes the distinction between phenomena and noumena as 
a way of thinking of the objects, and claims that both of them are aspects of one and the same 
object. He writes, for example, that appearances have “two sides, one where the object is 
considered in itself … the other where the form of the intuition of the object is considered.”  The 49
key word here is ‘considered,’ which shows that for Kant the distinction is in how we think of the 
object, not in their being multiple distinct objects.   50
The distinction in how we think of the objects we experience, which splits them into 
phenomenal objects and the things in themselves is mirrored in the distinction between a 
phenomenal subject and the subject as it is in itself. The subject in itself is the entity that 
receives representations from the object through sensibility. Like the thing it itself, its existence 
49 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A38/B55. See also Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A254/B310.  
50 This debate over these competing interpretations is an important one in Kant scholarship, and one on 
which I believe I have taken the most charitable reading of Kant. For modern commentators who advocate 
the two-aspect reading, see Lucy Allais,  Manifest Reality , and Paul Guyer,  Kant and the Claims of 
Knowledge.  For a clear discussion of the debate as a whole, see Lucy Allais, “Kant’s One World: 
Interpreting ‘Transcendental Idealism’.” 
That said, the debate between these interpretations does not, to my mind, ultimately impact the criticisms 
Hegel makes of Kant, or his transformation of the transcendental unity of apperception.  
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is independent of its being experienced. In other words, our existence is independent of any 
representation we might have of ourselves.  On the other hand, however, we also have an inner 51
sense by way of which we can come to know our own mental states. This inner sense, however, 
only gives us access to how our mental states appear to us, not how they are in themselves.  52
Accordingly, it provides us with access to a phenomenal subject, a subject as it appears, as 
opposed to the subject as it is in itself. As Kant brings out in the course of the  Critique , the 
subject, too, cannot be known as it is in itself. Like the thing in itself, it is known only insofar as 
it is experienced. Thus, just as in the case of the object of our experience, the subject of 
experience can also be divided into these two aspects: the way it is in itself, and the way it 
appears. 
Last but not least, it is important to clarify how one should understand all Kant’s talk of 
mental activities. Kant does not intend the  Critique  as a contribution to empirical psychology. 
Indeed, if it is read in that way, then it becomes impossible for Kant to meet his stated aim of 
justifying our use of metaphysical concepts and defending our claims to freedom. This is for two 
reasons. First, empirical psychology examines how human beings think, but does not address 
the issue of how we  should  think. Thus, though it could show us, for example, that we do in fact 
conceive of ourselves as free, it could not show us that this conception of ourselves is justified.  53
Moreover, the metaphysical claims Kant is concerned with (e.g. ‘every event has a cause’) he 
takes to be intended not as contingent facts based on observations, but rather as universal and 
necessary truths.  But as such, no empirical investigation could be sufficient to justify them; 54
Kant believes that all necessary and universal truths must be known a priori, if they are to be 
51 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B158-159. 
52 “We cognize our own subject only as appearance but not in accordance with what it is in itself.” Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason , B156. 
53 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A84/B116-A87/B119. 
54 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , Axv, A9/B13, B17-18.  
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known at all.  In sum then, the empirical sciences generally, and so empirical psychology in 55
particular, cannot serve to answer the skeptical worries Kant deals with because (1) such an 
empirical psychology deals only with how we do think, not how we  should  think, and (2) 
empirical psychology is suited only for the investigation of  contingent  facts. The skeptical worry, 
however, is a worry about  justification , and of justification for  necessary  truths. 
Kant’s exploration of our mental activities should be read then not as an empirical 
investigation, but rather as a backwards reconstruction of what must occur in the mind if 
experience is to have the character that it does. Kant’s question could be stated as follows: given 
that experience is always experience of an object as represented by us, what acts must the 
subject perform on its representations in order for such an experience to occur? Based on his 
conception of experience, Kant derives certain mental operations that the subject must be 
engaging in. These mental acts need not be consciously or willfully performed (though they 
could be), nor do they need to be mapped to certain regions of the brain or any other physical 
correlates. Instead, the mere fact that the subject experiences an object is, for Kant, sufficient to 
show that these acts were performed, even if the subject is not aware of it. This means that his 
discussion of the structure of experience operates wholly at the level of a priori and necessary 
truths, since it is not based on any empirical observation, but on the nature of experience itself. 
Kant’s analysis of experience into sensations, intuitions, concepts, and judgments, 
enables him to present a picture of experience that fits the broad picture he shares with his 
skeptical interlocutors. His discussion of the thing in itself and the subject as it is in itself 
captures the belief that experience begins with an interaction between two entities whose 
existence does not depend on experience itself. The inclusion of sensations in his account 
captures the directly given element of experience, and his discussion of concepts captures the 
55 “Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative universality.” 
Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B2-B4. See also Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A9-10.  
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general element. Kant’s description of intuitions as unities of sensations adds a new wrinkle to 
the story, and one that he will exploit in addressing the skeptical challenge, but it does not 
contradict the basic picture of experience that he shares with his skeptical interlocutors. Finally, 
the phenomenal object and phenomenal subject capture the fact that experience is always 
experience as of objects, and not merely a blur of sensations. With an understanding of what 
these elements are, then, we are in a position to see how and why Kant combines them. 
 
3 The Transcendental Unity of Apperception 
The transcendental unity of apperception is discussed by Kant in the portion of the 
Critique  called the Transcendental Deduction. The aim of this section is primarily to 
demonstrate that we are justified in our use of certain metaphysical concepts. To do this, Kant 
first tries to show that the steps of the progression outlined above, from sensation through 
intuitions and concepts and ultimately to judgments, are all necessary stages of any experience 
worth the name. Next Kant aims to derive, on the basis of this argument, a set of (perhaps 
unconscious) operations of the mind that are necessarily at work in the production of our 
experience of objects. Finally, a study of these operations reveals that they necessarily involve 
certain a priori concepts, which Kant calls the categories. This serves to justify our use of these 
concepts; we are justified in using them because they are necessary for any experience at all.  56
The Transcendental Deduction thus illustrates  that  experience must have the features Kant 
ascribes to it,  how  it comes to have them, and that it  should  have them. It is on the basis of this 
that Kant is able to answer the skeptical claims which were outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter. 
56 As noted above, it would not be enough for Kant to show simply that we do think a certain way; he must 
show that we are right to do so. In the  Critique  this is put in terms of the famous distinction between 
matters of fact ( quid facti ) and matters of justification ( quid juris ). Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , 
A84/B117-A89/B122. 
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Interestingly however, Kant begins his discussion not by focusing on objects, but by 
focusing on the subject. He observes that for any representation, if it is to be experienced by me, 
it must be thinkable by me. He puts this by writing that “the I think must be able to accompany 
all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be 
thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or 
else at least would be nothing for me.”   The ‘I think’ in this passage refers to a self-conscious 57
representation of the self as thinking.  The passage points out that if a subject is able to think 58
something, then that subject must also be able to represent itself to itself as so thinking, i.e., to 
accompany that representation with “the I think.”  For example, if I have a representation of a 59
fish, it must at the same time be possible for me to say, “I am thinking of a fish”, i.e. to represent 
myself as thinking of the fish. Although it may sound like an odd observation at first, there is 
some plausibility to this; a representation could never be  mine  if it were not at least possible for 
me to reflectively represent it  as  mine. Without this possibility, the representation would be, as 
Kant puts it, “nothing for me.”  This is true even on Kant’s somewhat thick conception of 60
thought, where to think requires the use of concepts in judgments: if a sensation was not, at 
least in principle, something that I could unite into an intuition, conceptualize, and form a 
judgment about, then it could hardly count as  mine .  61
57 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B132. 
58 ‘Apperception,’ though not a term much used today, refers to this self-awareness. At the same time, 
however, is important to note that Kant will distinguish what he calls ‘empirical apperception’ from the 
transcendental apperception which is the focus of this chapter. The former involves our representation of 
ourselves through the faculty of inner sense, while the latter is the pure awareness we have of ourselves as 
a thinking thing in general.  
59 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B131-132. 
60 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B132.  
61 It is a matter of debate the extent to which the ‘I think’ must actually  be  attached to the subject’s 
representations. Here I emphasize that it must be at least  capable  of being attached. Other interpreters 
have argued that it must actually be attached; i.e., that the subject must accompany all of its 
representations with a representation of itself as representing them. This to me seems like too strong a 
requirement, and one that is phenomenologically inaccurate, is not justified by Kant’s arguments, and not 
supported by the text. In the quote cited earlier in this paragraph, for example, Kant claims that the ‘I 
think’ must  be able to , not that it actually must, accompany our representations. See Henry Allison’s 
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The result, then, is that any representation of mine, since it must be thinkable by me, 
requires “a necessary relation to the I think.”  This ‘I think’ constitutes an additional 62
representation over and above the ones to which it can be attached. But the nature of this ‘I 
think’ is as yet quite obscure, and is only made more obscure when we consider that the ‘I’ here 
cannot refer to the self as it is usually conceived. That is, the ‘I’ cannot refer to any particular 
embodied existence in space and time, and by saying ‘I think’ (in the sense at issue here, at least) 
the thinking subject cannot be describing such an entity as having some mental episode. This is 
because the ‘I think’, as Kant intends it here, must be able to attach to any experience in order 
for it to be an experience at all; its possibility is thus prior to any particular experience, and 
hence to any particular experience a subject could have of itself. The subject could not represent 
itself in space and time, or as having particular mental episodes, without already being able to 
attach the ‘I think’ to its representations. So the ‘I’ at issue in the ‘I think’ is not the 
representation of any determinate empirical thinking subject; it has no height, no age, no 
gender, no past, and no future. While the ‘I think’ must be able to attach to all of the subject’s 
representations if they are to be anything for it, precisely this fact entails that it does not refer to 
any particular empirical entity.   63
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction , 345-348, for a defense of this reading. Paul Guyer’s  Kant and the 
Claims of Knowledge,  133-140, presents a contrasting point. 
This issue is of minimal importance for the reading of Hegel I will present in what follows; while Hegel 
discusses the use of ‘I’ he does not make the question of ‘attaching the I think’ a theme in his philosophy. 
62  Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B132. 
63 Indeed, it is an open question as to what kind of representation the ‘I think’ is, and whether it refers to 
anything at all. It cannot be an intuition, since it does not refer to any empirical entity. Nor can it be a 
concept, since, if it were, it would be a wholly empty one without legitimate use since it lacks any 
corresponding intuition. Here I follow Béatrice Longuenesse in considering the ‘I think’ to be an 
expression of the unity imposed on representations by the transcendental unity of apperception. As such, 
it is a kind of  sui generis  representation that does not refer to anything, but merely expresses the unity 
among other representations. In ethical contexts, the ‘I’ is used differently; in those cases it seems to refer 
to the noumenal self. See Longuenesse,  I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again , 102-113. 
Ultimately, although Hegel discusses the term ‘I’ as used by individual subjects, the way his modifies the 
transcendental unity of apperception leaves that use largely behind. For him (and, I think, for Kant), the 
most important feature of the ‘I think’ is that it is empty in the sense described above; other details of how 
we understand it here are not crucial to the overall course of this study.  
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Nonetheless, Kant does think we can know two important facts about the ‘I think.’ First, 
it is identical in all its occurrences.  This means that in reflectively representing itself through 64
the ‘I think,’ the subject represents itself as identical through all the various representations it 
has (though, as noted above, without saying anything determinate about the subject itself). Kant 
describes this as the “unity of self-consciousness”, i.e. the fact that the representation ‘I’ is 
identical each time it comes to consciousness.  This a priori identity of the ‘I think’ through all 65
the various representations it can accompany means that the subject takes its representations to 
form a whole, unified by their connection to the ever-constant ‘I think.’ Indeed, because it lacks 
any content of its own, the ‘I think’ is in a sense nothing more than the expression of the unity of 
these representations. Consider the difference between saying “I think that this fish is a gray,” as 
opposed to simply saying “this fish is gray.” For Kant, the difference is that the former makes 
explicit what was already implicit in the latter - that those representations have been unified into 
a single whole in the thinking subject.  
Second, the unity of the ‘I think’ is necessary, not merely contingent.  That the same ‘I’ 66
accompanies all of the subject’s representations is a necessary fact; without it, those 
representations would not belong to the same subject. Accordingly, in ascribing representations 
to myself, I must take the representations to form a necessarily unified whole belonging to one 
and the same subject; otherwise they would not all be  my  representations. In other words, the 
subject cannot represent itself as being one and the same subject in each experience if it does not 
simultaneously take its experiences themselves to form a necessarily unified whole. This 
requirement, however, presents us with a problem: representations must be unified into a whole 
in order to be reflectively ascribed to the subject, but sensations are not given as unified through 
64 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A107, B132-133, B138. 
65 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B132.  
66 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A108, B142. 
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the senses. As a result, the subject cannot simply take in sensations as they are given, but must 
actively unify them to form a whole so that they can be  its  representations, so that it can attach 
the ‘I think’ to them. Moreover, because the ‘I think’ has no content of its own, the necessary 
unity among representations cannot come from their relation to the ‘I think’ alone, but must be 
a result of how these representations are related to one another. The subject’s representations 
will have to form a necessarily unified whole among themselves, where each representation fits 
with the rest. It will be Kant’s task to show through what activities of the subject this necessary 
unity finally comes about.  
At this point we are ready to say what exactly the transcendental unity of apperception is. 
Appending the ‘I think’ to my representations, as in the example above, makes explicit the 
necessary unity of the subject’s representations - a unity that they must have if these 
representations are to be reflectively accessible, hence if they are to be anything to me at all. The 
transcendental unity of apperception is precisely this condition on the subject’s representations; 
it is the requirement that they form a necessarily unified whole if they are to be anything for the 
subject at all.  The representation ‘I think’ is an expression of this condition in that attaching it 67
to a representation expresses the fact that the representation in question has been incorporated 
into this necessary unity. And, as we saw in the last paragraph and will explore in more detail in 
the following sections, this requirement makes necessary certain actions on the part of the 
subject in order to bring about a necessary unity among its representations.  Based on this 68
67 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A107, B132. 
68 Other interpreters of Kant have identified the transcendental unity of apperception either with the ‘I 
think’ itself, or with the activities that it makes necessary, or with understanding as the faculty that 
performs these activities, among other things. I have chosen to interpret it as a condition that must be 
met. This is in keeping with Kant’s text, where at a number of points he describes the transcendental unity 
of apperception as a condition (see Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A106-107, B136, B138, and B150). In 
reality, all of these different interpretations are closely connected, and reading it as a conditions makes 
clear those connections: given this condition, the ‘I think’ is it’s expression, and the existence of this 
condition makes necessary the activities of the faculty of the understanding that Kant will go on to 
describe. In this way, the condition interpretation functions as a kind of arch-interpretation that can 
encompass and explain other options. For other interpreters who also take the condition reading, see 
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condition, this necessary unity among representations, Kant derives a number of different 
operations that the mind must be performing on representations in order to achieve this 
necessary unity.   69
Important to note, however, is that this unity is at the same time the unity of the 
reflective representation of the subject (the ‘I think’) and the unity of the subject’s 
representations of objects (all the other representation to which the ‘I think’ can be attached).  70
The operations that unify our representations ensure both that the ‘I think’ is necessarily 
identical in all of its occurrences  and  that representations come to have the stable and lawlike 
character they must have if they are to be representations of objects. Indeed, neither of these 
could occur without the other: the necessary unity of the subject is established by the necessary 
and lawlike relationships among its various representations, and the representations in turn 
could not be unified without being held together as the representations of a single necessarily 
unified subject.  
Thus one way to read Kant’s argument would be as follows: since we know that there 
must be a single and necessarily unified representation of the subject through all our 
experiences (as indicated by the necessary identity of the ‘I think’), we can be assured that 
certain mental operations are occurring, and so can be assured that we do in fact have 
representations of objects. Read this way, the condition of unity among our representations 
forms a kind of bedrock in Kant’s arguments against metaphysical skepticism. But the argument 
Strawson,  The Bounds of Sense , 26-27, 98 or Kemp Smith,  A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason , 250-253. For contrasting views, see Allison,  Kant’s Transcendental Deduction , Longuenesse,  I, 
Me, Mine , or Engstrom, “Unity of Apperception.”  
Interpreting the transcendental unity of apperception as a condition to be met will be relevant in the 
discussion of Hegel to follow. There, I hope to show that Hegel pushed this demand for unity beyond a 
condition for experience and makes it a condition for the possibility of objects in general. In this role, the 
requirement of unity put in place by Kant becomes, in Hegel’s hands, a driving force of his dialectical 
method.  
69 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B132. Nice. 
70 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A109. 
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can also be read from the other direction: since we know we have representations of stable and 
lawlike objects, we can be assured that the relevant operations are occurring, and so be assured 
that we have a representation of ourselves as a single unified subject. Because it can be read 
from both angles, the actions of the understanding that Kant describes can be seen from two 
sides: as either conditions for the possibility of our self-consciousness, or as conditions for the 
possibility of experience of objects. Kant’s insight was to show how the conditions for the former 
are at the same time the conditions for the latter. 
In what follows, I will present the three distinct (but interdependent) conditions that 
Kant outlines in the Transcendental Deduction: the synthetic, analytic, and objective unities of 
apperception.  For each, I will outline how this particular stage contributes both to the 71
necessary unity of the subject, as well as to the experience of an object. 
 
3.1 Synthetic Unity of Apperception 
If we are to be able to reflectively attribute representations to ourselves, if 
representations are to be  ours  in any real sense, then those representations must be related to 
others to form a necessarily unified whole of  our  experience - this requirement is the necessary 
unity of apperception. Yet on their own these representations are “dispersed and without 
relation to the identity of the subject.”  Accordingly, the first condition that must be met for the 72
unity of the subject is to collect these representations together “in one consciousness.”  Thus the 73
understanding combines the various representations to form a collection of them.  At this point 74
in the synthesis their unity is not posited as a necessary one - there is simply a mass of 
71 For the most part I focus on Kant’s views as presented in the B edition Transcendental Deduction.  
72 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B133. See also Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B134-135. 
73  Critique,  B133. I interpret Kant’s use of the term ‘consciousness’ here, and elsewhere in the 
Transcendental Deduction, to refer to the subject or it’s mind. 
74 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B133-B139. 
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sensations. Nor has it been conceptualized, since we have yet to form any concepts, but have 
only collected our sensations. Yet this synthesis of the representations is an essential first step 
towards a more complete synthesis that can do full justice to the unity of apperception, since the 
collection of sensations here provides the basis for the later stages. 
With respect to the objects of perception, the collection of sensations also forms a key 
first step in forming an intuition.  If a subject’s various sensations of silver and grey are to be 75
unified in an intuition of a fish, they must be first of all collected together in one consciousness. 
These sensations must be collectively attributed to one and the same subject; otherwise their 
unity in an intuition would be impossible.  To see why, imagine that various sensations occur, 76
but in different subjects. For example, you have a sensation of heat, I have a sensation of red, 
and a third person has a sensation of a smoky smell. The disparate sensations of these different 
subjects could never be combined to form a single intuition for a single subject. But if one and 
the same person had all of these (at the same time, of course), then it would be at least possible 
for them to combine them to form an intuition of a fire. In this way, it is a presupposition of any 
combination of sensations, and hence any intuition, that all the included sensations belong to 
one and the same mind.   77
 
3.2 Analytic Unity of Apperception 
At this point, Kant has proven that the first step of the synthesis in experience requires 
the subject to combine its representations to form a whole. But the unity of this whole is merely 
contingent, and its various parts lack any meaningful relationship to one another aside from 
75 Again, the issue of whether an intuition is formed in this way is a contentious one in Kant scholarship. 
76 This point, however, also reveals how the synthetic unity of apperception is also dependent on those 
that follow it. Where they not present, there would be no unified subject to refer the sensations to. 
77 At the same time, as will be shown in what follows, the various sensations could not all be collected in a 
single subject if they were not referred to an object. 
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their ordering in space and/or time. And even this ordering is merely a contingent result of how 
the subject happened to receive its representations, and lacks any necessity. But, as we have seen 
above, the transcendental unity of apperception requires that the various representations form a 
necessary  whole, and not an arbitrary collection. After all, the subject’s unity is not some 
contingent fact about it, but a necessary feature of it. Accordingly, the subject’s representations, 
too, must be necessarily unified, and not merely arbitrarily collected.  
As things stand, however, the synthesis of sensations into a single mass does not alter 
that fact that these sensations lack any generality, and hence any connection to one another 
beyond their merely contingent relationships in space and time. As noted above, sensations 
alone are not sufficient to account for experience, since they lack the generality distinctive of 
human thought. So, in order to  think  its representations, the subject must move from individual 
sensations to form more general representations that can be used to classify multiple sensations 
at once. In other words, it needs to form concepts. Based on the prior synthesis of its 
representations, the subject is able to group sensations together to form intuitions. From these 
intuitions, it is able to abstract out common features, thereby forming empirical concepts. ‘The 
analytic unity of apperception’ is the name given to this stage. Here, thanks to the preceding 
synthesis, it becomes possible to abstract out empirical concepts from the various collections of 
sensations, and use these concepts to classify them.   78
Since the ‘I’ in ‘I think’ lacks any empirical content, it is nothing over and above the unity 
of its representations. Accordingly, to come closer to establishing the necessary unity among its 
representations is at the same to come closer to establishing the necessary unity in the reflective 
representation of the subject itself. Conceptualizing our representations is a key step in 
78 Important to note, however, is that it is only because of the previous synthesis of various 
representations that it is possible to abstract out of them a common concept. Kant,  Critique of Pure 
Reason , B133-134n.  
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establishing the necessary unity in the subject’s representation of itself.  At the same time, the 79
formation of concepts is also an important part of bringing sensations up to the level of 
experience of objects; without concepts, sensations would be a mere blur of color and sound, 
and would lack the element of generality Kant takes to be an essential part of experience.  80
But the analytic unity of apperception, though it results in the formation of concepts, is 
insufficient to establish either the necessary unity of the subject or the experience of an object. 
This is for two reasons. First, at this stage, although concepts have been formed, they have not 
been employed in the actual act of ordering representations. For this, concepts need to be 
combined in judgments.  
Second and more importantly, at this point the various representations and concepts 
that the subject has are combined in a purely subjective manner. They are combined as the 
subject sees fit and with no reference to other subjects or the object they aim to represent. Kant 
describes this as a “subjective unity of consciousness”, to be distinguished from an “objective 
unity of consciousness.”  The former is simply the subject’s associations of ideas, but the latter 81
involves a kind of normative prescription, wherein the subject asserts that this combination is a 
necessary one, one that should hold for all other subjects as well.  What is missing then, is this 82
element of necessary unity that both objects and subjects have. Neither we, nor the objects of 
our experience, are merely contingently unified - the subject is necessarily one and the same in 
all of its experiences, and just as the object is one and the same in all our experiences of it.  83
79 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A112. 
80 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A112. 
81 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B139-140. 
82 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B139-143. 
83 Interestingly, however, the necessity at work in these cases is of a subtly different sort. The the unity of 
the subject’s experiences is a necessary condition on the possibility of there being any experience 
whatsoever. The necessary unity of the object, on the other hand, is the kind of normative necessity 
outlined above - it involves taking a unity of representations to be correct, and requiring others to unify 
them in a similar way. But at the same time, the act of taking any particular set of representations to be 
necessarily unified in that way is not itself necessary, and different subjects could unify their 
representations differently (within certain limits); this is why disagreement about objects is possible. This 
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3.3 Objective Unity of Apperception 
The representation of a unity as necessary, and hence as objective, is the objective unity 
of apperception. Kant uses the term ‘objective’ here to indicate that it is at this point that the 
synthesis of the sensations and their conceptualization is taken as a necessary one - one that 
captures features of an independent object, as opposed to a merely subjective association of 
representations. Other subjects, presented with the same set of sensations, may not perform the 
same synthesis - in this sense the unity of the sensations is merely possible. But with the 
objective unity of apperception we get the idea that other subjects  should  unify their 
representations in a certain way; a particular unification is taken as necessary in the sense of 
being  required , being the  correct  unification, independent of the particularities of the subjects 
themselves. This requirement for intersubjective agreement is constitutive of objectivity for 
Kant. 
The key notion here is that of judgment, and indeed Kant describes judgment as “nothing 
other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.”  In a 84
judgment, a relation between concepts (and hence between concepts and the intuitions that they 
are drawn from) is posited as holding necessarily for all subjects.  Should other subjects deviate 85
from representing things in this way, their deviation would mark an error on their part, and not 
simply an equally valid, but different, way of thinking. To take Kant’s own example, in a 
judgment, I say that bodies are heavy, not simply that when I carry a body I feel a weight.  The 86
former, but not the latter, posits a property (heaviness) as existing  in the object . It does not 
simply collect sensations in my own experience but makes a claim about the object itself. Since 
contingently posited necessary unity in the object contrasts with the unity of the subject - taking the 
subject to be a necessary unity is not a contingent part of experience. 
84 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B141. 
85 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B140, B142. 
86 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B142. 
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the weight is posited as existing in the object, other subjects presented with the object should 
also judge it as having the same weight. In this way, the act of judgement takes a mere 
self-report and turns it into a claim about how representations must necessarily be unified in the 
experience of the object. 
In the act of judgment, then, the subject construes the unity of its representations as a 
necessary one. In so doing, it establishes itself not as a merely contingent collection of 
representations, but as possessing the  necessary  unity proper to the identity of a subject in all of 
its representations. Of course, the very possibility of forming judgments depends on prior 
synthesis and analysis, since without these there would be no collection of representations, nor 
any concepts with which to form judgments. Yet at the same time, there would be no synthesis 
or analysis without the objective unity of apperception; both synthesis and analysis take the 
necessary unity of the subject as their basic assumption (without it there would be no single 
subject to collect representations or form concepts), and this necessary unity is only ensured by 
the objective unity of apperception.   87
On the side of the object, the objective unity of apperception takes what would have 
been a merely contingent collection of representations (a “subjective unity”) and makes into the 
experience of an object. By positing the unity of representations in an experience as necessary, 
regardless of the nature of the subject, that experience comes to be the experience of an 
independent entity (the phenomenal object) over and against the subject, an entity whose nature 
87 It may seem at this point that Kant’s argument is somewhat circular. After all, the preliminary synthesis 
is required for the objective unity of apperception, but at the same time the objective unity of 
apperception is a requirement for the synthesis itself. The appearance of circularity here, however, is only 
apparent. Although Kant’s presentation of his argument can only proceed in one direction, and the 
various mental processes are derived one after the other, the argument as a whole could be run both 
directions. What is most important is the necessary unity of the subject, which is a requirement 
established independent of the mental processes that bring it about. With this requirement in mind, one 
could move to the need for judgment, and hence to analysis and synthesis, or, as Kant does, from a 
foundation in synthesis to the further steps of analysis and judgement. The order of argument here is, at 
bottom, only a matter of Kant’s preference in exposition, and the three stages are interdependent and 
inextricably linked in the production of experience.  
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is not decided arbitrarily by the subject’s preferences.  In a judgement, the object forms a 88
necessary constraint on how the subject thinks about the world. This is why, despite being 
produced to some extent by the activities of the mind, the world we experience is not a wild and 
fanciful collection of nonsensical creatures over which we exercise an omnipotent power, as 
might occur in a dream. The act of judgment sets up the objects of our experience as 
independent objects whose properties lie outside our power to manipulate at will. This referring 
of our representations to an independent external object is precisely what makes them into 
representations  of an object , and the act of judgement is the final step in achieving this. 
That said, it is important to recognize that the three unities I have outlined above thus 
cannot be thought of as stages in a process. Each depends on the others - without the objective 
unity of apperception, for example, there would be no unified self to refer our representations to 
in the synthetic unity of apperception. Instead temporally distinct stages in a process, one can 
think of these unities as three aspects of the same activity. When one rides a bike, for example, 
one needs to move one’s feet, guide the handlebars effectively, and shift one’s weight to maintain 
balance. No one of these things is sufficient for riding a bike, and no one of these things can 
happen without the others. The unities of apperception I have described are similarly unified 
and interdependent, and their result is the formation of experience properly speaking - a 
sensory, conceptually articulated experience of a world of independent objects.  89
In sum then, the transcendental unity of apperception is what underlies our 
consciousness of ourselves as a necessarily unified subject through all our representations. In 
order for such a consciousness to be possible, the various conditions outlined above must be 
88 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B142.  
89 This reading of the connection between these three unities is not universally accepted. For a dissenting 
view, see for example Longuenesse,  Kant and the Capacity to Judge , 35-59. The details of how exactly 
these unities fit together is not of major importance to Hegel’s treatment of the transcendental unity of 
apperception, but the reading I present here does make for an interesting analogy of the three unities to 
the three stages of the dialectic, which are also interdependent moments of a single activity. 
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met. We must collect our representations, analyze them to form concepts, and combine these 
concepts in judgments. In the process, we not only establish the necessary unity of the subject, 
but also the necessary unity of representations which makes them into representations of 
objects. But each of the three unities of apperception discussed above depends crucially on the 
others, and none could arise without the rest. Thus, far from being distinct unities, each of these 
is a moment of the transcendental unity of apperception itself, i.e., is the transcendental unity of 
apperception as seen from different perspectives, with different emphases.  Kant calls this unity 90
as a whole the “transcendental” unity of apperception because it is on the basis of this unity that 
he is able to explain how we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths.  It is to this issue, 91
the issue of metaphysical skepticism, that we now turn.  
 
4 Kant’s Answer to Metaphysical Skepticism 
Kant’s approach to answering metaphysical skepticism is to show that the mind has a set 
of concepts that are essential to the formation of any and all intuitions. These concepts, which he 
calls the ‘categories’ or ‘the pure concepts of the understanding’ are not derived from experience, 
but instead play a crucial role in organizing sensations and intuitions so as to produce 
experience itself.  While I leave the precise details of Kant’s treatment of each metaphysical 92
concept for another time, in this section I will nonetheless try to present an outline of Kant’s 
general strategy, focusing in particular on the concept of causation. 
Kant’s first step actually comes much earlier than his discussion of the transcendental 
unity of apperception. He begins by isolating a set of twelve logical forms of judgment. They 
90 This is why Kant will at various points in the text refer to different unities as  the  transcendental unity; 
each of them is the transcendental unity but seen from different perspectives. Kant,  Critique of Pure 
Reason , B132-B142. 
91 “I also call its unity the transcendental unity of self-consciousness in order to designate the possibility of 
a priori cognition from it.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B132. 
92 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A79/B104-A81-B107. 
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include such forms as categorical judgments (e.g., all trees are plants), hypothetical judgments 
(e.g., if it is a tree then it is a plant), and disjunctive judgments (e.g., either it is a tree or it is not 
a tree).  Kant develops these forms of judgment out of the logic textbooks of his time, and 93
points out that the metaphysical concepts whose use he is trying to justify seem to have a certain 
affinity with these forms. For example, in a hypothetical judgment, we posit one judgement as 
the ground of another.  Now if we perform this same operation in the context of spatiotemporal 94
objects, by positing one as the ground of a change in another, (e.g., in the judgment ‘if the sun 
shines on it, then the stone will get warm’), we get something that looks a lot like a claim about 
causality. In this way the logical ground/consequent relationship that exists between judgments 
in a hypothetical judgment is mirrored in the more concrete (Kant’s term is ‘real’) 
ground/consequent relation that exists between a physical cause and its effect. This then is 
Kant’s first clue: if he can show that these forms of judgment are somehow necessarily at work in 
how we form our intuitions of the physical world, then he could show that the corresponding 
metaphysical concepts are also necessary elements of our experience. 
To achieve this, of central importance is Kant’s claim that all sensations, and hence all 
intuitions as unities of sensations, are necessarily located in time and/or space. We cannot have 
an intuition of an apple, for example, without locating that apple in space and time.  Of course, 95
this does not mean that we assign to the intuition a particular time on the clock, but only that all 
intuitions are located relative to one another in time (and, for intuition of external objects, in 
space). But from what was said above, we know that intuitions are not given to us complete, but 
must be produced by the unifying activity of the mind, in accordance with the transcendental 
93 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A70/B95. 
94 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A73/B98. 
95 This Kant proves in the Transcendental Aesthetic, where he shows that space and time are the forms of 
intuition. Objects of inner sense, unlike those of outer sense, are only experienced in time and not space. 
See Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A42/B60.  
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unity of apperception. Given that all these intuitions are necessarily spatiotemporally located, 
then if there were a set of rules for their spatiotemporal organization, those rules would have to 
appear as necessary features of all our experience. After all, they would be rules whose 
application would be necessary for the construction of any intuition, and hence for any 
experience at all. The categories are just these rules.  
This is perhaps easiest to see in the case of causation. Given the manifold of sensation, 
we begin uniting them into a coherent whole by organizing them in space and time. In the 
process, we form intuitions. Yet guiding this process must be some rule that says, for example, 
‘put the sensation of solidity and heat before the sensation of liquidity.’ Without rules of this 
sort, intuitions would be ordered willy-nilly, with no rhyme or reason, so that a coherent and 
unified experience of the world would not be produced. Causation, then, is a key way in which 
intuitions come to be organized in space and time. It can be seen functioning at three distinct 
levels. At the first, it operates to organize our sensations for us, without any conscious input on 
our part. At this level Kant calls it not the concept of causation, but the ‘schema’ of causation.  96
Later, upon reflection, we may notice that every time we experience ice and heat, this experience 
is followed by that of water. Conceptualizing this pattern, we could say that heat causes ice to 
melt, and here we are using the concept of causation proper. Finally, at the level of the logician’s 
studies, we can focus on the ground/consequent relation we find here and discover the concept 
96 Kant calls the rule for the organization of intuitions a ‘schema,’ and says that the categories are concepts 
that “express” these rules. The role of a schema is to mediate between the concepts of the understanding 
and the intuitions of sensibility, so that the categories will be realized at the level of intuitions and not 
remain at the level of concepts alone. While an understanding of the role of the schemata is admittedly 
essential to a complete grasp of the  Critique , the most salient point in this context is  that  the categories 
play a necessary role in constituting our experience, not  how  they play this role. The schematism is also a 
famously obscure section of the  Critique  (Kant himself calls it a “hidden art in the depths of the human 
soul”) and thus might needlessly distract the reader. Finally, there is nothing in Hegel analogous to the 
schematism, and in fact one of the major differences between Kant and Hegel is that Hegel’s system has 
no need for anything like Kant’s schematism of the categories. For these reasons, I have omitted any more 
detailed discussion of the schemata from this paper. Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A141/B181- 
A142/B182, A144/B183. 
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of a pure logical form: the hypothetical judgment. Importantly however, at no point in this 
process was was there any intuition of causation - hence the skeptic’s worry. But nonetheless, 
causation was operative in the necessary spatiotemporal ordering of intuitions, and hence is a 
necessary feature of experience. So the applicability of causal concepts to our experience cannot 
be questioned; there would be no experience without them. 
This then is Kant’s answer to the metaphysical skeptic. A similar argument could be 
made for other metaphysical concepts, and Kant presents just such arguments in the course of 
the Analytic of Principles.  For our purposes, especially as we will ultimately be comparing 97
Kant’s strategy here with Hegel’s, three principal features of this strategy are worth noting.  
First, Kant bases his strategy on a particular set of logical forms of judgment. These 
forms are developed out of the logical tradition of his time.  Of course, Kant is to some degree 98
critical of that tradition - he writes against those who would take an empirical, psychological 
approach to logic, for example.  At the same time, however, he takes his claims that all and only 99
these are the legitimate forms of judgment to be based on a reflective examination of his own 
thinking. For him, the forms of our thought are transparently available to us.  Later critics 100
would speak out against this move, arguing that the critical project of the  Critique  should have 
gone further and aimed to derive these logical forms themselves.  Now, it is an open question 101
to what degree these forms of judgment are important to Kant’s argument; they can be 
construed as mere helpful clues, or as essential elements of the overall Critical system.  102
97 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A131/B169-A234/B294. 
98 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A70/B95-A83/B109. 
99 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A53/B77. Other points at which Kant deviates from the tradition include 
his claim that the various forms of judgement cannot be reduced to the categorical, and the addition of 
certain forms to his table of judgements (the individual judgement, for example, which he distinguishes 
from the singular). 
100 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , Axiv. 
101 See for example Hegel,  Science of Logic , 25.35-25.36. 
102 This debate has gone on to the present day. For an interesting discussion of it see Longuenesse,  Kant 
and the Capacity to Judge , 78-80.  
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Nonetheless, the forms he chose and his way of justifying his choice would become a target for 
later German idealists. 
Second, Kant’s strategy depends crucially on the assumption that intuitions are distinct 
from concepts. Indeed, were it not for this assumption, it would not be possible to raise the 
question of whether a concept like causality could apply to intuitions. Kant’s distinction between 
schema, pure concepts, and logical forms, all depend on this distinction, since these are 
distinguished by their relationships to intuition.  And Kant’s discussion of spatiotemporal 103
order and the role of causation in that ordering and in the transcendental unity of apperception 
can be understood as an attempt to bridge that gap between intuition and concept. Were there 
no such gap to bridge, the transcendental unity of apperception would be radically different.  
This leads us to the third and last feature of Kant’s solution: its applicability to intuitions 
alone. Because Kant describes causation as a rule for uniting intuitions in the transcendental 
unity of apperception, the concept of causation cannot be defensibly applied to objects we have 
no intuition of.  Causation is a condition for the experience of an object, but there could be 104
objects of which we can have no experience, such as God or the noumenal subject. With regard 
to these objects, the concept of causation cannot be ensured of valid application; because there is 
no experience of them, there are no intuitions for the schema of causation to work on. Objects 
such as God or the noumenal self, then, have the potential to be totally free of all causal laws. 
To understand this last point more fully, and to grasp Kant’s responses to the problems 
of freedom and Pyrrhonian skepticism, we must take a closer look at another crucial distinction 
Kant makes: the distinction between the understanding and reason. 
 
103 Schema organize sensations to form intuitions, concepts are abstracted from intuitions, and logical 
forms contain no element of intuition whatsoever. 
104 “The categories consequently have no other use for cognition of things except insofar as these are taken 
as objects of possible experience.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B147-148. 
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5 Understanding and Reason  105
In introducing the faculty of reason in the opening pages of the Transcendental Dialectic, 
Kant writes that “all our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, 
and ends with reason, beyond which there is nothing higher to be found in us to work on the 
matter of intuition and bring it under the highest unity of thinking.”  The understanding is the 106
faculty responsible for performing the unifying actions that bring our representations into 
accord with the condition of the transcendental unity of apperception. Thus far then, we have 
discussed how the understanding works on what is given to us through the senses to produce 
experience of objects; it remains then to consider what the faculty of reason is for Kant, and how 
it can add to what the understanding has created.  
Kant construes the human attempt to know the world as a striving for greater and 
greater unity among our experiences. To study the world is to build a theoretical structure that 
can encompass all of experience, finding a place for each and illuminating the overall rational 
organization of the whole. In fact, this unifying activity is a necessary condition for experience 
itself. As we saw in the transcendental unity of apperception, it is only because the 
understanding brings a rational order to our sensations, ordering them to produce a world of 
105 In his discussion of reason and its operations in the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant largely leaves 
behind the concept of the transcendental unity of apperception, and mentions it only briefly in this part of 
the book. It may seem odd, then, to claim as I will that the transcendental unity of apperception has any 
role to play in Kant’s discussion of reason and hence in his responses to the problems of freedom and 
Pyrrhonian skepticism. That said, I believe that transcendental unity of apperception makes possible 
Kant’s responses to these problems precisely by its absence. In what follows, I hope to show that Kant’s 
approach to these issues depends crucially on his restricting the transcendental unity of apperception to a 
condition on the possibility of our experience of objects, as opposed to a condition on objects in general. 
This restriction allows Kant to distinguish between the unity of the understanding, which is necessary for 
experience, and the unity of reason, which is merely desirable. The same restriction also allows Kant to 
claim that while the categories employed by the understanding in constituting experience have legitimate 
application to objects of experience (because they are necessary for the possibility of experience itself), 
they have no such legitimacy when applied to objects outside of experience (because the transcendental 
unity of apperception is not applied to that sphere). So while the transcendental unity of apperception is 
not an explicit part of Kant’s argumentation in the Dialectic, it’s absence is precisely what makes the 
Transcendental Dialectic possible. 
106 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A298/B355. 
40 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 41/182
stable objects behaving in lawlike ways, that we can have experience of objects at all. But while 
the transcendental unity of apperception is a condition for the possibility of experience, so that 
all experience of objects is in accord with it, Kant also acknowledges a desire for unity that goes 
beyond simply ordering our sensations. The human mind seeks not only unity among 
sensations, but unity among its judgments as well. Recall that the result of the understanding' 
operations is a judgment that brings one concept under another, and thereby establishes a 
relationship between the objects that fall within the extensions of those concepts. But thought 
does not stop there. Where the understanding is the faculty of judgements, reason is the faculty 
of inference; it takes the judgments of the understanding and unites them in an inference.   107
For example, the understanding might provide us with the judgments “all humans are 
mortal” and “all scholars are human.” In such a case, it is the faculty of reason that infers the 
conclusion that “all scholars are mortal.”  In this way, reason organizes and enhances the 108
judgments of the understanding, bringing them into relation with one another to form a more 
unified and coherent system (hence Kant’s comment that reason brings intuition “under the 
highest unity of thinking” in the quote above).  One could say that just as the understanding 109
unifies sensations to form intuitions and unifies intuitions and concepts to form judgments, 
reason unifies these judgments to create a complete theory of the world. Reason performs this 
unifying function by subordinating some judgments under others through inference. In doing 
so, it brings otherwise disconnected judgments into the overall system.   110
107 “Reason … is the faculty of inferring.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A330/B386. See also Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason , A298/B355-A303/B359. 
108 This example taken roughly from Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A303/B360-A304/B360. 
109  Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A298/B355. 
110 “Reason, in inferring, seeks to bring the greatest manifold of cognition of the understanding to the 
smallest number of principles (universal conditions), and thereby to effect the highest unity of that 
manifold.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A305/B361. 
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From this characterization of reason, two important features of its use follow. First, the 
activities of reason are not necessary conditions for for the possibility of experience.  The 111
necessary unity of representations generated by the understanding is a necessary component of 
all experience, since without it there would be no object of experience at all. Reason, however, 
already begins from experience of objects. The unity it provides is thus not a necessary feature of 
experience, but rather a goal or ideal, set up as a standard to be met. We strive for a perfectly 
coherent and complete body of knowledge, we aim to organize all our judgements systematically 
via inference, but we can experience objects without having any such completed system of 
knowledge. This means that for Kant, while the unifying activity of the mind is operative in both 
understanding and reason, that unity is only a condition for the possibility of experience in the 
former, and in the latter is only a goal to be met. The necessary unity of the subject and object of 
experience is sufficiently secured by judgement alone, so that the unity provided by reason’s 
inference is a felt desire, not a condition of experience itself. 
Second, because it operates with judgements, reason is importantly detached from 
sensation. By combining the judgements that experience provides to us, or by applying the 
categories outside of experience, reason can make inferences about entities that have not or even 
cannot be experienced. After all, one can form judgements and inferences using concepts that 
have no basis in experience: concepts like the concept of God or the free and immortal soul, for 
example. In this way, reason is able to go beyond experience to form concepts of things that lie 
wholly outside of experience. Kant calls these concepts ‘ideas of reason,’ and they are a key 
element in his answers to the problems of freedom and Pyrrhonian skepticism. 
 
111 While this is the standard interpretation, and the one that makes the most sense of Kant’s conclusions, 
Kant’s text sometimes seems to imply otherwise. In reading Kant as I have here, I distance him from 
Hegel, since for Hegel reason’s needs are not merely regulative. This helps sharpen the contrast, but it is 
worth noting that Hegel can, on this point, be seen as drawing out something already hinted at by Kant. 
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5.1 The Ideas of Reason 
The ideas of reason are the result of reason’s inferential activity, so to see how they are 
produced we must look more closely at that inferential activity itself. Kant thinks of reason’s 
inferences as syllogisms, and sees them as operating according to the three canonical syllogistic 
forms: categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms.  To see how the transcendental 112
ideas of reason are formed, we need to understand how reason uses these syllogistic forms to 
develop a systematic and coherent theory of the world. The key to that puzzle can be found in 
the phrase ‘reason always seeks the unconditioned.’  Let’s see how this works. 113
For our purposes, the most important of the three kinds of syllogisms will be the 
hypothetical syllogism. In this syllogism, we start with a premises of the form ‘if A then B’ and 
another of the form ‘A’ and on the basis of these we conclude ‘B.’ Kant thinks of these premises 
as providing conditions. In other words, the premise ‘if A then B’ makes A a condition of B. The 
syllogism as a whole, then, states a condition, then asserts that the condition is fulfilled, so that 
we can conclude that the conditioned claim (B) is true.   
But reason cannot rest content with this simple conclusion - it strives to create a total 
and systematic theory, and this inference merely draws a connection between three judgments. 
So naturally its next move is to ask: what are the conditions for A? This is what is meant by the 
phrase ‘reason always seeks the unconditioned’: reason always seeks to discover the conditions 
for that part of the syllogism whose conditions are not a part of the syllogism. For a more 
concrete example, think of the activity of a natural scientist. Upon understanding a certain part 
of a causal chain, they will naturally turn to investigate the beginning of that chain, trying to 
understand how it all got started. Of course, when an answer to this question is found, e.g. if we 
112 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A323/B379. 
113 “The proper principle of reason in general (in its logical use) is to find the unconditioned for 
conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with which its unity will be completed.” Kant,  Critique of 
Pure Reason , A307/B364. 
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discover that Z is the condition of A, the next question will ask for the conditions of this new 
condition, i.e., what are the conditions for Z? In this way, reason constantly strives to grasp the 
conditions for what it sees as conditioned. In doing so, however, it naturally falls into a regress 
of conditions.  
If we turn to reflect on this process, we find ourselves faced with a dilemma. Either we 
accept that there are an infinite series of conditions, or we claim that there is some point at 
which the series must end.  If we take the second horn of this dilemma, we end up positing 114
some unconditioned entity or force that can begin the chain from nothing. This, for Kant, is how 
our reason leads us naturally to the ideas of a free agent and of God as a necessary being, among 
others. Kant calls these ideas the ‘Transcendental Ideas of Reason.’  God is posited as the 115
necessarily existing entity whose necessity grounds the chain of contingent existences.  A free 116
act is posited as the unconditioned beginning of a causal chain.  However, in both cases, it 117
remains possible to imagine that the chain of contingent existences or causes could simply 
continue on into infinity, with no God or free act to terminate the chain.  
It would be easy to resolve this dilemma if our experience of the world could somehow 
mediate the dispute. If we had an experience of God or of a free agent, then all would be well and 
we could decide the issue once and for all. Unfortunately, however, such an experience is 
impossible. To see why, recall that, through the transcendental unity of apperception, the 
category of causation plays a constitutive role in all of our experiences - if a thing is experienced, 
114 The presence of a dilemma or, as Kant calls it, an antinomy, is unique to the ideas of reason as 
produced by the hypothetical syllogism. Since the antinomies are the most directly relevant parts of Kant’s 
project here, I restrict my attention to them, but I feel I should note that the other forms of syllogism do 
not yield antinomies. They do, however, yield dialectical and illusory inferences.  
115 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A334/B392-A336/B394. 
116 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A452/B480. In this context, when it posits existing entities, we have 
what Kant calls the ‘real’ use of reason, as opposed to its logical use in drawing inferences. See Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason , A299/B355. 
117 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A444/B472. 
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it is experienced as part of a causal chain. Thus God and free agents, since they lie outside the 
influence of cause and effect, must lie forever beyond our ability to experience.  
The dilemma faced by reason is thus insoluble. Kant calls this situation an ‘antinomy’, 
and presents us with a set of four antinomies in the course of the Transcendental Dialectic.  In 118
each, we are presented with a pair of persuasive but mutually exclusive arguments. On the one 
hand, reason has solid grounds for positing some ending point for an infinite series of 
conditions. For example, a series of causes needs something uncaused to begin the series. Yet on 
the other hand, reason seeks to extend the series of conditions backwards into infinity. In the 
case of freedom, we find that reason operates at all times under the assumption that the natural 
world is subject to causal laws, and that the understanding organizes all experience in accord 
with these same causal laws. Thus, the positing of a free agent violates that basic assumption of 
reason and runs contrary to all experience.  Yet at the same time, some uncaused cause is 119
needed to begin the chain of causation. The question cannot be decided by argumentation, since 
there are equally powerful arguments on both sides. It thus presents us with a pair of 
contradictory beliefs, both of which are plausible, but which cannot both be true at the same 
time and in the same way. 
 
5.2 Kant’s Solution to the Problem of Freedom 
At this point we find ourselves with a set of problems. On the one hand, reason seems 
pushed to posit a free agent as the unconditioned condition for a causal chain. On the other 
hand, such a posit violates reason’s basic assumption that the natural world is causally ordered. 
This antinomy teaches us at least two things. First, it shows that a belief in free agency is a 
natural one, springing from the ordinary operations of reason as it seeks to form a coherent 
118 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A405/B432-A566/B594. 
119 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A451/B479. 
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system of the beliefs about the world.  Second, it shows that the idea of a free agent is not in 120
itself contradictory or self-defeating.  It may contradict our thoughts and experiences of the 121
world, but it is at least internally consistent. 
Faced with this antinomy, we may naturally seek to resolve the issue by trying to see if 
we can find any free agents in the world. The problem with this strategy, as noted above, is that 
all our experience is conditioned by the categories of the understanding. Among these is the 
category of causality, which entails that all our experiences of the world will be organized into 
causal chains; causality is an essential feature of the understanding’s unifying activity, and hence 
a condition for the possibility of any experience of objects. As a result, we can never experience 
anything as free, since to be experienced is to be a part of a causal chain. 
This might seem to be the end of the debate - if nothing can be experienced as free, what 
sense can there be in talking of free agents? To stop here, however, is to overlook a crucial 
distinction. Unlike the understanding, reason is not restricted to dealing with what is given to us 
through sensibility. It is therefore possible for it to posit the existence of things outside of 
sensibility, whose existence cannot be verified by the senses, but can be known on the basis of 
inference. In other words, because the transcendental unity of apperception is only the condition 
for the  experience  of objects, it is only a condition for objects  as they are experienced , i.e. as 
they appear to us. But it does not condition these objects as they are outside of experience. So 
although the understanding might present our actions and the actions of others as if they were 
causally conditioned, reason is able to go beyond this and claim that these same actions might 
yet be free actions as they are in themselves, independent of the understanding’s organizational 
120 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A305/B361, A307/B364, A331/B388-A333/B390. 
121 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , Bxxviii. 
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activity. It is thus possible both that all our experience is of the world as causally organized,  and 
that we are, independent of that experience, nonetheless wholly free agents.  122
This, then, is Kant’s way out of his own antinomy. Because the transcendental unity of 
apperception is only a condition for the possibility of experience, and not of thought or things in 
general, the categories it uses only condition things  as they appear to us . Accordingly, there is 
room for reason to go beyond this appearance and in its inferential activity posit entities that lie 
outside of experience. In later works, Kant presents other, practically motivated grounds for 
believing that we are in fact free, but already here in the first  Critique  we find him laying the 
groundwork for that later position by arguing that both freedom and complete causal 
determinacy can be consistent with one another.   123
For our purposes, a point worth noting here is the crucial restriction of the 
transcendental unity of apperception to the representations, especially representations given to 
us through the senses. It is a result of this restriction that the unity it requires is a condition only 
of objects as they appear, and not of objects as they are in themselves. There is thus room for 
reason to go beyond this restriction, and, via inference, posit the existence of objects outside of 
experience whose features are directly contrary to the features of objects as we experience them. 
Without this restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception, Kant’s solution to the 
problem of freedom would never have gotten off the ground, since causality would have been not 
merely a condition for the possibility of experience of objects, but a condition for the possibility 
of objects in themselves.  
 
122 “Thus freedom and [causally conditioned] nature, each in its full significance, would both be found in 
the same actions, simultaneously and without any contradiction, according to whether one compares 
them with their intelligible [noumenal] or their sensible cause.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , 
A532/B560-A541/B569. 
123 The practical grounds for our belief in ourselves as free agents Kant presents in the second Critique, the 
Critique of Practical Reason , and in the Canon of Pure Reason. See Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , 
A795/B823-A831/B859. 
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5.3 The Ideas of Reason and Pyrrhonian Skepticism 
At this point, I hope to have shown how Kant achieves at least two of the three major 
goals I outlined at the start of this chapter. He addresses metaphysical skepticism by showing 
how the categories work to condition all experience, and he addresses doubts about freedom by 
showing how, despite the fact that everything is experienced as causally determined, human 
beings could yet be free in themselves. I turn now to the last of Kant’s bugbears: the issue of 
Pyrrhonian skepticism. 
Recall that a Pyrrhonian skeptic is one who, for any claim presented to him, argues for 
the opposite. The goal of this procedure is to show that for any assertion, there is equal weight 
both for and against it, so that ultimately we simply have to suspend judgment. Kant, in the 
antinomies, seems to be doing the skeptic’s work for him by presenting precisely such a pair of 
opposite and equal arguments. Yet a closer look at the matter reveals that here Kant is, in a 
sense, losing the battle in order to win the war. He concedes to the Pyrrhonian skeptic that this 
kind of mutually balancing argument does exist. But at the same time, he presents a theory for 
why these pairs of arguments arise. On the basis of this theory, he thinks he can show that they 
will  not  arise elsewhere. 
In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant shows that there are certain cases where human 
reason tends to push beyond experience in its pursuit of a total theory. Most importantly, it ends 
up positing free agents, immortal souls, and an all-encompassing creator God.  These subjects 124
represent the most hotly debated metaphysical issues of Kant’s time, and are the topics over 
which so much ink has been meaninglessly spilled over the centuries. Yet we can have no direct 
experience in these areas because these entities are excluded from experience by the way the 
understanding organizes intuitions. For example, all intuitions are causally organized in the 
124 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A333/B390-A338/B396.  
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transcendental unity of apperception, so that we can never experience a free agent as free. 
Nonetheless, reason’s pursuit of the unconditioned leads to our going beyond these conditions of 
experience and positing the existence of free agents.  
Now, as we saw above, the mere fact that we cannot experience agents as free does not 
necessarily mean that there are no such free agents. After all, the casual conditioning of 
experience required by the transcendental unity of apperception only extends to things as they 
are experienced, and what they are outside of experience we have no access to. Similar points 
could be made in the case of God and the soul - it is impossible to experience these, but that does 
not rule out their existence outside of experience.  In the cases of these extra- experiential 125
entities, then, we find that the understanding is powerless to prove either their existence or 
non-existence. Their extra-experiential status puts them squarely beyond the possibility of proof 
via the normal techniques of natural sciences. If there is to be an answer to the question of 
whether God exists, that answer must come from reason alone.  
Yet the inferential unity of reason, unlike the transcendental unity of apperception, is not 
a necessary condition on experience. As a result it can never do more than provide guidelines for 
how to organize our judgments. These guidelines cannot reach the level of facts, but at best show 
us how the world would be organized if it were wholly rational. So reason, too, cannot establish 
the existence of free agents or God with any certainty (at least not in it’s purely theoretical 
capacity). It must treat them at best as useful theoretical posits, at worst as mere possibilities. 
And in the case of the antinomies, we find that reason itself produces mutually opposed pairs of 
equally convincing arguments.  
125 God and the immortal soul are treated, respectively, in the Transcendental Ideal and the Paralogism 
sections of the Transcendental Dialectic. Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A341/B344-A404/B432, 
A567/B645-A642/B670. 
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This then, is Kant’s diagnosis of why Pyrrhonian skepticism might seem like an attractive 
position. In the context of these important metaphysical debates, the human faculties of 
sensibility, reason, and understanding are simply powerless to decide the issue, because these 
entities, if they exist, must lie outside the realm of possible experience. As a result, we go back 
and forth, from argument to argument, without ever being able to decide the matter. Pyrrhonian 
skepticism is, it turns out, the proper attitude towards these debates.  126
At the same time, however, by providing us with a diagnosis of why these debates arise, 
Kant also gives us reason to believe that they will not arise elsewhere. These issues arise in the 
cases of God, freedom, and the immortal soul because these entities are the transcendental ideas 
of reason, and as such lie entirely outside the scope of possible experience. It is this fact that 
makes debate about them so fruitless. Moreover, Kant takes himself to have shown that debate 
will occur only in the case of these ideas. This is because the transcendental ideas arise from the 
three basic forms of inference. Having named the ideas derived from each form, we can be 
assured that there will be no others, and that other disciplines will be safe from the problems 
that beset reason in those contexts. 
Accordingly, if we turn to other disciplines, disciplines that study objects that are in fact 
possible objects of experience, we can expect that no such skepticism should arise. If a 
Pyrrhonian skeptic were to try and produce equally convincing reasons both for and against the 
claim that there are fish in the world, for example, we could easily answer such an attempt by an 
appeal to our sensory experiences. We see fish directly, so there can be little doubt that there are 
such things, no matter what arguments the Pyrrhonian draws up. 
126 This is true at least from the perspective of theoretical reason. In later books, Kant will aim to show that 
there are practical grounds on which we can justifiably believe in the existence of God, freedom, and 
immortality.  
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Kant’s strategy in effect circumscribes the field of objects as they are outside of possible 
experience and cedes it to the Pyrrhonian skeptic. Within this field, theoretical arguments will 
be interminable as to the existence of God or free agents. Yet by setting this field of debate aside, 
Kant preserves the rest of our knowledge against the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s arguments. In cases 
where we deal with objects of possible experience, no such skepticism should be able to arise. 
Here, too, the key point is the restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception to a 
condition on the possibility of experience, as opposed to a condition on the possibility of objects 
in themselves. This restriction makes it possible for reason to go beyond the conditions put in 
place by the transcendental unity of apperception and make unverifiable claims about what lies 
outside the possibility of experience. In the case of reason, then, but not in the case of the 
understanding, there is no necessary connection between our judgements and experience itself, 
so that the mind can find itself trapped in debates with no way of resolving them. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Before drawing this chapter to a close and moving on to examine Hegel’s responses to 
Kant on these points, it may be useful to briefly summarize the most salient points of Kant’s 
system as it has been presented here. To begin with, we have his central goals of addressing 
metaphysical and Pyrrhonian skepticism, as well as leaving room for our beliefs in freedom, 
God, and the immortal soul. Kant’s approach to these problems in each case relies crucially on 
the transcendental unity of apperception - a set of conditions for all possible experience, out of 
which emerges both a necessarily unified subject and a necessarily unified (phenomenal) object 
of experience. As a condition for the possibility of experience, the transcendental unity of 
apperception, because it requires the use of categories such as causality, necessarily applies 
causal concepts to all objects of experience, thus vindicating our use of these concepts against 
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the metaphysical skeptic. By restricting the understanding to the objects of experience, Kant 
leaves room for reason to infer beyond what is experienced so that it can safely posit God and a 
free agent outside of experience. And by showing how the antinomies arise only in reference to 
the extra-experiential entities posited by reason, and not to experience as it is organized to meet 
the demands of the transcendental unity of apperception, Kant is able to limit the scope of 
Pyrrhonian skepticism to a relatively small area that he is happy to cede. 
But this crucial restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception and its results is 
precisely the point in Kant’s philosophy that Hegel takes issue with. Drawing on the picture of 
experience he takes over from his skeptical interlocutors and focused on the epistemic issues it 
raises, Kant is committed to the idea that the transcendental unity of apperception is a condition 
on our representations alone. It makes necessary the operations that take the raw materials of 
sensations and work it into the experience of a unified and lawlike world of objects, but the 
transcendental unity of apperception never transcends the representational character of its 
origins. But this restriction of the unity of apperception to representations is the root of Hegel’s 
attack on Kant, creating a number of different, subsidiary, points of disagreement between the 
two philosophers. These potentially problematic consequences of Kant’s restriction of the 
transcendental unity of apperception are the topic of the next chapter.  
At this point, then, I hope to have provided an outline of the most important points of 
Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and a more detailed account specifically of the role of the 
transcendental unity of apperception in it. In the next chapter, I explore Hegel’s view of the 
problematic consequences springing from Kant’s restriction of the transcendental unity of 
apperception to experience.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Hegel’s Criticism of Kant 
 
After the publication of the  Critique of Pure Reason , it was not long before Kant’s 
philosophy gained admirers. But while these post-Kantian philosophers often expressed a deep 
debt to Kant’s basic insights, they also aimed to improve on a number of shortcomings they 
detected in Kant’s work. Reinhold, for example, found Kant’s philosophy insufficiently 
systematic because it relied on too many fundamental definitions.  Fichte emphasized the need 127
for a single foundation as well, and sought to find it in self-consciousness.  Schelling, for his 128
part, considered Kant’s system to be excessively focused on the subject, and aimed to focus on 
the object instead.  Hegel marks the last in this series of prominent German Idealists. His 129
criticism of Kant is informed by those of his predecessors, and in many ways incorporates them.  
In this chapter, I present a reading of Hegel’s criticism of Kant that focuses on the 
Kantian restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception to representations. In other 
words, I emphasize Hegel’s disagreement with Kant’s claim that the transcendental unity of 
apperception is to be a condition on representations alone as opposed to a condition on things in 
general. Hegel makes this criticism explicitly at a number of points.  Still, it cannot be denied 130
that Hegel also raises a number of other concerns against Kant, and some of these are more 
often repeated and forcefully emphasized than the issue of the transcendental unity of 
apperception. Nonetheless, I do think there are strong reasons to believe that many of these 
other objections are in fact rooted in issues surrounding the transcendental unity of 
127 Reinhold, “The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,” 67. 
128 Fichte, “Science of Knowledge: First Introduction,” 47-48. 
129 Schelling, “Introduction to the Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature,” 376. 
130 See, for example, Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 42, addition 2. 
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apperception, and I present those reasons in this chapter. That said, I will not be arguing that 
Hegel himself saw any particular issue as central - it seems to me that in Hegel’s own mind his 
various objections were not given any particularly stable order of priority.  My aim is somewhat 131
more modest. Given the overall goal of this dissertation - to present a reading of the transition 
from Kant to Hegel that focuses on the modification of the transcendental unity of apperception 
- this chapter is intended at once to motivate that project and move it forward. I do this by 
examining Kant’s representational conception of the transcendental unity of apperception and 
showing how, once we focus our attention on it, we can see that it is at the root of a surprising 
number of different objections Hegel brings against his predecessor.   132
To that end, I break this chapter into four major stages. First, I briefly examine the 
history of German Idealism leading up to Hegel. Although hidden behind some shifts in 
terminology, the transcendental unity of apperception was arguably the central topic of concern 
for German idealists prior to Hegel, and this fact makes it plausible that it would play a major 
role in Hegel’s thinking about Kant as well. Having established the central role of this concept, I 
next move on to specify more precisely what objecting to the restriction of the transcendental 
unity of apperception means and to demonstrate that Hegel does in fact make this objection and 
gives it a prominent place both in his early writings and his later texts. Third, I turn to a number 
of the other objections Hegel brings against Kant and show how they can be read as 
consequences of the restriction on the transcendental unity of apperception. Finally, I compare 
this reading against other positions in the literature in a similar way, defending it against 
possible objections and demonstrating that other popular readings of Hegel’s position on Kant 
131 Indeed, given the overall holism of Hegel’s philosophy, there may be systematic reasons for him  not  to 
name a single issue as primary. 
132 It is worth noting that this thesis is independent of the additional question about whether or not 
Hegel’s objections to Kant on this count are actually warranted. 
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are also consequences of Kant’s failure to give the transcendental unity of apperception its 
proper scope. 
 
1 The Transcendental Unity of Apperception in the German Idealist Tradition  
Shortly after Kant’s first  Critique  was published, philosophers in Germany recognized its 
groundbreaking nature. Yet few were content to simply accept and preach the Kantian gospel. 
Instead, most attempted to make revisions to Kant’s project. In this section, I give a brief (and 
therefore unfortunately incomplete) history of some of these revisions in an attempt to show 
how the transcendental unity of apperception was taken up as a major Kantian breakthrough 
and reworked by Kant’s successors.  Doing so, while it may not shed light on the particular 133
nature of Hegel’s views on the transcendental unity of apperception, should nonetheless 
demonstrate that the transcendental unity of apperception was considered to be of the highest 
importance by Hegel’s contemporaries and major influences. It thus motivates a study of that 
concept as it appears in Hegel’s thought, and gives us reason to believe that issues surrounding 
it could be important to understanding his relation to Kant. 
133 In this section, I focus on three philosophers in particular: Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. Fichte and 
Schelling, in particular, were direct influences of Hegel’s. Fichte was his colleague at Jena and the subject 
of much of his early writing. Schelling shared those features with Fichte and was, in addition, a longtime 
friend of Hegel’s until a philosophical disagreement ended their friendship in 1806. Reinhold I include 
because, thanks to his general influence in popularizing Kant’s philosophy, he was responsible for setting 
the tone for how Kant would be read by the German idealists that followed. Moreover, he is mentioned 
explicitly by Fichte in the “Review of Aenesidemus” and is also mentioned by Hegel, though not taken up 
as seriously as Fichte and Schelling. Overall, these three, and especially the second two, can all claim to be 
important influences on Hegel’s philosophy. That their work focuses on modifications to the 
transcendental unity of apperception, then, gives us reason to believe that studying Hegel’s philosophy 
through that lens would also be fruitful. 
For examples of Hegel’s relation to Fichte and Schelling see  Faith and Knowledge,  where he discusses 
Fichte in relation to Kant, and  The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy , 
where he puts his two predecessors in dialogue. There is also the preface to the  Phenomenology of Spirit , 
in reaction to which Schelling famously terminated his friendship with Hegel. 
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One of Kant’s earliest readers and the one who is perhaps most responsible for 
popularizing the Critical philosophy was K. L. Reinhold.  But Reinhold he was also one of 134
Kant’s first critics. In what would become a theme among Kant’s critics, Reinhold believed that 
Kant did not take his own critical project far enough.  While Kant did an excellent job of 135
explaining how synthetic a priori judgements were possible, his explanation itself rested on a 
number of assumptions about how the mind operated, in particular Kant’s division of faculties 
(sensibility, understanding, and reason) and the corresponding division of representations 
(intuitions, concepts, ideas).  In other words, Kant did not adequately describe the general 136
nature of representationality itself, and explain why it should be divided into these three 
categories.  Reinhold aimed to correct these oversights and saw himself as developing a science 137
not, as Kant did, of how different representations relate to one another, but of representations in 
general. This is “the science of the a priori form of representing through sensibility, 
understanding, and reason; on this form depends the form of knowledge, as well as that of 
desire. In a word, it would be the science of the  entire faculty of representation as such. ”  138
To this end, Reinhold proposed a single first principle that would serve to define what a 
representation is and set the stage for further analysis. This admittedly somewhat esoterically- 
formulated principle is as follows: “In consciousness, representation is distinguished through 
134 Reinhold’s series of letters, which reviewed and presented Kant’s ideas for a general public and were 
first published in 1786, were of great importance in spreading Kant’s ideas. Prior to these letters, the 
Critique of Pure Reason  had received only some lukewarm attention and little real engagement in the 
philosophical community. 
135 “Philosophical reason must press forward yet another step in its analysis past the point attained in the 
Critique of Reason.” Reinhold, “The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,” 68. 
136 Reinhold, “The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,” 67. 
137 Kant does have some theory of what a representation is but for Reinhold that theory is insufficiently 
determinate and inadequate as a basis for a systematic philosophy. Some modern scholars have agreed 
with Reinhold on this point. A. C. Dickerson, for example, writes that “despite the crucial role it plays in 
his arguments, Kant pays little attention directly to the abstract notion of representation in general.” 
Dickerson,  Kant on Representation and Objectivity,  4. 
138 Reinhold, “The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,” 67. 
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the subject from both subject and object and is referred to both.”  Although perhaps obscure in 139
its language, a closer examination of this principle shows that, in effect, it simply generalizes the 
transcendental unity of apperception by making it a definitional feature of all representation, as 
opposed to a condition of experience. To make this connection clearer, let’s break down the 
principle into its component parts.  
First, Reinhold qualifies his discussion by using the phrase ‘in consciousness.’ This tells 
us that he has in mind mental representations only, not other representational objects like 
drawings or written words. Next, Reinhold claims that the representation is distinguished from 
the subject and the object. In other words, the representation is taken, in consciousness, to 
neither be the conscious subject nor the object represented. Yet at the same time, a 
representation is also “referred” to the subject and the object. What Reinhold has in mind here is 
the fact that the representation is taken to  belong  to the subject - it is ‘my’ representation and in 
that sense is referred to me. And it is also a representation  of  the object, and in that sense is 
referred to the object. A representation, then, occupies this middle ground of being neither 
identical too, nor wholly separate from, the subject and the object.  
All this would amount to a rather trivial and everyday description of what a mental 
representation is, except for the fact that Reinhold describes all of this as happening “through 
the subject.”  In including this clause, Reinhold makes clear that he sees the distinguishing and 140
referring not simply as given, but as resulting from the activity of the subject. Kant, however, has 
a similar idea of the subject’s role in distinguishing representations from itself while 
simultaneously referring them to an object and a subject. In fact, this is exactly the kind of 
activity demanded by the transcendental unity of apperception. In the act of judgement, the 
subject’s representations are referred to an object by being taken as a necessary unity. And the 
139 Reinhold, “The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,” 70. 
140 Reinhold, “The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,” 70.  
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entirety of this unifying activity is designed to fulfill the transcendental unity of apperception’s 
condition that representations must be  mine , must be referred to the (necessarily unified) 
subject that is having them. In this way, the principle that Reinhold extracts to play the 
foundational role in his philosophy is close kin to the transcendental unity of apperception, and 
plays a similar role. Reinhold’s innovation is to take it as a definitional feature of representations 
in general, where Kant saw it as a condition on cognition only. In this way, we can see that even 
starting as early as Reinhold, there is a trend toward widening and expanding the scope of the 
transcendental unity of apperception beyond the parameters Kant kept it to.  141
This trend continues with the philosophy of Fichte. Fichte is not content with Reinhold’s 
presentation of what is intended to function as a fundamental principle of representation. As the 
foundational element of Reinhold’s philosophy, this principle is meant to be beyond doubt and 
not dependent upon anything else for its content; the terms within it are to be defined through 
the principle itself.  That is, the terms in the principle are to be thought of as have no meaning 142
outside their relation to the other terms also contained therein. Yet this would be unworkable, as 
Reinhold’s critics were quick to point out. In fact, the principle relies on any number of 
additional concepts, such as those of ‘subject,’ ‘object,’ ‘referring,’ and ‘differentiation.’ Fichte 
himself makes this point in his “Review of Aenesidemus,” where he writes that “the concept of 
distinguishing and referring only allows of being determined by means of the concepts of 
identity and opposition.”  In other words, Reinhold’s principle is not fully self-contained and 143
141 It is not clear that Reinhold himself made this connection to the transcendental unity of apperception; 
nonetheless I hope to have illustrated how the connection could be drawn.  
142 The principle is “determined through itself” and “excludes any characteristic not contained in the 
principle.” Reinhold, “The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,” 72.  
143 Fichte, “Review of Aenesidemus,” 139.  Aenesidemus  was a book written in response to Reinhold in 
which the author attacked Reinhold’s philosophy and the Kantian system in general. Fichte’s review of the 
book finds him defending Kant’s essential conclusions, while granting various objections to details of 
Reinhold’s system. 
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independent; his attempt to start his philosophy with a self-determining principle ends in 
failure. 
Instead of a principle that could be captured in words, where it would always be forced to 
rely on some other terms for its content, Fichte proposes a basic and fundamental  action : 
self-consciousness. He begins his famous  Science of Knowledge  (or  Wissenschaftslehre ) by 
asking the reader to “attend to yourself: turn your attention away from everything that 
surrounds you and towards your inner life; this is the first demand that philosophy makes of its 
disciple.”  For Fichte, self-consciousness was the fundamental act out of which one can 144
reconstruct the structure of empirical life. In self-consciousness, I am at once the subject of 
consciousness and the object of that consciousness; the mere thought of the self guarantees the 
existence of the self. The representation of the self is thus radically different from all other 
representations, since when one represents any other object, it always remains possible that the 
object of which one is thinking does not actually exist. The representation of the self, then has 
this built-in certainty, in that any thought of the self can be sure to have an object.  145
But self-consciousness would be nothing, Fichte believes, if it did not also include a 
relation between the self and something external to it, something which was non-self. Thus it is 
a condition for the existence of the ‘I’ (as Fichte often calls the self in these contexts) that it be 
related to a ‘non-I.’ The non-I is Fichte’s way of describing the external, empirically understood 
and objectively determined world. Yet this non-I remains  within  consciousness, as part of the 
way in which we necessarily conceive of the self.  We are conscious of ourselves as necessarily 146
conditioned by a world of forces outside ourselves. Thus the I and the non-I mutually condition 
144 Fichte, “Science of Knowledge: First Introduction,” 44.  
145 “The proposition ‘I am I’ is unconditionally and absolutely valid, since … it is valid not merely in form 
but also in content. In it the I is posited, not conditionally, but absolutely, with the predicate of 
equivalence to itself; hence it really  is  posited, and the proposition can also be expressed as  I am .” Fichte, 
Science of Knowledge , 96. 
146 “Opposition is possible only on the assumption of a unity of consciousness between the self that posits 
and the self that opposes.” Fichte,  Science of Knowledge , 104. 
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one another within consciousness. To bring this to a more everyday level, one might say that we 
are always aware of ourselves, but also always aware of ourselves as related to and defined by 
things that are not ourselves.  
So for Fichte there is a kind of three-part layering to how consciousness works. There is 
the fundamentally free self-consciousness of the self, but this always requires the positing of 
something opposed to itself, which then reflects back and conditions the originally free self. As 
an example of how this works, take any act of self reflection. Suppose that Clarissa thinks of 
herself as a short person. Her thought of herself as short is, initially, a spontaneously generated 
thought, conditioned by nothing but her own free consciousness. Yet once made, it puts her in 
relation to things beyond her own control, namely, her physical body and its limitations. And 
this in turn conditions her further thoughts about herself - she is no longer free to think of 
herself as easily reaching high objects, for example.  Fichte takes this basic structure and 147
develops it further, showing how certain forms of self-constraining self-consciousness are 
necessary, and these ultimately form the structure of the moral and physical universe we would 
recognize from everyday experience.  But the key idea is always the self-generating, and 148
self-constraining, action of self-consciousness.  
Yet this self-consciousness is, of course, nothing more than the transcendental unity of 
apperception, here again ascending to new heights of power, but fundamentally recognizable in 
147 This example, of course, is a bit flawed in that it begins with a concrete person at its center, and thus 
with any number of constraints already in place, such that her thoughts about her height may not seem 
genuinely spontaneous or free. Fichte’s self-constrainting self-consciousness would not begin with any 
such constraints and thus would be wholly free to define itself in any way it chooses. Yet no matter how it 
defines itself, it thereby constrains its conception of itself, just as Clarissa constrains her conception of 
herself when she thinks of herself as short. 
148 One of Fichte’s innovations, which the theoretical focus of my project puts forces me to leave to one 
side, is that he unified practical and theoretical philosophy in his conception of the I. The 
self-constraining activity of the I generates the overall structure of our experience  and  the structure of 
moral action.  
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outline.  Fichte places more emphasis on the self-consciousness element of Kant’s central idea 149
than Reinhold did, but we once again find a self-consciousness that, out of its own activity and 
according to its own essential laws, structures the empirical world. Like the transcendental unity 
of apperception, Fichte’s conception of the ‘I’ forms the foundation of his theory of the mind. 
Like the transcendental unity of apperception, the ‘I’ is understood as a kind of free activity of 
self-consciousness.  Like the transcendental unity of apperception, it is limited by something it 150
takes to be external to itself (in Kant’s case the transcendental object, in Fichte’s the not-I). And 
like the transcendental unity of apperception, Fichte’s ‘I’ is responsible for differentiating 
subjective from objective representations, and for giving structure to the world of experience.  151
While there are important differences between Fichte’s thought and Kant’s, one can clearly see 
the transcendental unity of apperception as a thread that binds them together; each philosopher 
agrees that there is some kind of unifying self-consciousness whose principles account for 
important features of empirical reality, but disagrees on exactly how to understand it. 
Schelling is the last major German Idealist we will consider here, and he is no exception 
to the trend of taking the transcendental unity of apperception as a foundational starting point 
for systematic philosophizing. In fact, one of his early texts is titled ‘Of the I as the Principle of 
Philosophy,’ and there he writes that “the perfect system of [philosophical] science proceeds 
149 The language of the ‘I,’ is also found in Kant, and Fichte even claims that his “system is nothing other 
than the Kantian.” It seems reasonable to suppose that he was aware of this connection. Fichte,  Science of 
Knowledge , 4. Dieter Henrich, in his paper “Fichte’s Original Insight,” confirms this by arguing that 
Fichte’s philosophy can be understood as, at its heart, a criticism of and improvement on the Kantian 
conception of self-consciousness. 
150 Kant is careful to distinguish free activity from spontaneous activity - the former is the subject of moral 
philosophy, while the latter is characteristic of mental functions other than sensibility. The transcendental 
unity of apperception, then, is not free, but spontaneous. This corresponds to a strict division, in Kant, 
between practical and theoretical philosophy. Fichte, in expanding Kant’s conception, overturns this 
distinction - his conception of the ‘I’ sees it as both free and spontaneous, with both the moral and the 
theoretical spheres being derived from its self-constraining activity. 
151 Indeed, Fichte’ frames his whole philosophy as an attempt to answer the question of why some 
representations appear to be under the subject’s control and others seem to be independent of it. See 
Fichte, “Science of Knowledge: First Introduction,” 45. 
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from the absolute I, excluding everything that stands in contrast to it.”  This absolute I, as we 152
have already seen, is the term used by Fichte for his modified version of Kant’s transcendental 
unity of apperception. Here, then, Schelling essentially asserts that the transcendental unity of 
apperception, in the modified form in which he employs it, is the basis from which the correct 
system of philosophy would proceed. In short, the transcendental unity of apperception 
continues to play as pivotal role in Schelling as it did in Fichte and Reinhold. 
Schelling distinguishes himself from Fichte, however, in that he takes the first steps 
towards removing the ‘I’ from consciousness and from the subject. He writes, for example, that 
“any system that takes its start from the subject, that is, from the I which is thinkable only in 
respect to an object … is like dogmatism in that it contradicts itself in its own principle.”  The I, 153
thus, should not be thought of as a subjective consciousness. In what follows, Schelling goes on 
to list other features of the I, such as that it is utterly unconditioned, a simple unity, and 
“contains all being, all reality.”  In later works, Schelling will leave behind the terminology of 154
the I and make this principle into a force governing nature, where he describes it as an “absolute 
productivity” or “infinite becoming.”  In point of fact, however, the later developments of 155
Schelling’s philosophy are not of great importance here, since it was during his earlier period 
that Schelling and Hegel were comrades, and Hegel would soon distance himself from 
Schelling’s more naturalistic interpretation of the creative unifying power of the ‘I.’  What is of 156
152 Schelling, “Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy,” 73. 
153 Schelling, “Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy,” 70. Dogmatism contradicts itself in that it attempts 
to explain the subjective world of experience through an account of the relations between 
things-in-themselves, while simultaneously claiming that these things-in-themselves are all that truly 
exist. A philosophy starting from the subject would have a similar problem if it claimed to know the object 
as something external to the subject while simultaneously claiming that all knowledge was only of what 
can be experienced.  
154 Schelling, “Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy,” 80.  
155 Schelling, “Introduction to the Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature,” 376. 
156 This can be seen to some extent in the  Difference  essay, but most decisively in the  Phenomenology of 
Spirit . After being asked to read the preface to the latter, Schelling was insulted enough by Hegel’s 
criticism that he terminated their friendship. 
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real importance is the fact that the transcendental unity of apperception continued to be of 
central importance through all the major thinkers in the German idealist tradition, from 
Reinhold on through Schelling.  157
In sum then, it is no exaggeration to say that the transcendental unity of apperception 
reigned undisputed as the crowning principle of philosophy from Kant through Reinhold, 
Fichte, and Schelling. In all of these philosophers one can recognize an emphasis on a creative 
self-consciousness that works to determine the objective and subjective world of everyday 
experience. In all of them, this element of their philosophy is given pride of place as a 
fundamental principle, foundational activity, or absolute ground. And it is also worth noting that 
as German idealism developed, the originally restricted transcendental unity of apperception 
was given greater and greater power, first expanding to encompass all representations, then 
coming to generate the structuring principles of the empirical world, and finally expanding 
beyond consciousness to become a principle of the natural world in itself. It makes sense, then, 
to look for the a part of Hegel’s thought that could play the same role as the transcendental unity 
of apperception plays in Kant, and it would be reasonable to expect that the Kantian restriction 
of that unity would be a key flaw, from Hegel’s perspective, in the Kantian system. 
 
2 The Restriction of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception 
In order to see how important the restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception 
is to Hegel’s understanding of Kant, it is important to first of all understand what this restriction 
amounts to. The transcendental unity of apperception is, for Kant, a condition on all of a 
subject’s representations; it is the requirement that these representations be synthesized in such 
a way as to form a unified whole. But Kant does not extend that condition to things that are not 
157 Schelling, like Reinhold, did not himself make the connection to Kant’s concept explicit. His use of the 
term ‘I’ is borrowed largely from Fichte. 
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representations. Things as they are in themselves, for example, are under no such obligation to 
be unified in this way.  It is only the subject’s representations that are required to form a whole 158
in this way, so that ordering representations in the appropriate manner is seen as the act of a 
human subject, not something occurring in the world as it is in itself.  
For Hegel, this conception of the transcendental unity of apperception marks the great 
tragedy of the Kantian philosophy. On Hegel’s reading, the transcendental unity of apperception 
was Kant’s central insight into something that, unfortunately, he was unable to see clearly. The 
unity of apperception marks the point at which subject and object were unified, a neutral point 
out of which both subject and object are generated. The proper understanding of this matter 
would lead one to develop a form of idealism, sometimes described as ‘absolute idealism,’ that 
could avoid all of the other issues that plague Kant.  But Kant, despite discovering this pivotal 159
point of unity, failed to treat this insight adequately. Hegel makes this explicit in the  Science of 
Logic : 
“His [Kant’s] original synthesis of apperception is one of the most profound                       
principles for speculative development; it contains the beginning of a true                     
apprehension of the nature of the concept and is fully opposed to any empty                           
identity or abstract universality which is not internally a synthesis. The further                       
development, however, did not live up to this beginning. The term itself,                       
“synthesis,” easily conjures up again the picture of an external unity, of a mere                           
combination of terms that are intrinsically separate. Then, again, the Kantian                     
philosophy has never got over the psychological reflex of the concept and has                         
once more reverted to the claim that the concept is permanently conditioned by                         
the manifold of intuition. It has declared the content of the cognitions of the                           
understanding, and of experience, to be phenomenal, not because of the finitude                       
of the categories as such but, on the ground of a psychological idealism, because                           
they are only determinations derived from self-consciousness.”   160
 
158 Things in themselves may have some form of unity, but it will not be the kind of unity imposed by the 
transcendental unity of apperception. The degree to which things in themselves might be unified is a 
controversial issue in Kant scholarship, but one on which we can remain neutral. 
159 See Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 7. 
160  Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.22-23. 
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This discussion comes in the context of Hegel’s discussion of the Concept, one of the later stages 
in the dialectic he presents in the  Science of Logic . So when he uses the word ‘concept’ here, he 
does not have in mind concepts precisely as Kant understood them - in fact, he is criticizing 
Kant’s understanding of concepts, and especially his understanding of the categories. For us, 
however, the key portions of the passage are where Hegel writes that the “original synthesis of 
apperception is one of the most profound principles for speculative development,” but in the 
next sentence qualifies this by saying that “further development, however, did not live up to this 
beginning.”  Hegel also explains why this was the case: Kant indulged in a “psychological 161
reflex” and “declared the content of cognitions of the understanding, and of experience, to be 
phenomenal … on the ground of a psychological idealism,” that is, on the basis of an assumption 
that they were merely the result of an operation of the mind.  In other words, Kant went back 162
on his crucial insight by conceiving of the unity of apperception as something restricted to the 
the subject’s psychology, to their mental faculties.  
This same criticism of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception is made elsewhere as 
well. Perhaps the most forceful such claim comes in the  Encyclopedia Logic , where Hegel writes 
that “Kant, meanwhile, designates that unity of self-consciousness [i.e. the transcendental unity 
of apperception] merely as  transcendental , and by this he means that it is only subjective and 
does not also belong to objects as they are in themselves.”  Here we have Hegel directly 163
161  Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.22-23. 
162 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.22. ‘Psychological idealism,’ like the other term ‘subjective idealism,’ that 
Hegel uses to describe Kant’s philosophy, is an idealism that restricts its scope to the subject’s 
representations and experiences alone. Also worth noting is that the term ‘content’ has a different sense 
here than it does in Kant. The ‘content of cognitions’ refers to appearances, which we cognize in 
experience.  
163 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 42, addition 2. Here Hegel is distinguishing the transcendental from 
the transcendent. The former has to do with the conditions for the possibility of experience, the latter 
would be something existing or having its nature independently of experience in general. Kant conceives 
of the transcendental unity of apperception as  transcendental , Hegel remarks, but should have thought of 
it as  transcendent . 
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criticizing Kant for treating the transcendental unity of apperception as something subjective 
and restricted to experience, not to objects as they are independently of experience.  
Similar statements are also made in the  Science of Logic . There, Hegel describes Kant’s 
project by saying that “his principal idea is to vindicate the categories for self-consciousness 
understood as the  subjective ‘I.’  Because of this determination, his point of view remains 
confined within consciousness and its opposition, and, besides the empirical element of feelings, 
is left with something else not posited or determined by thinking self-consciousness, a 
thing­in­itself. ”  Recalling the use of the term ‘I’ among earlier German idealists, it should be 164
clear that Hegel has the transcendental unity of apperception in mind here when he refers to the 
‘subjective ‘I.’’ He then immediately goes on to point out how this initial mistake keeps Kant 
“confined within consciousness” and forces him to grapple with the thing-in-itself. So here too, 
we see Hegel describing the unity of apperception as the centerpiece of Kant’s philosophy, and 
pointing to its subjective, restricted character as the central flaw of the same. He will go on to 
repeat this point a few pages later when he says that, in order to develop and adequate form of 
philosophical cognition, “the finite determinateness in which that form is as ‘I,’ as 
consciousness, must be shed.”  Here, too, we find Hegel attacking the idea that unity of 165
apperception should be restricted to a subject’s mind, to consciousness. 
The recurring theme in these passages is that in them Hegel derides the representational 
and subjective conception of the transcendental unity of apperception Kant puts forth. There is 
thus no shortage of textual support for the idea that this objection is an important one, and 
could be a thread helpful in understanding the connection between the two philosophers. For 
164 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.47. 
165 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.48. Hegel’s use of ‘finite’ is slightly idiosyncratic and will be discussed at 
greater length in the following chapter. In brief, by describing the form of the ‘I’ as finite, he is pointing to 
the fact that it is defined by what lies outside it. Consciousness is a prime example of finitude in that 
consciousness is always consciousness  of  something; consciousness is thus defined in terms of a relation 
to something external to consciousness. 
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Hegel, Kant takes the unity of subject and object that occurs in the unity of apperception and 
renders it something subjective, something restricted to operating with the subject’s 
representations. In so doing, Kant undermines his own major insight and recreates for himself 
all of the various problems that have faced dualisms of subject and object prior to him. For this 
reason, Hegel views the transcendental unity of apperception as Kant’s great missed 
opportunity, the mishandling of which his system never adequately recovers from, and which 
leads to various other problems throughout.    166
This being the case, one might still wonder why, if the transcendental unity of 
apperception really does occupy such a central role in the transition from Kant to Hegel, has it 
received relatively little explicit or detailed treatment by most commentators? The fact is that 
while Hegel does make frequent references to the restriction of the transcendental unity of 
apperception, these references are often opaque or made parenthetically and he does not often 
explicitly single it out as the single central issue in his discussion of Kant.  He does, however, 167
consistently point to what could be described as Kant’s subjectivism and formalism. In the next 
section, I argue that these are best understood as objections to the subjective and formal 
treatment of the transcendental unity of apperception in particular, and that to describe it as 
166 Longuenesse summarizes this elegantly when she writes that “Kant and Hegel disagree in their answer 
to the question: what is the unity of apperception? For Kant, it is the unity of a finite consciousness: a 
consciousness which is not the source of its own empirical objects, but merely generates the forms 
according to which these objects are perceived and conceptualized … For Hegel, the unity of apperception 
is much more than this. … it is the source not only of the form but also.” Unfortunately, her discussion 
occupies only the brief culmination point of her article. Longuenesse, “Point of View of Man or Knowledge 
of God,” 187.  
See Karl Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 7, and Sally Sedgwick,  Hegel’s 
Critique of Kant , 11, for other presentations of this point in the literature. Sedgwick, while she points to 
Hegel’s claim about Kant’s mistreatment of the transcendental unity of apperception, takes Hegel’s points 
about the intuitive intellect to be a deeper issue. I deal with hers and Amerik’s points in a later section of 
this chapter.  
167 To be clear, however, Hegel is generally just not in the business of identifying a single major objection - 
one will not find any other objection consistently labelled as primary either. 
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‘subjective’ or ‘formal’ is to say precisely that it is a condition on representations alone, as 
opposed to operating on all things in general. 
 
2.1 The Transcendental Unity of Apperception, Subjectivity & Formalism 
In the representational conception of the transcendental unity of apperception one can 
distinguish two major elements, corresponding to the two poles of a representation in general. 
On the one hand, a representation is something possessed by a subject. Seen in this light, by 
conceiving of the unity of apperception as operating on representations, Kant is conceiving it as 
something restricted to the subject and the subject’s mind. In this sense, it is appropriate to 
describe it as ‘subjective.’ On the other hand, a representation is something that, at least in the 
ideal veridical cases, is related to an object. Thus by conceiving of the unity of apperception as 
operating on representations, Kant makes it dependent on some link to the object, which for 
Kant comes through the material furnished to us through intuition. In this sense, one could 
describe the unity of apperception as ‘formal’ in that it molds this sensory material into a certain 
form, but does not produce that material itself. 
The charges of subjectivism and formalism are a frequent sight in Hegel’s texts, though 
they are not always clearly connected to the transcendental unity of apperception. In this section 
I look more closely at these two in turn and show how what might appear to be general 
objections are better understood as specific objections to Kant’s handling of the transcendental 
unity of apperception. In so doing, I further establish the unity of apperception as a central point 
of contention between the two philosophers by broadening the base of its textual support.  
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That Hegel repeatedly charges Kant with being subjective, or with providing only a 
subjective idealism, is well established.  And as we have seen above, Hegel often makes this 168
charge of subjectivity specifically with respect to the transcendental unity of apperception. In the 
previous section, I provided some examples of precisely this. But just as an additional example, 
take the passage of the  Encyclopedia Logic  where he writes, that “even the Kantian objectivity of 
thinking itself is in turn only subjective insofar as thoughts, despite being universal and 
necessary determinations, are, according to Kant,  merely our  thoughts and distinguished from 
what the thing is  in itself  by an insurmountable gulf.”  By the phrase ‘objectivity of thinking,’ 169
Hegel refers to the results of the transcendental unity of apperception; recall that it is only 
through that unity that thought becomes thought of an object, properly speaking. Here Hegel is 
attacking Kant for making this objectivity a merely subjective one, occurring in our thoughts 
alone and having no real relation to things as they are in themselves. 
But it is important to note that various broader claims about subjectivity will also take 
their starting point from the subjectivity of the transcendental unity of apperception. The 
transcendental unity of apperception is, for Kant, the condition that structures our experience of 
the empirical world. If it is conceived of as conditioning the activity  of a subject only , then the 
empirical world can be nothing more than the result of a subject’s activity. The general 
subjectivity with which Kant is charged, namely that he makes the entirety of the empirical 
world into mere appearance, thus finds its source in the subjective conception of the 
168 Hegel writes, for example, that “Critical philosophy did indeed already turn metaphysics into logic but, 
like the subsequent idealism, it gave to the logical determinations an essentially subjective significance out 
of fear of the object, as we said earlier.” Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.35. 
Commentators frequently make this point. Sedgwick devotes a chapter of her book  Hegel’s Critique of 
Kant  to it (see Sedgwick,  Hegel’s Critique of Kant , 70-97). See also Houlgate, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” 
26; Smith, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” 447; Guyer, “Thought and Being: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s 
Theoretical Philosophy,” 171. 
169 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 41, addition 1. 
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transcendental unity of apperception.  When we read Hegel attacking Kant as a “subjective 170
idealist” or claiming that Kant’s philosophy remains a mere “subjective idealism,” these broad 
claims may seem quite separate from issues surrounding the transcendental unity of 
apperception.  But in fact, since the transcendental unity of apperception is the basic principle 171
for Kant’s theory mind, it is the specific subjectivity of that principle that renders the rest of 
Kant’s system similarly subjective. 
In this sense of the term ‘subjective,’ to describe Kant’s system as ‘subjective’ is to say 
that it takes the empirical world to be merely the experience of a subject. This is Hegel’s primary 
charge of subjectivity. Yet at the same time, Hegel also charges Kant with being excessively 
subjective in that his philosophy focuses entirely on the subject, and does not deal with the 
object except through insofar as it is related to the subject. This kind of criticism is made, for 
example, when he writes that “the Kantian philosophy declares this finite cognition to be all that 
is possible. … In so doing, it falls back into absolute finitude and subjectivity, and the whole task 
and content of this philosophy is, not the cognition of the Absolute, but the cognition of this 
subjectivity. In other words, it is a critique of the cognitive faculties.”  Here Hegel is objecting 172
to the Kant’s mistaken choice of topic - Kant saw his project as one of exploring the mind alone, 
170 I say this because without the theory of the transcendental unity of apperception, Kant would have no 
account of the empirical world as a world of appearances. There are, of course, other arguments, aside 
from those surrounding the transcendental unity of apperception, that Kant puts forth in defense of his 
claim that experience is merely of appearances, or subjective in the sense here at issue. These arguments 
are put forth in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Dialectic, and I deal with them in 
greater detail in sections 3.1 and 3.3. of this chapter. Here, however, I will just note that without the 
subjective conception of the transcendental unity of apperception in particular, Kant’s other arguments 
would lose much of their plausibility, because Kant would then lack any account of everyday experience. 
171 “Now, although the categories (e. g., unity, cause and effect, etc. ) pertain to thinking as such, it does not 
at all follow from this that they must therefore be merely something of ours, and not also determinations 
of objects themselves. But, according to Kant's view, this is what is supposed to be the case, and his 
philosophy is subjective idealism.” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 42, addition 3. See also Hegel, 
Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 45, addition, and Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.180.  
172  Faith and Knowledge , 68. See also,  Faith and Knowledge , 76. ‘Finite cognition’ here means cognition 
of what is given in intuition. The issue of Kant’s excessive focus on the subject is particularly important in 
relation to Kant’s failure to derive the categories; I deal with it in more detail in that section. 
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and restricted himself to that where he should have seen the deeper implications of his 
discoveries. 
Like the previous charge of subjectivity, this one too is rooted in the representational 
conception of the transcendental unity of apperception, and for reasons similar to the ones 
presented above. Kant’s major contribution in his study of the cognitive faculties was his 
discovery of the transcendental unity of apperception. Had he not, upon discovering this, 
restricted it to a condition on representations alone, he could have seen the consequences of this 
discovery for philosophy broadly speaking. Instead, because he saw it as a condition on the 
mental faculties of subjects, he continued to focus entirely on the subject’s mind, despite what, 
to Hegel, are the obvious broader implications of this discovery.  173
The second side to the restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception is Kant’s 
conception of it as merely formal, as a merely formal condition. Kant makes this explicit when 
he describes the ‘I’ as “a form of representation in general,”  and writes that “the logical form of 174
all judgments consists in the objective unity of the apperception.”  Kant goes on to describe the 175
categories, insofar as they are not connected to intuition, as “mere forms of thought.”  This 176
latter point gives us a clue as to how to understand what of what describing the transcendental 
unity of apperception as formal amounts to for Kant in this context. That the categories are 
173 To be sure, there is a kind of loop here. Kant set out to study our faculties of cognition and discovered 
the transcendental unity of apperception in the process of doing so. The narrow focus of his original 
project could thus be construed as the cause of his restriction of the unity of apperception - his project was 
already focused only on the mind, so that whatever he discovered appeared to him to be a structure of the 
mind alone. Yet at the same time, the transcendental unity of apperception gave Kant the opportunity and 
the impetus to expand the scope of his project, but he chose not to because of his representational 
conception of it. In other words, the initial framing of Kant’s project caused him to misunderstand his 
discovery, and that misunderstanding forced him to keep that initial, subjective, framing in place. I have 
focused on the last step of this loop, but would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the first. 
174 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A346/B404. Kant also writes that “the proposition I think (taken 
problematically) contains the form of every judgment of understanding whatever and accompanies all 
categories as their vehicle.” Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A348/B406. 
175 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B140. 
176 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , B150. 
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‘mere forms’ and that the transcendental unity of apperception is “a form of representation” 
amount to the fact that they are, in and of themselves, mere elements of the subject’s mind 
which cannot yield any cognition of objects; they are always dependent upon some matter given 
to them through intuition.  
This formalism is, at bottom, rooted in a representational conception of the 
transcendental unity of apperception and the categories it employs. Representations are 
fundamentally incomplete - they always require, if they are to be veridical or have any 
determinate content, some other thing that they represent. Thus to be real experience and not 
simply fantastical thinking, our representations must have some connection to the object.  This 177
connection to the object which elevates mere thinking into experience of determinate objects is 
provided, according to Kant, through intuition. In this way, by conceiving of it as a condition on 
representations, Kant ensures that the transcendental unity of apperception will be dependent 
on intuition. If the transcendental unity of apperception were not, and gave all of its content to 
itself, it would be for Kant a meaningless mental game, not a way of knowing or experiencing the 
world properly speaking.   178
In this way, to understand the transcendental unity of apperception as a condition on 
representations is to understand it as always requiring some material given to it externally, 
through intuition. Representations would not count as experience of an object, for Kant, without 
a connection to something external that they represent. Since this connection is provided by 
intuition, the transcendental unity of apperception must be dependent upon intuition. 
177 Indeed, the problem of this connection is arguably the central issue of Kant’s first  Critique . Kant rejects 
as dogmatic the rationalist accounts of this link that came prior to him. See Gardner,  Kant and the 
Critique of Pure Reason , 27-37.  
178 There is a certain sense in which the transcendental unity of apperception  does  give content to itself - in 
the act of judgement it employs certain forms, and these forms of judgement ultimately end up 
conditioning the nature of our experiences. Yet Kant insists that these forms of judgement are useless  if 
they are not given some content to make judgements  of , and that latter content is given through intuition. 
Hegel would have Kant focus more directly on the content of the categories as opposed to their relation to 
objects through intuition. 
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Built into this conception of the transcendental unity of apperception is a kind of duality 
between the material given to it and the way in which it structures that material. It imposes its 
unity on our intuitions through concepts, thereby giving them the appropriate form to be part of 
a full-fledged experience, as opposed to the raw chaos of sensation. It is in this sense that the 
transcendental unity of apperception can be understood as a formal condition, a form opposed 
to the matter of intuition.  By restricting the transcendental unity of apperception to 179
representations, Kant makes it into merely the  form  of thought, dependent for its material on 
things external.   
Hegel objects firmly to this point, and insists that thought can and indeed must give itself 
its own content - the process of thought’s doing so is embodied in the dialectic.  The opening 180
pages of the  Science of Logic  contain long meditations on the formal conception of logic and 
thought and Hegel is adamant that thought not be understood as something merely formal.  181
There, Hegel discusses philosophical cognition, writing that “in order to arrive at this cognition, 
the finite determinateness in which that form is as “I,” as consciousness, must be shed. The 
form, when thought out in its purity, will then have within itself the capacity to determine itself, 
that is, to give itself a content, and to give it as a necessary content – as a system of 
thought-determinations.”  The first sentence of this quote was given before, since there we see 182
Hegel explicitly attacking the idea of the transcendental unity of apperception as merely a 
feature of consciousness. But in the second sentence we find him claiming that once that 
restriction is dropped, that same form of unity will no longer be dependent, but will be able to 
give a necessary content to itself. The idea of self-generating content is key to Hegel, and he sees 
179 Of course, Kant also believes intuitions to have their own form, that of space and time, prior to any 
unifying activity. This, however, is the form of sensibility, not the form of thought, and it is with the latter 
that Hegel is predominantly concerned. 
180 This arises especially in relation to the doctrine of determinate negation, of which more in the following 
chapter. See Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.38. 
181 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.28-21.32.  
182 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.48. 
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Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception as a step in the right direction on this front in that it 
generates the categories out of itself.  But Kant’s formal conception of it means that he does not 183
focus on this element of the transcendental unity of apperception as much as Hegel might like, 
instead focusing on its status as parts of the subject’s mental faculties and the issue of how it 
might be related to objects.  184
This issue of formalism is closely related to another commonly-discussed point of 
contention between Kant and Hegel: the relation between concepts and intuitions. For Kant, 
thought without intuitions is, famously, empty. In other words, concepts depend on intuitions 
for their relation to the world. Concepts, in this context, correspond to the form - they are used 
to order and structure the raw material of intuition. That concepts should be dependent on 
intuition in this way, is, as I have tried to show, a product of Kant’s representational conception 
of the transcendental unity of apperception.  Because Kant sees the transcendental unity of 185
apperception as operating on representations, he makes it dependent upon a link to the object - 
a link that is provided by intuition. 
Hegel cites the idea that concepts depend on intuitions as a mistake, for example 
describing it in the quote given above as a result of a “psychological reflex.”  Immediately 186
following that passage, Hegel writes: “Here accordingly we have again the supposition that apart 
183 See the  Encyclopedia Logic , where Hegel writes that “to assert of the categories that, with respect to 
themselves, they are empty is unjustified insofar as they possess in any case content through the fact that 
they are  determinate .” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 43. 
184 Hegel, putting this issue in terms of a Kantian over-emphasis on the questions of subjectivity and 
objectivity, complains that “nothing at all, therefore, depends on that difference between subjectivity and 
objectivity. Instead, it is the content on which everything depends, and this is equally subjective and 
objective.” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 42. 
185 It could be argued that the implication runs the other way - that Kant’s claim that concepts are 
dependent upon intuitions brought him to claim that the transcendental unity of apperception was 
similarly dependent. I believe that the two theses stand or fall together. The concept/intuition 
dependence, however, would have been more or less a theoretical dead end were it not for the 
transcendental unity of apperception, since it would have not have successfully achieved Kant’s theoretical 
aims. The same cannot be said of the unity of apperception, as Kant’s successor’s make clear. 
186 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.22 
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from the manifoldness of intuition the concept is without content, empty, despite the fact that 
the concept is said to be a synthesis a priori; as such, it surely contains determinateness and 
differentiation within itself.”  As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Hegel points out that 187
concepts (here the categories in particular)  do  have a content independent of intuition. It is this 
content that allows us to distinguish the concept of causation from that of substance, for 
example. While Kant acknowledges this fact, he sets it to the side and emphasizes not this 
content but the fact that these concepts are representations and thus require intuition for their 
relation to objects. Had Kant not been trapped in a representational conception of the 
transcendental unity of apperception’s operation, he would not have problematized that relation 
- indeed that relation would not have been an issue at all. He would then have been able to focus 
on the content of the pure concepts of the understanding (i.e, the categories) instead of their 
relation to objects.  
In this sense, then, the dependence of concepts on intuition is but another facet of Kant’s 
formalism, and one that is derived from the formal, representational conception of the 
transcendental unity of apperception.  In this case, the formalism is more broad: concepts in 188
general (and the categories more specifically) are understood as forms of thought and the 
intuitions constitute the content of thought.  Hegel’s critique is that in giving pride of place to 189
intuition, Kant misses the important content that concepts have in and of themselves - for him, 
thought without intuition is anything but empty.  That the formalism of the transcendental 190
187 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.23 
188 The charge of formalism here is intended to describe the dependence between concepts and intuitions 
alone. That Kant distinguishes between concepts and intuitions, and various other features of that 
distinction, such as that one is universal and the other particular, one is spontaneous and the other forced, 
one is mediated and the other immediate, etc., are not necessarily implicated in this formalism and may 
be independently motivated.  
189 See Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A51/B75, where Kant implicitly identifies intuition with the content 
of thought.  
190 If this argument is correct, then the general objection to Kant that he makes cognition dependent on 
intuition is rooted in the restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception to representations. This 
objection is all but omnipresent in the literature; what I have done here is connect it more directly to 
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unity of apperception should have consequences in Kant’s general theory of concepts (namely, 
that they too are forms dependent upon intuition) should not be surprising, since he 
transcendental unity of apperception is the fundamental principle of human cognition for Kant; 
broad claims about Kant’s formalism with regard to cognition can easily be understood as 
springing from his formal conception of that fundamental principle. 
Indeed, in a somewhat paradoxical turn of events, it is precisely the fundamentality of 
the transcendental unity of apperception that can obscure its importance in the transition from 
Kant to Hegel. The Kantian system is organized around answering the question of how we can 
know synthetic a priori truths. The transcendental unity of apperception is, in essence, Kant’s 
answer to that question - we can know synthetic a priori truths because of the forms inherent in 
the unifying activity that makes experience of objects and ourselves possible.  With this answer 191
in place, the rest of Kant’s philosophy can be understood as organized around it. Accordingly, 
Kant’s conception of the transcendental unity of apperception - that he locates it in the subject, 
that he makes it dependent upon sensations, that it results in a judgement - shapes every other 
element of his system. Thus when Hegel presents various criticisms of Kant he is, in many cases, 
talking about the transcendental unity of apperception, though without doing so explicitly. In 
the next section, I try to show how this is the case by examining three commonly stated Hegelian 
Kant’s conception of the transcendental unity of apperception. 
See Longuenesse,  Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics , 23; Guyer, “Thought and Being: Hegel’s Critique of 
Kant,” 189; Sedgwick,  Hegel’s Critique of Kant , 70-91. 
191 Without the transcendental unity of apperception, no synthetic a priori judgements would be possible, 
since Kant would have no theory of judgement in general. The Analytic thus answers the central Kantian 
question in a more direct way that the Aesthetic and Dialectic do not. The Aesthetic, while it grounds our 
knowledge of synthetic a priori truths in mathematics, does not provide the necessary theory of judgement 
to make our mathematical claims comprehensible. The Dialectic does not address the issue at all, and if 
anything denies us knowledge of what would have seemed to be synthetic a priori claims prior to Kant’s 
discussion. This being the case, it would make sense to imagine that the central concept of the Analytic - 
the transcendental unity of apperception - would be the more important element in Kant’s arguments for 
transcendental idealism. And indeed, transcendental idealism itself would not answer Kant’s central 
question were it not for the addition of the transcendental unity of apperception. 
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objections and tracing their connection to Kant’s representational conception of the 
transcendental unity of apperception. 
 
3.1    Three Other Hegelian Objections ­ The Thing In Itself 
Though the charges of subjectivism and formalism I presented above are often repeated 
objections Hegel brings against Kant, they are far from the only objections he brings against his 
predecessor. Here I focus on three other major problems that Hegel brings up in his writing: 
Kant’s failure to grant us knowledge of things in themselves, his failure to adequately derive the 
categories, and his failure to understand the true nature of dialectical reasoning.  Of course, in 192
attempting to understand Hegel’s criticism of his predecessor, one could simply take all of these 
up in a list, not taking any of them to be primary or privileged. But a deeper understanding of 
the connection between these philosophers, and of how Hegel aims to build on Kant, requires us 
to see the connections between these problems, and, if possible, trace them to a common source. 
My contention in this section is that these three criticisms do have such a common source: they 
are all features of Kant’s philosophy that result from his restriction of the transcendental unity 
of apperception. This in turn further establishes the value of a study of Hegel that takes his 
connection to the transcendental unity of apperception as its starting point. 
On a first reading of Kant or Hegel, it is the idea of the thing-in-itself that might appear 
as most immediately problematic. Kant famously denies that we have any theoretical knowledge 
of things as they are in themselves, independent of our experience of them. With regard to these 
entities, we can have faith and perhaps some practical knowledge, but we cannot truly know 
192 There are, to be sure, other criticisms Hegel makes of Kant. And other readers have presented other 
criticisms as primary. In these three sections, my primary aim is to unify these three most explicitly 
repeated criticisms by showing them to be results of Kant’s restriction of the transcendental unity of 
apperception to representations. In the sections that follow, I consider other attempts to distinguish in 
Hegel a single primary objection to the Kantian philosophy. 
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them in the way we know the natural world. To Kant, this result was of paramount importance 
in that it allowed him to preserve the belief in God and freedom against the contrary evidence 
provided by the natural sciences. By denying us knowledge of things in themselves, Kant makes 
it possible to have faith that among these entities there may be immortal souls, free agents, and 
benevolent authors of the natural world.  
Yet at the same time, many readers of Kant find the idea that we cannot know the world 
as it is in itself deeply unsatisfying. They are not alone - many philosophers in the German 
idealist tradition, including Hegel himself, felt the same way. This objection to Kant’s philosophy 
is raised repeatedly by Hegel throughout his writings.  In his early essay  Faith and Knowledge , 193
for example, Hegel charges Kant with concluding that “things in themselves and the sensations 
are without objective determinateness.”  The  Encyclopedia Logic  finds Hegel describing Kant’s 194
critical philosophy as one that “shares with empiricism the supposition that experience is the 
sole  basis of knowledge, except that it lets that knowledge count, not for truths, but only for 
knowledge of appearances.”  He takes a similar line in the  Science of Logic , where he writes 195
that “the  critique of the forms of the understanding  has arrived precisely at this result, namely 
that such forms do  not apply to things in themselves . - This can only mean that they are in 
193 In the literature, many scholars have noted the objection as well. John Smith, for example, writes that 
“that Hegel was opposed to Kant's doctrine of the thing-in itself and his consequent limitation of human 
knowledge to the sphere of  Erscheinung  [appearances] is well known and has often been repeated.” 
Smith, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” 448-449. See also Longuenesse,  Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics , 
18-24; Guyer, “Thought and Being: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 171-173; Stern, 
“Hegel’s Idealism,” 146-147; Houlgate, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” 26. 
Some, like Guyer, consider the objection to be a question-begging one based on a weak understanding of 
Kant. Others, like Longuenesse, see the objection as rooted in deeper issues such as the nature of truth. 
Yet others, like Houlgate, see the objection as a strong one based on Kant’s own stated critical aims. The 
strength of the objection depends on how one understands Hegel’s argument for it. Here, however, that 
particular issue is not so relevant as the fact that in each case, the denial of our knowledge of things in 
themselves arises from a restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception. 
194 Hegel,  Faith and Knowledge , 74. 
195 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 40. 
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themselves something untrue.”  In each of these cases, we find Hegel objecting to the Kantian 196
view that restricts knowledge to appearances, describing it as rendering our knowledge untrue 
and indeterminate.  
For Hegel, there is a clear cause for this Kantian conclusion: the formal nature of the 
categories, i.e., the fact that they require material given to them through sensation. He writes 
that “the categories are therefore incapable of being determinations of … something that is not 
given in a perception, and, for that reason, the understanding or knowledge by means of the 
categories is unable to know  things in themselves .”  Because the categories cannot be 197
legitimately applied except to appearances, they can provide us knowledge only of those 
appearances. The categories can let us know, for example, that these appearances are necessarily 
correlated, but they cannot assure us of anything that lies beyond them.  
A similar connection between the dependence on sensation and our inability to know                         
things in themselves is made in the  Science of Logic :  
 
“knowledge flees ... to sensuous existence, believing that there it will find stability                         
and accord. On the other hand, since this cognition is self-admittedly a cognition                         
only of appearances, the unsatisfactoriness of the latter is admitted but at the                         
same time presupposed: as much as to say that although we do not have                           
cognition of things in themselves, nevertheless, within the sphere of appearance                     
we do have correct cognition … this is like attributing right insight to someone,                           
with the stipulation, however, that he is not fit to see what is true but only what is                                   
false. Absurd as this might be, no less absurd would be a cognition which is true                               
but does not know its subject matter as it is in itself.”  198
 
196 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.30. By ‘critique of the forms of the understanding’ Hegel means Kant’s 
theory of the categories. The categories are described as ‘untrue’ here because, by Kant’s own admission, 
they do not accurately capture the nature of things in themselves. 
197 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 44. In the section immediately prior, Hegel takes issue with Kant’s 
claim that “with respect to themselves, the categories are empty, having application and use only in 
experience.” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 43. 
198 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.30. 
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Here we find Hegel again connecting the dependence on sensation to the fact that 
cognition is, for Kant, merely cognition of appearances. The argument here is, like most of such 
arguments in Hegel’s criticism of Kant, somewhat condensed. We can, however, attempt to 
dissect it here. The first charge is that for Kant, cognition depends on something given to us 
through the senses - intuition. This is the thesis that we have described above as Kant’s 
formalism. Next, we have the idea that through the senses we receive representations of objects, 
not the objects themselves - in the language of the quote just given, one could put this by saying 
that cognition of sensuous existence is cognition of appearances. Again, Kant would happily 
agree to this point. After all, it is this fact that that allows him to present a theory of the a priori 
form of intuition; were intuitions not representations, then the subject’s faculties would not have 
any particularly important relation to their form.  
To these, now, we must add a premise that is largely suppressed in Hegel’s text, but 
which would have been one that could easily be taken for granted in Hegel’s time and in relation 
to Kant’s philosophy as well. This is the claim that there is no intrinsic link between 
representations - appearances - and things as they are in themselves. In other words, knowing 
one does not entail knowing the other. This claim essentially amounts to a denial of any 
dogmatically established link between appearances and things in themselves. Kant’s critical 
philosophy begins from this kind of attack on dogma - if it did not, there would already be any 
number of easy answers to the question of how synthetic a priori judgements were possible.  199
This is what Hegel is getting at when he says that “unsatisfactoriness of [sensuous existence] is 
admitted.”  Kant himself would claim that knowledge of intuitions only gives us knowledge of 200
199 Such answers could take the form of Descartes’ claims regarding God’s benevolence, or perhaps 
Leibniz’s pre-established harmony. There could also be simply the assertion that the subject’s faculties of 
perception are transparent, such that features of objects are represented faithfully in all cases - such an 
assumption might underlie certain versions of empiricism. This reading of Kant’s project is also presented 
by Gardner in his book  Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason , p27-37. 
200 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.30. 
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appearances, though he would disagree with Hegel that this is unsatisfactory, since for Kant 
having knowledge of appearances alone is a perfectly acceptable, indeed desirable, consequence 
of his system.  
If we bring these three claims together, we see that since intuitions are a kind of 
representation, there will always be skepticism about whether they accurately represent things 
in themselves. And since the categories are functions for unifying intuitions, any knowledge of 
them would be knowledge of representations only - the categories too are unfit to provide us 
with real knowledge of things in themselves. They can tell us about the necessary connections 
between our representations, but not anything about the world as it is in itself. In this way, the 
formal nature of the categories, i.e., their dependence upon intuition, is the root cause of Kant’s 
denial of our knowledge of things in themselves.  201
But to say that the categories require intuition to have any relation to objects is, in effect, 
simply another way of saying that the transcendental unity of apperception is similarly 
restricted. After all, the categories are the forms of unity required by the transcendental unity of 
apperception in unifying intuitions to generate experience. And as we saw above, the demand 
that there be some sensory material given prior to this unifying activity is itself part and parcel 
with the representational, formal way in which Kant thinks of the transcendental unity of 
apperception. If it were not conceived of as a condition on a subject’s representations, then it 
would not require a connection to an external thing in itself that could be represented. In other 
words, it would not require intuitions, since these are posited by Kant as precisely the immediate 
connectors between the mind and things in themselves.  
201 Note that in his inaugural dissertation, Kant has a kind of concept/intuition distinction, but does not 
see concepts as dependent upon intuition. For this reason, he does not draw the transcendental idealist 
conclusion that knowledge is of appearances alone. It is only in the  Critique , where the dependence of 
concepts on intuition is made a major theme, that Kant puts forth his claims about the restriction of 
knowledge. This further supports the idea that the dependence here is a key element in Kant’s argument. 
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We can summarize this line of reasoning as follows. The transcendental unity of 
apperception is a condition on the subject’s representations. Representations cannot constitute 
genuine experience of an object unless connected to something external that they represent. 
That connection is established by intuition. The transcendental unity of apperception, then, 
must be dependent upon intuition, in that it imposes a formal condition on material given to it 
through the senses. And since it deals with intuition, the transcendental unity of apperception 
cannot give us knowledge of things in themselves, but only of how intuitions (i.e., 
representations) are ordered. In this way, Kant’s restriction of the transcendental unity of 
apperception leads to his denying that we can know things as they are in themselves. Hegel’s 
criticism of this point goes farther to show precisely why this is unsatisfactory, but for our 
purposes the essential point is here - it is the restriction of the transcendental unity of 
apperception that is at the root of Kant’s restriction of our knowledge. 
The passages cited above, and others in Hegel’s texts, show that, at least to Hegel’s mind, 
it was the formal nature of the categories, i.e. of the transcendental unity of apperception, that 
was at the root of Kant’s claim that we cannot have knowledge of things in themselves.  This is 202
sufficient, at least, to show that Hegel saw a direct link on this count, and thus to justify the 
attempt to understand Hegel’s positive philosophy by looking at how he would correct the flaws 
he saw in the transcendental unity of apperception. But it is another matter whether Hegel’s 
claims about the link here are faithful to Kant’s texts and whether Kant’s argument for his 
restriction of knowledge did in fact crucially depend on his understanding of the transcendental 
unity of apperception. Kant did, after all, provided a number of arguments for his claim that our 
knowledge is of appearances only. The  Critique of Pure Reason  is divided into three major 
sections, each of which presents what seems like a relatively independent argument for the 
202 See also Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.22, where Hegel again makes this connection. 
82 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 83/182
claim, and his discussion of the transcendental unity of apperception is only obviously central in 
one of those arguments. There are two others that Kant presents: one given in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and based on space and time, and one in the Transcendental Dialectic 
and based on addressing transcendental illusions. Before moving on to other Hegelian 
criticisms, I want to briefly address Kant’s argument from the Transcendental Aesthetic to show 
how it, too, is related to Kant’s overall subjective and representational approach.   203
The argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic depends on Kant’s claim that unless space 
and time are understood as a priori forms of intuition, we cannot account for our knowledge of a 
priori truths about space and time. We clearly have such knowledge, as in the discipline of 
geometry, for example. Kant contends that to make sense of this we must think of our intuitions 
as appearances conditioned by a general form of intuition. With this assumption in place, we can 
be assured that our knowledge of geometrical truths is in fact a body of necessary truths. Space 
is one of the conditions under which we intuit objects, so that all objects of intuition must 
necessarily be spatial, and hence must be governed by the laws of geometry. Were space a 
property of things in themselves, and not a form of our intuition, then we could not explain the 
necessity that attaches to geometrical truths. By making space a form of intuition, one that 
necessarily conditions all appearances, Kant can show why geometric truths have the necessity 
they are commonly understood to possess. In this way, the claim that experience is always of 
appearances, and not of things in themselves, is seen as the only way to explain our knowledge 
of a priori truths about geometry. This provides Kant with an argument for his restriction of 
knowledge that seems to be independent of any issues related to the transcendental unity of 
apperception. 
203 I address Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Dialectic in section 3.3. 
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Now, the key point that distinguishes this argument from the argument in the 
Transcendental Analytic is that it deals with the form of intuition, where the latter deals with 
concepts. The transcendental unity of apperception, for Kant, conditions our concepts, while 
space and time are the forms of our intuitions. But, as we noted above, this dependence of 
concepts on intuitions is itself a result of Kant’s representational, subjective conception of his 
project. Because Kant sees himself as studying the nature of the subject’s representations, he has 
to give some account of how these representations are connected to their objects; this account is 
given in terms of intuitions. So the fact that Kant has two separate arguments, one based on the 
form of intuition and one based on the transcendental unity of apperception, is a result of his 
generally subjective approach to the project of establishing our knowledge of synthetic a priori 
truths. 
But while all this shows that Kant’s subjective approach is crucial to his distinguishing 
the two arguments, it does not in itself establish the primacy of the transcendental unity of 
apperception in this context. It does, however, show that there is a common thread between 
them - Kant’s assumption that he is studying the subject’s mind led him to restrict our 
knowledge of things in themselves in both cases. In a sense, this assumption that Kant starts 
with, and his general ontological picture of the world as populated by subjects and objects that 
are fundamentally opposed to one another, is the key point of disagreement between him and 
Hegel.  
Kant’s theory of space and time is clearly a case where that disagreement leads to 
problematic results, i.e., to the restriction of our knowledge to appearances. But it is not the 
most interesting or most important such case. Rather, the transcendental unity of apperception 
marks the point at which, both for Hegel and for the modern reader aiming to reconstruct his 
philosophy, Kant comes closest realizing a genuine alternative the ontological assumptions he 
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starts with. It also promises to leave something behind in the absence of those assumptions: a 
unifying activity that would work on things in themselves and not just representations. So while 
there are other Kantian arguments for denying that we have knowledge of things in themselves, 
these arguments rest on the same kind of subjective approach that plagues his treatment of the 
transcendental unity of apperception, and they do not provide any truly instructive guides for 
understanding Hegel. Focusing on the transcendental unity of apperception, then, stays truer to 
Hegel’s own reading of Kant and provides a more meaningful narrative of the shift between the 
two philosophers. 
 
3.2  Three Other Hegelian Objections ­ the Derivation of the Categories 
At this point, a second issue comes to the fore. A common objection to Kant raised by 
many German idealists was not just that the categories were restricted in their application, but 
that the precise nature of the categories themselves was never adequately demonstrated.  Kant 204
outlines twelve categories, which he connects with forms of judgement and inference in formal 
logic. But why these twelve should take priority, or why forms of judgement in general should be 
of primary importance here, is something later philosophers would take issue with.  
There are two related issues here. First, why should forms of judgement be favored at all? 
Second, why should Kant’s specific 12 forms of judgement be favored? For Hegel, Kant focused 
on the forms of judgement, and was largely satisfied with the forms handed down to him by 
history and introspection, for the same reason: because he conceived of the transcendental unity 
of apperception as a mental condition on representations.  
Hegel traces this reasoning himself in the  Encyclopedia Logic :  
204 Hegel, while making this point himself, attributes it to Fichte - “It remains the Fichtean philosophy’s 
profound contribution to have reminded us that the  thought­determinations  [i.e., the categories] must be 
exhibited in their  necessity  and that it is essential that they be  derived .” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 
42. 
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“It is well known that the Kantian philosophy made it very easy for itself in                             
locating  the categories. The I, the unity of self-consciousness, is quite abstract                       
and entirely indeterminate. How is one then to arrive at the  determinations of                         
the I, the categories? Fortunately, the  various forms of judgement are already                       
listed empirically in ordinary logic. Now to judge is to  think a determinate object.                           
The various forms of judgement that had already been enumerated thus provide                       
the various  determinations of thought. ”   205
 
In this passage, Hegel connects the premise that “to judge is to think a determinate 
object” with the idea that the forms of judgement can be happily taken from ordinary logic. It is 
because of Kant’s focus on what it means to  think  a determinate object that he isolates the act of 
judgement, and hence the forms of judgement, as of particular importance.  
But this Kantian emphasis on  thought  is nothing other than the restriction of the 
transcendental unity of apperception to the sphere of representations, the sphere of thought. 
Because Kant focuses on the mind, he looks to a mental operation in looking to discover the 
source of objectivity. That mental operation is the act of judgement, and Kant names judgement 
as the fundamental act of thinking. It is in a judgement that we finally assert something 
determinate of the world, something that could be true or false. The understanding is 
accordingly conceived of as the faculty of judgement, and experience itself is seen as a kind of 
judgement. We experience things, properly speaking, when we form judgements about them. 
The transcendental unity of apperception is just this condition on representations that requires 
them to be made into judgements. But the most important thing to note here is that it is because 
that unity is conceived of as mental and representational that judgement seems like the 
plausible example of that unity. Kant’s representational conception of the transcendental unity 
of apperception as the unity of a single subject leads him to take judgement as the best example 
205 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 42. 
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of that unity, and hence to consider the forms of judgement as guides to the nature of the 
categories. 
But the focus on representations, Kant’s treatment of the transcendental unity of 
apperception as merely subjective and formal, also let him accept the forms of logic on an 
empirical and psychological basis, without adequate derivation. The connection here is not one 
of strict logical entailment; Kant could have done more to derive the categories, even if he 
conceived of them as merely subjective.  But because of his subjective starting point, the forms 206
of logic seemed natural and appropriate, and Kant did not look further. Hegel hints at this point 
in the passage quoted above, and also when he writes that “this critique, however, does not 
address the  content  and the specific relationship that these thought-determinations [the 
categories] have vis-a-vis each other. Instead, it examines them with a view to the opposition of 
subjectivity  and  objectivity  in general.”  In other words, Kant focuses not on the nature of the 207
categories, but on how they might be connected with objectivity.  
The connection is made direct in the  Science of Logic  where Hegel writes that “because 
the interest of the Kantian philosophy was directed to the so-called  transcendental  nature of the 
categories, the treatment itself of such categories came up empty. What they are in themselves 
apart from their abstract relation to the ‘I,’ a relation which is the same for all, how they are 
determined and related to each other, this was not made a subject of consideration, and 
therefore knowledge of their nature was not in the least advanced by this philosophy.”  By the 208
phrase ‘transcendental nature of the categories’ Hegel means the way in which the categories are 
employed by the mind in making experience possible. According to Hegel, since Kant focuses on 
206 Hegel praises Fichte, for example, for noticing that the categories must be derived, but also charges 
Fichte with remaining excessively subjective in that he derives the categories for the subject only, without 
showing their necessary relation to an object (understood as a thing in itself). See Hegel,  Encyclopedia 
Logic , sect. 42, and Hegel,  Faith and Knowledge , 62-63, 153. 
207 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 41. 
208 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.48. 
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this, on their role in the subject’s experience, he does not attend appropriately the character of 
the categories themselves, and remains satisfied with what Hegel describes as their ‘empirical’ 
presentation in ordinary logic. 
Other commentators, too, have pointed to the derivation of the categories as a point at 
which Hegel takes issue with Kant. Among these is Stephen Houlgate, who writes that “Kant’s 
‘empirical’ approach to thought, judgements, and the categories falls short of what is demanded 
in a science of logic, Hegel believes, because it does not demonstrate that … the categories thus 
have to be taken from the various kinds of judgement, but it simply assumes the primacy of 
judgment. Furthermore, Kant does not show that the specific kinds of judgment that he takes to 
underlie the categories inhere in thought necessarily.”  But this gap in Kant’s reasoning, 209
according to Houlgate, is seen by Hegel as a part of a larger problem. Hegel in general holds 
Kant to a higher epistemic criteria than Kant held himself. Houlgate sees Hegel’s criticisms of 
Kant as rooted in a “desire to be utterly  self­critical .”  Where Kant was willing to take as 210
starting points various common assumptions of his time - the accepted functions of judgment, 
our dependence on sensations, and the distinction between subjects and objects among them - 
Hegel questions these. In so doing, Hegel sees himself not as importing new standards to Kant’s 
philosophy, but as carrying on Kant’s own critical enterprise of searching into the foundations of 
our knowledge; a search that must be fundamentally presupposition less .   211
I agree with Houlgate’s interpretation on this point: Hegel did indeed seek to create a 
philosophical system that was presuppositionless, and this goal could be seen as an extension of 
Kant’s, though perhaps only in a broad sense.  But as a general strategy of interpreting Hegel, 212
209 Houlgate,  The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , 15. 
210 Houlgate,  The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , 25. 
211 “Hegel thus interprets his own critique of Kant as an immanent critique insofar as he sees his own 
philosophy as fulfilling the demand for radical self-criticism implicit in Kant’s critical philosophy better 
than Kant himself.” Houlgate,  The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , 27. 
212 It is not clear that Kant had the goal of presuppositionless philosophy specifically in mind when he set 
out to write the first  Critique . An important element of Kant’s work was an attempt to examine our 
88 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 89/182
this reading falls short in two ways. First, it does not do full justice to the details of the text. 
While it captures the fact that Hegel objects to the absence of a clear derivation for the 
categories, it obscures Hegel’s other comments on this point. As I point out in the passages 
above, Hegel connects this Kantian failure with Kant’s excessive focus on the subjective 
conditions of experience, i.e. on his conception of the transcendental unity of apperception as 
merely subjective. Taking that unity to be merely representational is, for Hegel, one of Kant’s 
uncritical assumptions, but describing the connections between these assumptions is an 
important part of the interpretative project. This task can be overlooked if we simply content 
ourselves with the general charge of insufficient self-criticism. 
Second, taking the demand for criticism as Hegel’s primary objection to Kant is too 
broad an objection. Under that aegis fall any number of disconnected assumptions that Kant 
may have made, and seeing them merely as so many failures of self-criticism does little to 
connect them in a meaningful way. One of the advantages of focusing on the transcendental 
unity of apperception is that it provides a single focal point that can systematically connect 
various other problems Hegel raises for Kant. In fact, it is particularly helpful because it takes 
broad and often-repeated criticisms like charges of subjectivism or of a problematic dependence 
on intuitions and locates a central point through which to understand these charges. In this way, 
while Houlgate is right to note the demand Hegel makes for stronger, more radical 
self-criticism, his point can be refined if we focus more precisely on specific Kantian 
assumptions and their interconnections. I have tried to do that in this chapter by focusing on 
faculties of knowledge, and it could be thought that such an attempt must be itself presuppositionless. But 
if we focus more narrowly on the question of synthetic a priori judgements, it isn’t as obvious that Kant 
must be committed to questioning all of his presuppositions in the way Hegel might have wanted. 
Ultimately, then, whether we take Hegel’s criticism on this point to be an immanent one or rather simply 
an expression of Hegel’s own philosophical agenda will depend on how we characterize Kant’s goals. 
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Kant’s assumption that the transcendental unity of apperception is a condition on the subject’s 
representations alone, and showing how it relates to other objections found in Hegel’s texts. 
 
3.3 Three Other Hegelian Objections ­ Misunderstanding the Dialectic 
In this way, at least two of the most commonly cited criticisms made by Hegel of Kant 
can be traced to Kant’s restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception. I turn now to a 
third common objection, one which is found in Hegel’s early writings as well as in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit , the  Science of Logic ,  and the  Encyclopedia Logic .  This objection 213 214
charges Kant with misunderstanding the true nature of the dialectic. Recall that Kant does 
devote a good portion of his book to discussing what he calls the ‘transcendental dialectic.’ 
There, Kant explores the question of whether and how reason can produce knowledge 
independently of sensation. The general conclusion of this section of the text is that while reason 
can produce helpful ideas that can guide our thinking, it cannot provide theoretical knowledge 
of the world.  Reason, for Kant, leads us astray when it goes beyond a description of what is 215
given in experience, and as evidence for this he presents a number of cases where the operation 
of reason leads to conflicting, contradictory claims that cannot be reconciled. For Kant, these 
dialectical contradictions indicate that reason should not go beyond what is given in experience, 
and that we can know things only as they appear to us and not as they are in themselves.   216
213 “But if one stays fixed at the abstract negative aspect of dialectics, the result is only the commonplace 
that reason is incapable of knowing the infinite - a peculiar result indeed, for it says that, since the infinite 
is what is rational, reason is not capable of cognizing the rational.” Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.40. 
214 “Kant stopped short at the merely negative result of the unknowability of the in-itself of things and did 
not press on to the true and positive significance of the antinomies.” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 48, 
addition.  
215 This understanding of reason is not an unusual one, but it is by no means uncontroversial. Moreover, 
Kant does take reason to play an important role in moral philosophy - a role which I largely ignore in this 
section in order to focus on issues in Kant’s theoretical philosophy.  
216 Kant uses this distinction between things in themselves and things as experienced to resolve the 
contradictions presented in the transcendental dialectic, thereby providing what might be a considered an 
argument for making this distinction. If restricting our knowledge to things as they appear allows us to 
resolve these contradictions, this provides a certain level of motivation for accepting that restriction. In 
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Hegel, as we have seen, disagrees with Kant on this point. For him, these contradictions 
are of paramount importance not, as Kant would have it, because they demonstrate that we can 
know things only as they appear, but because they provide the motive force for the further 
development of thought. I will have more to say about Hegel’s positive theory of the dialectic in 
the next chapter; here I focus on the problems he discovers with Kant’s view.  
Despite charging Kant with mishandling the dialectic, Hegel does consider the discovery 
of these contradictions to be a great achievement. He writes: 
“This thought that the contradiction posited in the realm of reason by the                         
determinations of the understanding [i.e., the categories] is  essential and                   
necessary must be regarded as one of the most important and profound advances                         
in the philosophy of recent times. The [Kantian] resolution is as trivial as the                           
view is profound. It [the resolution] consists merely in a tenderness for worldly                         
things. It is not supposed to be the worldly essence that bears the blemish of                             
contradiction, but it is supposed to fall to thinking reason  alone , the  essence of                           
spirit . … But now if the worldly  essence is compared with the spiritual  essence ,                           
one can marvel at the naivete with which the humble claim has been put forth                             
and repeated that it is not the worldly essence, but instead the thinking essence,                           
i.e. reason, that is in itself contradictory.”  217
 
In this passage, Hegel first praises Kant for his discovery of the dialectical contradictions 
based in the application of the categories. Immediately following this, however, he dismisses 
Kant’s solution as trivial. Kant’s solution depends crucially on the claim that the contradiction is 
merely in our thinking and not in things themselves. This being the case, he is able to 
disambiguate the apparently contradictory pairs of claims found in the dialectic by showing 
how, for example, one is true of appearances and the other is true of things in themselves. This 
solution would not be possible if the contradictory claims were thought of as both describing the 
section 3.1 I mentioned alternative arguments for denying our knowledge of things in themselves and 
addressed one of them; this is the second such alternative argument. 
In this section, I show how Hegel attacks Kant’s solution to the antinomies and how that solution, and 
thus Kant’s argument for the restriction of our knowledge to appearances, depends on the 
representational conception of the transcendental unity of apperception.  
217 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect 48. 
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nature of things in themselves; Kant’s solution depends crucially on his claim that the 
contradiction occurs in the mind, so that it can be disambiguated in the way he presents.  
But to Hegel, this is no solution at all, and merely shifts the problem. If one moves the 
problem to the mind, the result will be that our thinking is inherently riddled with 
contradictions; but this is just as unacceptable as a contradictory theory of things in themselves. 
Hegel makes this point when he writes that “the determinations of finite and infinite run into 
the same conflict, whether they are applied to time and space, to the world, or are 
determinations internal to the spirit.”  The contrast between finite and infinite is at the root of 218
the antinomies Kant discusses in the dialectic. Here Hegel makes the point that these 
contradictions demand resolution regardless of whether they are internal to the mind or 
contained in the world itself.  Again, “if our representation of the world is dissolved when we 219
carry over to it the determinations of the infinite and finite, still more is spirit itself, which 
contains both determinations within itself, something inwardly self-contradictory, 
self-dissolving.”  Here Hegel again makes the point that by placing the contradictions in the 220
mind, Kant only succeeds in characterizing the our thinking as self-contradictory.  
For Hegel, Kant was  right  in so characterizing our thinking. Thought, and indeed reality 
as a whole,  does  tend toward contradiction, but that contradiction is not something merely 
negative. Instead, the correct understanding of the dialectic would take the contradictory pairs 
and synthesize them, thereby forming new concepts. Kant, however, was unable to appreciate 
this, because he saw the contradictions as arising in the mind alone. Thus, instead of taking 
these contradictions for what they were - the driving force of dialectical inquiry - he took them 
218 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.31. Recall that ‘spirit’ here translates the German ‘ Geist ,’ a word which could 
also be translated as ‘mind.’ 
219 To be sure, Kant does attempt to resolve them by disambiguating them and referring one claim to 
things in themselves and the other to appearances. 
220 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.31.  
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as problems to be solved, and tried to solve them by restricting our knowledge to things as they 
appear. Thus it is that Hegel writes: “Kant stopped short at the merely negative result of the 
unknowability of the in-itself of things and did not press on to the true and positive significance 
of the antinomies.”   221
Kant’s solution here, however, is only an option if one takes the contradictions he 
discovers to be merely mental. For this reason, Kant’s attempt to resolve the antinomies by 
describing them as transcendental illusions, mistakes in reasoning that the mind cannot help 
but make, is rooted in his conception of the transcendental unity of apperception as a merely 
mental activity working with representations and dependent upon sensation. To see why, note 
that the transcendental unity of apperception is considered to be, according to Kant, a condition 
for the possibility of experience. In other words, there could be no experience if there were not 
the kind of unity demanded by the transcendental unity of apperception. But this condition on 
experience does not extend to all of our thinking - in particular, the faculty of reason is not 
governed, according to Kant, by the transcendental unity of apperception. Reason does impose a 
kind of unity on experiences, but the unity it demands is merely desirable and normative, 
whereas the unity provided by the transcendental unity of apperception is necessary and 
constitutive.   222
This distinction, while it may seem unimportant, is the reason that Kant is able to 
provide the solution he does to the contradictions he discovers in the transcendental dialectic. If 
the unity demanded by reason were conceived of as a condition for the possibility of experience, 
as the transcendental unity of apperception was, then the contradictions Kant discovers in 
reason could not be so easily dismissed. It would not be possible to accommodate these 
221 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 48, addition.  
222 Again, there are passages of Kant’s work that seem to hint at a more constitutive role for reason. 
Insofar as we take those passage seriously, Kant seems closer to Hegel than he is presented as being here. 
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contradictions by explaining them as human errors in reasoning. If reason’s unity was a 
condition on experience, and that same unity generated contradictions, then that unity, and 
hence experience itself, would be an impossibility. Thus it is only because Kant distinguishes the 
unity of reason as a normative requirement from the unity of apperception as a constitutive need 
that he is able to answer the antinomies by accepting that reason does in fact necessarily lead to 
contradiction. 
This distinction, however, rests crucially on the assumption that the transcendental unity 
of apperception and the faculty of reason are both mental phenomena. Because human 
cognition can be incomplete, it is possible to conceive of the wholly unified system of our 
representations as an unattainable goal; Kant conceives of the unity of reason in this way. But 
the actual objects we represent, the things in themselves, cannot be incomplete in this way. 
There cannot be gaps in reality in the same way that there can be gaps in our knowledge. There 
is no room among things in themselves for a distinction between a constitutive unity and a 
merely normative one. Thus the very idea that there could be a distinction between the 
transcendental unity of apperception and the unity of reason depends on taking them both as 
merely representational unities. If this basic assumption is dropped, then constitutive unity is 
the only unity that remains, and the unity of reason becomes constitutive as well. The 
transcendental unity of apperception would expand, then, to include the contradictions that 
Kant discovers, and so would demand a resolution that takes these contradictions seriously, 
instead of dismissing them as mental illusions. This is, in effect, what Hegel does in his own 
positive philosophy. The important point here, however, is that the distinction between the unity 
of the understanding, which is conditioned by the transcendental unity of apperception, and the 
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unity of reason, which is merely normative, depends upon Kant’s belief that both unities are 
unities of mental phenomena only.   223
I hope now to have shown how these three objections, arguably the three most frequently 
made objections that Hegel brings against Kant, are, at bottom, consequences of Kant’s 
representational conception of the transcendental unity of apperception. This conception 
grounds the restriction of our knowledge to things in themselves, since it makes the 
transcendental unity of apperception dependent upon intuition for its tenuous link to objects. It 
leads Kant to lift the categories from the traditional forms of judgement because it makes the 
mental operation of judgement appear a good candidate for the source of objectivity. And it 
makes possible the distinction between reason and the understanding, which Kant uses to give 
his problematic solution to the antinomies in the transcendental dialectic. If these arguments 
are successful, then I will have shown that not only does Hegel explicitly identify the 
transcendental unity of apperception as a central insight that Kant mistreats, but that that 
mistreatment is at the root of the other objections that make up the textual bulk of his attacks on 
Kant. This provides a solid motivation for considering the transcendental unity of apperception 
as Hegel’s key point of departure from the Kantian philosophy, and for interpreting Hegel’s 
positive philosophy through that lens. 
Of course, there are other ways of approaching the criticisms Hegel makes of Kant. In the 
following section I present first a possible problem for my unity of apperception-centric reading 
here, and then outline two alternative readings of Hegel on Kant.  
 
223 Accordingly, the distinction between Kant’s argument for the restriction of our knowledge in the 
Transcendental Dialectic, and his argument for the same on the basis of the transcendental unity of 
apperception, is itself a distinction based on Kant’s assumption that he is dealing with subjective, mental 
phenomena alone. If we strip Kant of this assumption, the constitutive unity of apperception would 
subsume the unity of reason; for this reason it is the transcendental unity of apperception that is of 
greater importance in tracing the transition from Kant to Hegel. 
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4.1 Karl Ameriks ­ Hegel’s Criticism as Question­Begging 
Given the centrality of the transcendental unity of apperception as I have depicted it 
here, it remains a curious fact that in the literature on Hegel’s critique of Kant that issue is not 
often made the explicit subject of extended treatment. One exception is Karl Ameriks, who, in 
his paper “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” does make the issue one of Hegel’s 
primary charges against Kant.  There, after showing how Hegel sees the transcendental unity 224
of apperception as a missed chance, Ameriks argues that Hegel’s argument on this point actually 
begs the question against Kant.  For Ameriks, Hegel’s claim amounts essentially to claiming 225
that Kant did not do what Hegel would have with the idea of the transcendental unity of 
apperception. But the fact that Kant did not employ the concept in an argument for absolute 
idealism, and did not use it to eliminate the idea of things in themselves, is not a flaw in Kant’s 
philosophy, at least not according to Kant himself. For Ameriks, it is only because of Hegel’s own 
philosophical agenda that he sees Kant’s representational conception of the transcendental unity 
of apperception as a mistake.  226
The primary goal of this chapter is to present and motivate a study of the transcendental 
unity of apperception as a key player in the connection between Kant and Hegel. On the fact that 
it is does play a key role, Ameriks and I are agreed. And to a certain degree, in establishing that 
point it is immaterial whether Hegel’s claims on this count constitute legitimate objections to 
the Kantian system. It is enough that Hegel makes these criticisms and can be understood as 
building his own philosophy out of the weaknesses he finds in Kant on this point. Nonetheless, if 
Hegel’s arguments were merely question-begging, that would weaken the importance of the 
224 He describes it as “one of three major weaknesses that Hegel finds in Kant’s deduction.” Ameriks, 
“Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 5. 
225 “As far as I can see, it is only with a question-begging assumption of absolute idealism that Hegel can 
force on Kant the kind of all encompassing "productive" representation of the I that he does.” Ameriks, 
“Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 8. 
226 Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 8. 
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connection here and make it harder to justify a reading focused on that connection. So I want to 
take a moment to address these charges against Hegel’s reading of Kant. 
Whether a criticism of another philosopher is question-begging depends on the 
philosophical goals of the criticized philosopher. So to understand whether Hegel is in error on 
this count, we need to understand Kant’s goals. Kant’s primary stated goal in the first  Critique  is 
to explain how synthetic a priori judgments are possible - he describes this issue as the “the real 
problem of pure reason.”  But this question about synthetic a priori judgments is a more 227
precise and philosophically determined way of a framing a more basic question: how can we 
know substantive necessary truths about the world? This same question has plagued many 
philosophers prior to Kant, including thinkers like Plato and Hume, virtually none of whom 
thought of it as a question that was primarily concerned with appearances alone.  Although 228
they did not always make a strong distinction between appearances and things in themselves, if 
pressed, it seems unlikely that Plato, Hume, or even any everyday person, would think of the 
question as primarily focused on how we experience the world. If anything, they would be more 
likely to instinctively conceive of the question as an issue concerning things in themselves, and 
not mere appearances.  229
Bearing this in mind, note that Kant’s representational conception of the transcendental 
unity of apperception can serve as an answer this question only insofar as the synthetic a priori 
227 A few sentences later, he goes on to say that “On the solution of this problem, or on a satisfactory proof 
that the possibility that it demands to have explained does not in fact exist at all, metaphysics now stands 
or falls.” Kant,  Critique   of Pure Reason , B19.  
228 The Platonic theory of forms could be read as an answer to this question, and Hume’s skepticism about 
causality is based on his claim that we cannot have any such knowledge of necessary truths. 
229 Hume, for example, was not a self-avowed skeptic about causality because he thought we did not 
experience  causality. He would agree that we experience certain connections as causally necessary. He 
would deny, however, that there is any such necessity even in our experience, since what we describe as 
causal necessitation is simply the product of repeated habituation. Moreover, even the (illusory) 
experience of such necessary causal connections is not, for him, a necessary one but merely a contingently 
existing habit of the human mind. 
Plato, too, would be deeply dissatisfied if the only way of establishing the existence of the forms was to 
make them necessary features of human cognition.  
97 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 98/182
judgments in question are construed as being judgements about objects understood as 
appearances . Indeed, that is Kant’s key innovation; the theory of transcendental idealism, by 
taking the objects of experiences to be appearances and not things in themselves, is able to 
demonstrate the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. This shift from things in 
themselves to appearances, and the corresponding shift from a study of the nature of the object 
to the nature of the subject, is key to the answer Kant wants to give to his question.  In other 230
words, Kant is able to resolve the matter, but only by re-defining the objects about which we 
form judgments, taking them not to be things in themselves, but appearances only.  
This is a major advance on prior thinkers, who merely dogmatically assumed that such 
judgements were possible. But it also marks a subtle shifting of the goalposts. The original 
question was, if not directly about things in themselves, at least neutral as to whether it was 
them or appearances that we were concerned with. Kant answers it, but by restricting our 
knowledge to appearances only; in doing so he is answering a slightly different question than the 
one originally posed. 
So in charging Kant with misunderstanding the transcendental unity of apperception, 
Hegel is not begging the question. Instead, in effect, he is saying that a better answer to the 
question can be given, one that does not rely on narrowing its scope and thus restricting our 
knowledge to appearances. To put it more forcefully, Hegel is arguing that Kant does not in fact 
succeed in addressing the problem he raises for himself, insofar as he redefines central elements 
of that problem to make it more tractable. If Hegel can answer this question in the way it is 
originally framed, without restricting it to appearances, then his solution would be preferable to 
Kant’s. Understood in this way, the charge that Kant mishandles the transcendental unity of 
230 That Kant describes this shift as a “Copernican  Revolution ” indicates that even for him it represents a 
major shift, a revolution, in how we would normally understand the question. See Kant,  Critique of Pure 
reason , Bxvi-xvii. 
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apperception is not a question-begging objection based on Hegel’s own philosophical agenda, 
but a demand that Kant take his own question seriously and on its own terms - it should be 
understood as a question about how we can have synthetic a priori knowledge not simply of 
appearances, but of things as they are outside of the subject as well. If we take the 
transcendental unity of apperception as a subjective condition on representations, it is useless in 
answering this latter question.  Hegel’s insight, however, is to see that if we liberate the 231
transcendental unity of apperception from its subjective, representational role, it could hold the 
key to a more satisfying solution to our problem. In that, he aims to develop Kant’s basic insight, 
pushing it past the restrictions Kant places on it so that it can give a more complete answer to 
the question Kant himself posed.  
 
4.2 Sally Sedgwick ­ Intuitive Understanding  
Sally Sedgwick, in her book  Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity , 
provides an alternative understanding of Hegel’s approach to Kant’s philosophy. For her, the 
central issue is the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions. For Kant, this 
distinction is a central issue, and much of the  Critique  is aimed at showing how these two kinds 
of representations must be combined if one is to cognize the world. Yet even when combined, 
they remain two distinct and heterogeneous elements, formed through two distinct faculties. It 
is to this strict division that Sedgwick sees Hegel objecting. She writes that Hegel “charges that, 
although Kant to some extent acknowledges the intimate relation of these two components of 
cognition, he fails to fully appreciate the respect in which the two components are identical 
231 It is possible that Ameriks sees Hegel’s position as more problematically question-begging because he 
reads Hegel’s idealism as an attempt to reduce the world to mental phenomena. On such a reading, 
Hegel’s solution would be no better than Kant’s, since it, too, would have nothing to say about things in 
themselves. See Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 5. 
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rather than absolutely opposed or heterogeneous.”  This dichotomy colors his system, and 232
Kant fails to achieve a true unification of these elements, fails to identify their common root.  
Sedgwick’s way of describing this point is to say that Kant remains committed to the idea 
of human cognition as merely  discursive , and denies the existence of any intuitive 
understanding (sometimes also called an ‘intuitive intellect’ or ‘intellectual intuition’). A 
discursive understanding is one that relies on sensations for its content, and is unable to 
generate content freely out of itself.  It is restricted to working with what is given to it. The 233
understanding, as a mere faculty of concepts, is restricted to ordering and arranging the material 
given to it through sensation. An intuitive understanding, by contrast, is one that is “capable of 
generating the matter of cognition merely by exercising its cognitive powers.”  Such an 234
understanding creates the objects of its thought through the simple act of thinking them. One 
might look to God’s creative power for an example of this kind of intuitive understanding. For 
Kant, an intuitive understanding is beyond our capacity to comprehend, and is restricted to 
beings such as God himself.  
According to Sedgwick, Hegel takes a deep interest in the idea of an intuitive 
understanding, and sees it as a kind of organic unity that is prior to the distinction between 
concept and sensation that Kant takes as his starting point.  Kant’s mistake, on this reading, is 235
in not seeing this original unity of concept and sensation. This original mistake then cascades 
with powerful consequences for the rest of his system, some of which I have outlined above. For 
example, the dependence on sensation leads Kant to deny our knowledge of things in 
themselves, and to deny the capacity of Reason to attain knowledge outside the confines of 
232 Sedgwick,  Hegel’s Critique of Kant , 10.  
233 “As discursive, our understanding is a dependent mode of cognition in the following respect: in our 
efforts to know nature, we must rely on a matter or content that is given in sensible intuition.” Sedgwick, 
Hegel’s Critique of Kant , 14. 
234 Sedgwick,  Hegel’s Critique of Kant , 14. 
235 “The intuitive intellect is of interest to Hegel precisely because it suggests a model of cognition in which 
the heterogeneity of concepts and intuitions is overcome.” Sedgwick,  Hegel’s Critique of Kant , 46. 
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sensory experience. What Sedgwick is proposing, then, is that, for Hegel, sensation and concept 
are unified, and the Kantian distinction between faculties of intuition, understanding, and 
reason, collapses.  The result is that we can know things in themselves and can use our reason 236
to attain real knowledge of reality beyond sensory experience, among other things. 
This reading of Hegel accurately portrays central issues in his treatment of Kant. The 
primary difference between Sedgwick and I is one of emphasis - where she focuses on Hegel’s 
theory of human cognition, and how he uses the idea of an intuitive understanding to reimagine 
the relation between concepts and intuitions in the human mind, I focus more on Hegel’s 
transformation of the transcendental unity of apperception. There are, however, reasons to 
prefer this focus. First, Hegel’s mature writings rarely make mention of the intuitive 
understanding, and, when they do, they do not treat it well. In the  Encyclopedia Knowledge , for 
example, Hegel gives an extended and critical treatment of what he calls “the standpoint of 
immediate knowing.”  ‘Immediate knowing,’ in this sense, is a kind of knowledge that is meant 237
to be beyond concepts yet also beyond the sensory world.  It is thus reasonable to read this 238
section of the  Encyclopedia  as an attack on the idea of an intuitive understanding that was in 
vogue at the time, especially in the philosophy of Schelling. Aside from this section attacking the 
idea, the intuitive intellect does not make any appearance in the text. 
The essential problem with an intuitive understanding is, for Hegel, that it does not 
provide a real epistemic foundation for a systematic philosophy. As Kenneth Westphal notes, 
after his early essays and prior to writing the  Phenomenology , Hegel became increasingly 
236 It is important to note that Sedgwick does not take Hegel to be attributing an intuitive understanding 
to human beings. Rather, the intuitive understanding is understood as a common root that grounds the 
connections between concepts and sensations that human beings make, and allows us a greater certainty 
in operating beyond the confines of sensation. Sedgwick,  Hegel’s Critique of Kant , 57. 
237 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 61-78. 
238 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 68. 
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interested in the skeptical Problem of the Criteria.  Indeed, the  Phenomenology  can be read as 239
Hegel’s answer to that problem.  If one attributes to human beings an intuitive intellect, one is, 240
in effect, attributing to them a kind of direct and unquestionable access to reality. But there are 
no criteria in place for measuring when that access is present, and no standards that would 
decide between two rival assertions that both claim to be based on the intuitive intellect. Hegel 
describes this situation in the  Encyclopedia Logic : “because the  fact of consciousness  rather 
than the  nature of the content  is set up as criterion of truth, the basis for what is alleged to be 
true is  subjective  knowing and the  assurance  that I find a certain content in  my  consciousness. 
What I find in  my  consciousness is thereby inflated to mean what is found in  everyone’s 
consciousness and alleged to be the  nature  of consciousness itself.”  For Hegel, the intuitive 241
understanding cannot really function as the foundation of a philosophical system, because 
claims based on it are amount to mere special pleading, to claiming that one has a privileged 
insight into reality that others lack. While such an intuitive understanding may exist, its 
existence cannot be taken as up as the starting point of a philosophical study. 
Second and perhaps more importantly, even if one focuses, as Sedgwick’s Hegel does, on 
the dependence of concepts on intuitions, this distinction is a result of Kant’s representational 
treatment of the transcendental unity of apperception. If Kant were not focused on mental 
representations, he would not see the transcendental unity of apperception and the concepts it 
employs as dependent upon intuitions for their relation to objects. Sedgwick herself sees Hegel 
239 Westphal, “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of ‘the’ Intuitive Intellect,” 290. The problem of the criteria is the 
skeptical problem that one faces when deciding on a standard to use in making knowledge claims. Of any 
standard, one can ask why it is an appropriate standard. This forces one either into the circular position of 
using the standard to justify claims about the standard or into a regress of different standards.  
240 Westphal, “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of ‘the’ Intuitive Intellect,” 290. The same point is echoed by 
Michael Forster in his book  Hegel and Skepticism . One way of understanding the difference in Hegel and 
Kant’s approach to philosophy is in the different forms of skepticism they took as primarily problematic. 
Hegel concerned himself above all with the Problem of the Criteria, while Kant was more focused on what 
Forster calls ‘metaphysical skepticism,’ as described in the previous chapter. 
241 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 71. 
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as making this point. She writes that for Hegel, Kant’s strict division between concept and 
intuition, and the problems that come from it are a result of the fact that Kant’s idealism “suffers 
from ‘subjectivity.’”  In other words, Kant’s problem here is that he sees experience as 242
ultimately representational, the result of some activity of the subject. The dependence of 
concepts on intuitions is one of the major claims that are based in this position.  But if this is 243
so, then it is ultimately the Kantian  metaphysics  that is the sticking point between Kant and 
Hegel. Had Kant not insisted on a strict division between subject and object, and restricted 
himself to studying the nature of the subject’s mind, the problems Sedgwick raises for the 
intuitive understanding would not have come up. 
Ultimately, however, Sedgwick’s focus on the issue of intuitive understanding is in fact 
quite strongly aligned with our own project. As Sedgwick herself points out, Hegel thinks of the 
transcendental unity of apperception as the high point of Kant’s philosophy. It has this status, 
however, precisely because it is with the idea of the transcendental unity of apperception that 
Kant most closely approximates the idea of an intuitive understanding. The transcendental unity 
of apperception is a wholly spontaneous activity that generates the objects of experience. Kant’s 
pivotal mistake was to conceive of it as representational and thus restrict it by making it 
dependent upon material given to it from outside. Had he not made this mistake, the 
transcendental unity of apperception would be, in fact, nothing other than the intuitive 
understanding itself.  This being the case, in tracing the development and transformation of 244
242 Sedgwick,  Hegel’s Critique of Kant , 70. 
243  “For Hegel, systems committed to the metaphysic of subjectivity embrace the thesis of absolute 
opposition. Hegel is therefore convinced that, for all their differences, Kantians and empiricists share 
assumptions about the respective contributions, in cognition, of sensible content and subjective form.” 
Sedgwick,  Hegel’s Critique   of Kant , 93. 
244 Sedgwick seems to actually make this point herself: “In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant introduces 
the idea of a faculty whose thought-forms or concepts are not “absolutely opposed” or “external” to 
intuitions. Kant, in other words, seems to acknowledge that human cognition ultimately depends on acts 
of synthesis performed by a faculty that is neither a pure faculty of intuitions nor a pure faculty of 
concepts. But although he introduces the idea of a faculty that on his own description is an ‘original 
synthetic unity,’ he remains true in the end to his commitment to dichotomy or heterogeneity. As Hegel 
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the transcendental unity of apperception from Kant to Hegel, we are, in effect, tracing Kant’s 
closest approximation of the intuitive understanding and seeing how Hegel develops it in his 
own philosophy. This project, I hope, would be one that Sedgwick would approve of.  
 
4.3 Béatrice Longuenesse ­ The Nature of Truth 
Béatrice Longuenesse, too, presents a different picture of the pivotal disagreement 
between Kant and Hegel. For Longuenesse, however, the key issue is one concerning the proper 
definition of truth. She writes, for example, that “behind the false ‘problem of the thing in itself’ 
lurks another: the problem of how to define truth.”  In the  Critique of Pure Reason , Kant 245
seems quite happy to take as given the traditional correspondence theory of truth. On such a 
view, truth is “the agreement of cognition with its object.”  In other words, a judgement about 246
some object is true if and only if that object corresponds appropriately with that judgement.  
The problem, however, is that if Kant is right and we know only things as they appear to 
us, then this criteria of truth is never met. The object of our cognitions is an appearance 
provided through sensation, but the cognition itself is not an appearance - it is a linking of 
concepts. According to Longuenesse’s Hegel, there can be no agreement between these two 
entirely heterogeneous elements: “in this case, cognition is the concept, and its object is the 
appearance, the “undetermined object of a sensible intuition.” Obviously they do not agree: how 
could a concept and a sensible image agree?”  Instead, agreement can only arise  within 247
thought itself, where both object and concept are taken up as parts of thought itself. One must, 
points out, Kant claims that all combination or synthesis is an act of spontaneity performed by our faculty 
of concepts (the “understanding”). The faculty he [Kant] identifies as an original synthetic unity, then, 
turns out not to be a genuine synthetic unity after all.” In other words, it is in the unity of apperception 
that Kant comes close to overcoming the dichotomy Sedgwick points out, and while Kant came close, he 
ultimately fails to take this insight far enough, because he continues to conceive of it as a product of “our 
faculty of concepts.” Sedgwick , Hegel’s Critique of Kant , 11. 
245 Longuenesse,  Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics , 24. 
246 Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , A58/B82. 
247 Longuenesse,  Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics , 24. 
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accordingly, conceive of both the object and the conceptual representation of it as arising within 
thought.   248
Understood this way, one ceases to ask how one can know the thing in itself - such a 
question no longer make sense, since both the object of our cognition and that cognition itself 
occur within thought, and there is nothing outside thought, no thing in itself standing externally 
opposed to thought. Hegel thus reframes the discussion of the thing in itself as a discussion 
about truth; the thing in itself, insofar as it exists, is the standard against which we measure the 
truth of our claims, but that standard is internal to thought itself - it is a standard  we set up for 
ourselves . Where for Kant the thing in itself was an external and unknowable entity, for Hegel it 
is understood as something internal to thought, playing a specific role in our thinking.  249
Reconceptualizing truth as thought’s agreement with itself changes the thing-in-itself into a part 
of thought, not some “absolute beyond” as it was in Kant.  250
Now, it cannot be denied that Hegel does indeed take this stance on the thing-in-itself, 
claiming that it is in fact a product of thought, and that Kant fell into error by conceiving of it as 
an entity in its own right, independent of the mind.  Hegel also often frames truth in terms of 251
an agreement of thought with itself, and scorns rationalist and empiricist philosophers (among 
whom he places Kant), for not understanding the nature of truth aright.   252
But one might wonder why Kant so willingly accepts the standard correspondence theory 
of truth. One clear contributing factor was his representational conception of the transcendental 
unity of apperception, and of his project in general. Kant saw himself from the beginning as 
248 “There can be agreement only between two elements that are homogeneous to one another: between 
thought and thought, between cognition as thought and object as an object that is thought. In other 
words, for cognition of an object to be said true, the object itself must be transformed into an object that is 
thought.” Longuenesse,  Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics , p25. 
249 “It is easy to see that such an abstract entity as the thing-in-itself is itself only the product of thought, 
and of merely abstractive thought at that.” Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.47. 
250 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 60, addition. 
251 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.47. 
252 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 26. 
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outlining the mental faculties of human subjects. His study was an a priori one based on 
rational, not empirical, methods, but it nonetheless remained at all times concerned with the 
representational faculties of subjects. This perspective begins from the opposition between 
subjects and objects and tries to makes sense of the possibility of a connection between them. A 
philosophy that is focused on connecting subject with object will naturally take truth to be a 
correspondence of the mental representation with the objects, be they understood as 
appearances or as things in themselves. Kant’s problematic theory of truth, then, rests most 
fundamentally on his problematically representational theory of judgements, since it is after all 
only judgements that can be true or false. As representational, these judgements always referred 
to something beyond themselves, and that beyond served as the basis for their truth or falsity. 
But judgements are the results of the transcendental unity of apperception’s unifying activity; to 
take them to be representational is to take the transcendental unity of apperception to be 
representational. Bringing all this together, we can see that if Kant did not already conceive of 
the transcendental unity of apperception as a condition on representations alone, then the 
correspondence theory of truth would have been unworkable. It is thus this representational 
treatment of the transcendental unity of apperception that underlies Kant’s flawed conception of 
truth and the objections Longuenesse’s Hegel brings against it.  
 
5 Conclusion ­ The History of Philosophy 
If this chapter has been successful, then the reader should be persuaded that the 
transcendental unity of apperception plays a central role in understanding Hegel’s criticism of 
Kant. In a way, such a conclusion was already obvious - the transcendental unity of apperception 
is central to Kant’s philosophy, so it should surprise no one that it is central to Hegel’s criticism 
of the same. But more specifically, Hegel takes issue with Kant’s representational conception of 
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this central element, with his restriction of it to a subject and its dependence on sensations. 
From this crucial mistake, any number of other Kantian failings follow, from his denial of our 
knowledge of things in themselves, to his failure to derive the categories or the dialectic of 
reason.  
In the next chapter, I show how Hegel transforms this subjective unity of apperception, 
and how that transformation can be used to understand the Hegelian system as a whole. But 
before moving on, I want to pause briefly to consider how Hegel must have seen himself in 
relation to Kant, not simply as a critic of the latter, but as a philosopher in his own right. It is 
well known that Hegel saw the history of philosophy as not merely a collection of ideas 
conditioned by contingent socio-economic forces, but as a real development towards a greater, 
more consistent and comprehensive understanding of the world. Philosophical systems of the 
past, for Hegel, were each and all attempts to know the world, and each of them contained 
within them some truth, though glimpsed incompletely and thus presented inconsistently.  
For Hegel, the key element of truth contained in the Kantian system was the 
transcendental unity of apperception. As we noted above, time and again Hegel would return to 
Kant’s discovery of it as the central Kantian insight. It was here that Kant discovered the 
fundamental unity of subject and object, the neutral starting point that, through its own activity, 
differentiated them from one another and generated the whole of our experienced universe. But 
Kant, like every philosopher prior to Hegel, saw this truth only, as it were, through a glass 
darkly. He thought of it as a mere operation of the mind, and was blind to its truly neutral 
ontological status. 
Given his dialectical view of history, Hegel likely would have seen himself as extracting 
the germ of truth from the Kantian system and developing it fully in his own work. But the point 
I want to make here is that, given his conception of the history of philosophy, the mere fact that 
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Hegel praises the transcendental unity of apperception so highly is sufficient to entail that he 
sees the mishandling of it as the crucial error of the Kantian system. Philosophies go wrong 
when the light of their truth is clouded by the dogma and assumptions of their time period. For 
Hegel, that happened to Kant’s conception transcendental unity of apperception; it was clouded 
by the empiricism and formal thinking of Kant’s time. In our reading of Hegel on Kant, it is 
important that we focus on this central truth that Kant could not see clearly - it is there that we 
will find Hegel’s most important objections and his most stunning innovations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Hegel’s Thought and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception 
 
In the previous chapter, I presented Hegel’s criticisms of the Kantian project. Those 
criticisms, I hope to have shown, were rooted in Kant’s way of conceiving the transcendental 
unity of apperception as a condition on representations alone. From this point followed a 
number of separate objections Hegel brought against Kant, including the restrictions Kant 
placed on our knowledge, his insufficiently critical derivation of the categories, and his failure to 
appreciate the true nature of the dialectic. In this chapter, I focus on Hegel’s own positive 
philosophy, and especially the way he aims to correct the failings he sees in Kant. I will argue 
that the fundamental shift that allows Hegel to succeed where he sees Kant as failing is the 
transition from the Kantian subject that acts to unify representations in the transcendental unity 
of apperception to the Hegelian conception of a unifying entity that is neither subject nor object. 
The name Hegel gives to this entity is ‘Thought.’  253
This interpretation emphasizes the ontological difference between the Kantian and 
Hegelian systems of philosophy and takes seriously Hegel’s frequent claims to be doing logic and 
metaphysics simultaneously.  In doing so, the interpretation given here differs from many in 254
the current literature. Most recent interpretations read Hegel as exploring the necessary 
structure of the mind, as giving a new version of the derivation of categories: a project quite 
similar to Kant’s, though different in it’s execution.  On my reading, however, although Hegel 255
253 Because ‘thought’ is a common term and Hegel has a unique understanding of it, I use a capitalized 
‘Thought’ to name Hegel’s concept and distinguish it from the everyday conception. 
254 See for example Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.48-49. In stressing the metaphysical dimension of Hegel, I 
am explicitly opposed to readers like Robert Pippin, who “defend a nonmetaphysical interpretation of 
Hegel.” Pippin,  Hegel’s Idealism , 6. 
255 In this connection Stephen Houlgate writes that ”Hegel sees it as the task of the  Logic  to provide in a 
rigorous and disciplined manner a proper understanding of the familiar categories of thought.” Houlgate, 
The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , 13. Sebastian Rödl also sees Hegel’s project as one of deriving categories 
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did study the mind, this study forms only a small part of his overall project. To ignore the 
metaphysical dimension of his thought would be to ignore that part of Hegel that marks his most 
radical departure from his predecessors and which holds the key to understanding how he can 
feel justified in his claim to have resolved their problems, and indeed, all the problems of 
philosophy, once and for all. 
The chapter that follows is divided into five major sections. In the first, I briefly outline 
again the issues Hegel finds problematic in Kant. In the second and third, I present the Hegelian 
conception of Thought and show how Hegel uses it, through the dialectical method, to address 
these issues. By going through the dialectic and understanding its process, we can come to an 
understanding of exactly how Hegel transforms the transcendental unity of apperception to 
solve the problems he finds in the Kantian position. Section four then is concerned with a more 
sustained comparison of the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception and Hegel’s 
modification of it in order to demonstrate that Hegel is modifying something present in Kant, 
and not building a completely new system from scratch. Finally, in section five I conclude by 
turning to a more focused defense of my reading against alternatives, specifically those readings 
that focus on the social dimension of Hegel’s philosophy and the category-theory style readings 
described briefly above. 
 
1 Criticisms of Kant 
In the previous chapter, I discussed Hegel’s criticisms of Kant’s transcendental unity of 
apperception. Before going into more detail with regard to Hegel’s own positive philosophy, it 
analogous to Kant’s - see Rödl, “Eliminating Externality,” 186. As a last example, John Burbridge, too, 
argues that Hegel is concerned with the categories that “structure our thinking of the world.” Burbridge, 
“Hegel’s Conception of Logic,” 92. For my part, I do not deny that there is an analogy there, but deny that 
as categories of thought, they should be understood as the mental objects Rödl and Houlgate take them to 
be.  
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may be worthwhile to briefly summarize the main points Hegel makes against the Kantian 
theory.  
As we noted in the first chapter, Kant’s use of the transcendental unity of apperception is 
aimed at three main results. First, Kant wants to defend our knowledge of theoretical truths 
against metaphysical skepticism - skepticism about our knowledge of necessary truths. Second, 
he is concerned to address Pyrrhonian skepticism. And finally, Kant wants to defend our belief 
in God and free agency against a naturalistic conception of the world that would seem to 
overturn them. The transcendental unity of apperception is key to achieving all three of these 
goals, as I have described in my first chapter. 
But while the Kantian project may be successful in these aims, this remains, for Hegel, 
only a partial victory. Kant’s use of the transcendental unity of apperception sees it in every case 
as a condition on representations, on mental items. Since in this chapter our major concern is 
with the contrasting metaphysics of these philosophers, it may be useful to frame this objection 
more clearly in terms of that contrast. One way to get at this issue from the perspective of Kant’s 
metaphysics is to say that although Kant distinguishes the subjective from the objective  within 
experience, he is able to do so only by dogmatically assuming another, more fundamental 
distinction between subject and object. This is the metaphysical distinction between the subject 
as receiver of representations and the object as the mind-independent source of representations. 
From Hegel’s perspective, Kant in the  Critique  simply assumes that the subject receives 
sensations from some external influence. Based on this assumption, Kant is then able to 
describe how the sensations received by the subject are unified, and in this way derive the 
subjective/objective distinction within the subject’s own experience. In that context, the 
distinction appears as the distinction between those representations that are unique to the 
subject and under its free power (subjective) as opposed to those that are intersubjectively 
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agreed upon and forced upon us (objective). But the more basic subject/object distinction is left 
untouched and unexplained - why would the world be divided into subjects forming 
representations and mind-independent objects being represented? Kant assumes this 
distinction and occupies himself with the subject side of it. But while Hegel agrees that such a 
distinction is present, he takes Kant to have given an inadequate explanation of why. Because 
the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception is seen as a condition on representations, it 
begins by assuming a distinction between representations and what they represent, and cannot 
be used to derive this more fundamental distinction between subject and object.  256
This in turn leaves Kant unable to attain his philosophical aims in a way that Hegel 
would find satisfactory. The requirement that  representations  be unified says nothing about 
what things would be like outside of their being represented. For this reason, Kant’s 
achievement always remains at the level of representation. This restriction, for Kant, is 
important and beneficial, since it eliminates all possibility for theoretical knowledge about the 
nature of things as they are in themselves, outside our representations of them. This means, in 
turn, that we are free to believe in the existence of God or the freedom of the will, since these 
would be features of things in themselves. But for Hegel, the restriction of the transcendental 
unity of apperception to representations alone creates at least three key weaknesses in the 
Kantian position. 
First, Kant’s restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception leaves us unable to 
have theoretical knowledge about God, freedom, or things as they are in themselves.  While 257
Kant is able to preserve the possibility of God’s existence against the attacks of atheists, he is 
powerless to prove definitively that God exists. Perhaps even more problematic is the fact that 
256 As we shall see, one of Hegel’s aims will be to derive this distinction more clearly.  
257 One should note here that Kant does not deny  all  knowledge of God, freedom, or immortality. He 
seems to admit that we can have some knowledge of these things on the basis of practical reason. 
112 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 113/182
we cannot know how things are in themselves, and only ever know our own representations of 
them.  While Kant did not see these restrictions as drawbacks, Hegel in finds it unacceptable 258
that we could not know things as they are in themselves. This, too, was a direct result of 
restricting the transcendental unity of apperception to representations; so restricted, it can only 
be used to structure the objective world of our experience, not the objective world itself.  
Second, the restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception to representations 
weakens Kant’s derivation of the categories, the specific a priori concepts he sees as necessary 
features of experience. By restricting the action of the transcendental unity in this way, he makes 
it dependent on representations given to the subject from an external influence: sensations. The 
subject’s role, then, cannot be in creating experience wholesale, but in collecting and ordering 
this raw data through the act of judgement. In this way, the act of judgement gives a certain 
conceptual form to our experience. As a result, the forms of judgement are given a privileged 
position, and it would seem natural to proceed as Kant does and use the 12 forms of judgement 
he identifies as the starting point to derive the categories. 
For Hegel, however, this way of proceeding ultimately leaves unexplained why 
judgement takes on those 12 forms and no others. What Hegel would require is that the various 
specific forms of judgement themselves be shown to be necessary and the system of them shown 
to be complete. Kant fails to achieve this, in part because he restricts the transcendental unity of 
apperception to acting on sensations. This restriction amounts to restricting the transcendental 
unity of apperception to producing only the subjective form of experience. The corresponding 
emphasis on subjective form makes it appear as if the categories are merely mental entities, and 
could be discovered through a study of one’s own thought processes.  This leaves Kant content 259
258 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , section 41, addition 2. 
259 Kant implies as much when he claims that the completeness of logic in his day results from its being 
concerned only with the form of thought, which is immediately available to us at all times, as opposed to 
the objects of experience. See Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason , Bix. 
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to describe the forms of judgement on the basis of introspection and the historically accepted 
logic of his time, though of course with some modifications. Kant thus gives no philosophically 
systematic derivation of these logical forms, and hence no clear derivation of the categories. For 
Hegel, this is a major oversight - Kant’s reliance on rational introspection in his study of logic 
obscures the deeper question of what exactly the logical forms should be, and if they should be 
thought of as mere forms at all.  260
Last, Kant is unable to fully appreciate the character of the dialectic. Although he is the 
first to make the major discovery that reason contradicts itself in its natural operation, he shies 
away from addressing this fact head-on. Instead, because he sees reason as operating with 
merely normative requirements, rather than the constitutive conditions on representation 
characteristic of the transcendental unity of apperception, Kant comes to see the contradictions 
in reason as a matter of mental overreach. Reason is led to these errors by its ideas, but had it 
remained within the realm of appearances, no such error would have arisen. Hegel sees this as a 
kind of false humility that misses the important role contradiction has to play in our thinking 
and in reality at large.  
 
2 Hegel’s Solution ­ Thought 
Hegel shares many of Kant’s basic goals. He too wants to address skepticism and give an 
account of why the world seems to divide itself into mental and non-mental, subjective and 
objective. He also wants to explain why the world has the necessary and universal features it has, 
and how we can know these features. Finally, and here Hegel is perhaps even more invested 
260 “Kant’s examination of the thought-determinations suffers essentially from the defect that they are not 
being considered in and for themselves but only from the viewpoint of whether they are  subjective  or 
objective .” Hgel,  Encyclopedia Logic , section 41, addition 2. Here Hegel points out that Kant places undue 
emphasis on the question of whether the categories (“thought-determinations”) are applicable to objects, 
and does not examine the nature of the categories themselves. See also Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.35. 
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than Kant, Hegel wants to justify our belief in God, freedom and moral truths. So, with these 
goals in mind, Hegel can see himself as carrying on the Kantian project, though, as we shall see, 
in a radically altered form. 
The key problem with the Kantian project, as we have seen, was that it located the drive 
to unity, the transcendental unity of apperception, in the  subject , as a demand for unity among 
the subject’s  representations . In locating the transcendental unity of apperception in the 
subject, Kant effectively begins by assuming a distinction between the subject as receiver of 
representations and the object as the source of them, and then turning to see how the subject 
must handle the representations it has received. But by focusing on the subject’s side of this 
assumed distinction, Kant makes it impossible for him to derive this distinction itself, as well as 
impossible for him to provide any solutions to his problems that could go beyond the subject’s 
own faculties and address things as they are in themselves. Hegel, observing this flaw in the 
Kantian project, realizes that the drive toward unity cannot be located in the subject; it cannot 
be a transcendental unity of  apperception , but must be a different kind of unity.  
At the same time, however, it would not be effective to locate the demand for unity in the 
object as the source of representations. This approach to the question suffers from the same 
problem that faced Kant - by beginning from one side of the subject/object distinction and 
aiming to construct the other, it fails to explain the origin of the distinction itself, and would 
incapable of explaining how things stood with the other side.  What is required, then, is some 261
third element, that would be neither subject nor object, but instead serve as a neutral origin 
from which the distinction between perceiver and perceived, representor and represented, 
subject and object, could be derived.  
261 Fichte elaborates on this point at length, arguing that the object-side could never explain the nature of 
subjectivity. Hegel, having worked with Fichte and written criticisms of his work, would have been 
familiar with these points. See Fichte, “Science of Knowledge: First Introduction,” 48-53. 
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This neutral element Hegel calls ‘Thought.’ The fundamental shift that allows Hegel to 
succeed where he sees Kant as failing is the ontological shift from Kant’s subjective conception 
of the transcendental unity of apperception to Hegel’s subject/object-neutral conception of 
Thought. Arguing for this claim will be the task of the remainder of this chapter, but I begin that 
argument simply by pointing out the crucial role Thought plays in Hegel’s philosophy.  
In Hegel’s own estimation, his most important published text is the  Science of Logic , 
which was first published in 1812 but updated throughout Hegel’s lifetime. After his death, and 
in today’s scholarship, another Hegelian text, the  Phenomenology of Spirit  came to be a major 
focus of Hegel’s readers. But the  Phenomenology  in fact plays only a preliminary role in the 
Hegelian system. Hegel describes this role in the introduction to the  Science of Logic , where he 
writes that “the concept of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the 
present work in so far as the  Phenomenology of Spirit  is nothing other than that deduction.”  262
The  Phenomenology  is aimed at an examination of the epistemological positions and their 
internal inconsistencies. This study leads, ultimately, to the standpoint of what Hegel here calls 
‘pure science,’ and the  Science of Logic  is that pure science.  The  Phenomenology  is thus 263
primarily a tool to help readers enter into the Hegelian way of approaching philosophy.  
This approach to philosophy is embodied in the book Hegel wrote immediately after the 
Phenomenology , and to which he devoted over 4 years of his life: the  Science of Logic .  Hegel’s 264
life after the  Phenomenology  was spent developing and revising the  Logic , and his writings and 
lectures all take it, not the  Phenomenology  as their starting point. In fact, Hegel never lectured 
262 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.33. See also Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.54. The deduction of a concept, 
which Hegel discusses here, means a demonstration that the concept has valid application. In this case, 
the  Phenomenology  demonstrates that there is a pure science, and what that science would be. 
263 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.33. 
264 This 4 year estimate is highly conservative, and tracks only the years from the publication of the first 
volume in 1812 to the last in 1816. In fact, Hegel was working on early drafts of the  Logic  even before he 
wrote the  Phenomenology . By comparison, the  Phenomenology  occupied Hegel only for 2-3 years, from 
about 1805-1806 to it’s publication in 1807. See Pinkard’s  Hegel: A Biography , for a description of 
Hegel’s development in these years. 
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on the  Phenomenology  at all during his 13 years at the University of Berlin, and even came to 
reject it as even an ‘introduction’ to his system in 1825.  Moreover, in later texts, Hegel often 265
aims to restate the conclusions of the  Science of Logic  in more approachable language or to 
develop them further and apply them in new areas.  As an example, the first book of the 266
Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences , the  Encyclopedia Logic , is essentially a summarization 
of the  Science of Logic  itself. The  Elements of the Philosophy of Right  is also presented as a 
further development of that system. Many of these later texts explicitly mirror the structure of 
the  Science of Logic , using its original dialectic as a model for the development of a philosophy 
of nature, for example.  For Hegel, there are systematic reasons for this mirroring, but the 267
crucial point here is that it is the  Science of Logic  that serves as a foundation for these later 
texts. So while the  Phenomenology  serves as a kind of entry-point, a guide to bring everyday 
people into the Hegelian way of thinking, its usefulness ends once that goal is achieved, and 
Hegel’s developed system of philosophy is found in the  Science of Logic  and the texts that 
followed it. 
Now, if the  Science of Logic  is Hegel’s major text, our next question must be - what is the 
Science of Logic  about? Hegel makes clear that the  Science of Logic  is occupied with nothing 
other than Thought: “thinking [ Denken ] is thus the content of pure science” and logic is “defined 
as the science of pure thought [ reinen Denkens ].”  Thought, then, is the basic subject matter of 268
Hegel’s most important works, and it would behoove us to understand fully what Hegel means 
by that term.  
265 Pinkard, “Hegel’s  Phenomenology  and  Logic : an overview.” 
266 These aims occupy the  Encyclopedia Logic , and the  Philosophy of Nature  and  Philosophy of Spirit , 
respectively, as well as other works. 
267 These connections are common in the later texts. See for example Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 
249, 252, and 254.  
268 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.34 and 21.45. See also the  Encyclopedia Logic , where Hegel writes that 
“logic is the science of thinking” and that “everyone is in agreement that thinking is the object of logic.”. 
Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic ,   sect. 19 and sect. 19, addition 2. The significance of the term ‘pure’ in the 
passage quoted above will be considered in the following section. 
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2.1    What is Thought? A Puzzle 
‘Thought’ is a common word in everyday conversations. In everyday life, one might say 
that they are thinking about lunch, having second thoughts about their decisions, etc. Thinking 
in this context is generally understood as a kind of mental work with representations, where we 
form inferences and perhaps produce new concepts. Logic, on this way of understanding, would 
be the study of the rules we use (or should use) in inference and in employing concepts. If we 
understand thought in this way, then Hegel’s emphasis on thought as the major topic of the 
Science of Logic  will make it appear as if he is emphasizing the importance of studying these 
laws and placing that study at the center of his system. That many readers of Hegel walk away 
with this impression, or one along these lines, is thus unsurprising, given the way the word 
‘thought’ is used in our everyday life.  269
But Hegel’s conception of Thought is radically different from this. Indeed, it has to be - 
given the criticisms of Kant presented above, the everyday use of the word ‘thought’ must appear 
to Hegel as overly subjective and restricted to the sphere of the representations. In this section, 
then, I want to provide a few passages that present Hegel’s positive claims about what Thought 
is. These should serve on the one hand to demonstrate that Hegel’s Thought really is something 
quite different than the everyday understanding of thought, and on the other hand to give us a 
concrete textual basis from which to develop an understanding of this central Hegelian concept.  
Consider the following passages: 
“Logic was defined as the science of pure thought - the science that has  pure                             
knowledge for its principle and is a unity which is not abstract but living and                             
concrete, so that the opposition of consciousness between  a being subjectively                     
existing for itself , and another but objectively  existing such being , has been                       
overcome in it, and being is known to be in itself a pure concept and the pure                                 
concept to be true being.”   270
269 I have in mind here readers such as Pippin, who aim to present a nonmetaphysical reading of Hegel, 
and those who see him as producing a kind of neo-Kantian category theory. See Pippin,  Hegel’s Idealism , 
and Houlgate,  The Opening of Hegel’s Logic . 
270 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.45. 
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“Pure science thus presupposes the liberation from the opposition of                   
consciousness. It contains  thought in so far as this thought is equally the fact as                             
it is in itself; or the  fact in itself in so far as this  is equally pure thought . As                                       
science, truth is pure self-consciousness as it develops itself and has the shape of                           
the self, so that that which exists in and for itself is the known concept and the                                 
concept as such is that which exists in and for itself. 
[...] 
Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the                           
realm of pure thought.  This realm is truth unveiled, truth as it is in and for itself .                                 
It can therefore be said that this content is  the exposition of God as he is in his                                   
eternal essence before the creation of nature and of finite spirit. ”  271
 
“In general, from what has been said so far, the logical dimension is to be sought                               
as a system of thought-determinations for which the opposition of the subjective                       
and the objective (in its ordinary sense) falls away. This meaning of thinking and                           
its determinations is expressed more directly by the ancients when they say that                         
nous governs the world - or when we say that reason exists in the world and mean                                 
by it that reason is the soul of the world, residing in it, immanent in it as its                                   
ownmost, innermost nature, its universal. To take a more particular example,                     
when we talk about some specific animal we say that it is an  animal . The  animal                               
as such cannot be shown, only a specific animal can.  The  animal does not exist                             
concretely but is instead the universal nature of individual animals, and each                       
concretely existing animal is much more concretely specific, something                 
particularized. But to be an animal, i.e. the genus that is the universal, belongs to                             
the specific animal and constitutes its specific essentiality. Take what it is to be an                             
animal away from a dog, and we would be at a loss to say what it is. In general,                                     
things have an abiding inner nature as well as an external existence. They live and                             
die, come to be and pass away. The genus is their essentiality, their universality,                           
and it is not to be construed merely as a some common feature.  
Just as thinking makes up the substance of external things, so it is also the                             
universal substance of all things spiritual. […] thinking is the universal in all                         
representations, memories, and generally in every spiritual activity, in all willing,                     
wishing, and so forth. The latter are one and all merely further specifications of                           
thinking. When we construe thinking in this way, it appears in a different context                           
from when we merely say that among and alongside other faculties such as                         
perception, representations, willing, and so on we also possess the faculty of                       
thinking. When we consider thinking as the true universal in everything natural                       
and everything spiritual as well, then it extends over all of this and is the                             
271 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.34. 
119 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 120/182
foundation of everything. […] We can say that ‘I’ and thought are the same; or                             
more specifically, ‘I’ is the thinking as someone thinking.”  272
 
“[Kant’s] principle idea is to vindicate the  categories for self-consciousness                   
understood as the  subjective ‘I’. Because of this determination, his point of view                         
remains confined within consciousness and its opposition, and, besides the                   
empirical element of feeling and intuition, is left with something else not posited                         
or determined by thinking self-consciousness, a  thing­in­itself , something alien                 
and external to thinking - although it is easy to see that such an abstract entity as                                 
the  thing­in­itself is itself only the product of thought, and of merely abstractive                         
thought at that. - If other Kantians have expanded on the determining of the                           
intended object by the ‘I’ by saying that the objectifying of the ‘I’ is to be regarded                                 
as an original and necessary deed of consciousness, so that in this original deed                           
there is not yet the representation of the ‘I’ … then this objectifying deed,                           
liberated from the opposition of consciousness, is closer to what may be called                         
simply  thinking  as such. But this deed should no longer be called consciousness;                         
for consciousness holds within itself the opposition of the ‘I’ and its intended                         
object which is not to be found in that original deed. The name ‘consciousness’                           
gives it more of a semblance of subjectivity than does the term ‘ thought ,’ which                           
here, however, is to be taken in the absolute sense of  infinite thought , not as                             
encumbered by the finitude of consciousness; in short,  thought as such .”  273
 
Hegel also often speaks of other terms that are typically associated with minds and 
mental operations as if they are to be considered in this same neutral sense, as not restricted to 
mental operations. Terms like ‘concept,’ ‘idea,’ and ‘judgement,’ which name late stages of the 
dialectic are good examples of this: 
“In logic at the level of the understanding the concept is usually considered as a                             
mere form of thinking and, more precisely, as a universal representation. The                       
claim, so often repeated from the side of sentiment and the heart, that concepts                           
as such are something dead, empty, and abstract, refers to this low-level                       
construal of the concept. Meanwhile, just the opposite holds and the concept is                         
instead the principle of all life and thereby, at the same time, something                         
absolutely concrete.”  274
 
272 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, addition 1. 
273 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.47-48. 
274 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 160, addition. 
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“The idea can be grasped as  reason (this is the genuine philosophical meaning of                           
reason ), further as  subject­object , as the  unity of the ideal and the real, of the                             
finite and the infinite, of soul and the body,  as the  possibility that has its                             
actuality in itself , as that the  nature of which  can only be conceived as existing,                             
and so forth because in it all relationships of the understanding are contained,                         
but in their  infinite  return and identity in themselves.”  275
 
“Judgement is usually taken in the  subjective sense as an  operation  and form that                           
surfaces merely in  self­conscious thinking. This difference, however, is not yet on                       
hand in the logical [sphere, where] judgement is supposed to be taken in the                           
completely universal sense:  all things are a judgement .”  276
 
From these passages, it is clear that Hegel does not use the word ‘thought,’ or other 
apparently mental terms, in the everyday way we might be accustomed to using them. Thought 
is seen as the “foundation of everything,” as “infinite” and “unencumbered by the finitude of 
consciousness,” and as “equally the fact in itself.” The concept is “the principle of all life” and he 
specifically distinguishes his understanding of judgement from the typical one, writing that “all 
things are a judgement.” Making sense of these claims will be the work of the next sections of 
this chapter. In doing so, we will come to a fuller understanding of what it might mean for 
Thought to be the neutral element I’ve been describing, and come closer to a reading of Hegel 
that can do justice to these difficult parts of his texts. I focus on two major claims: that Thought 
is “unencumbered by the finitude of consciousness,” and that Thought is the substance of things 
both external and spiritual. 
 
 
 
 
275 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 214. 
276 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 167.  
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2.2 Thought and the Finitude of Consciousness 
In the passages cited above, there is frequent reference to the “opposition of 
consciousness” and the “finitude of consciousness.” These phrases do not have any immediately 
clear interpretation. My claim is that these two phrases are synonymous, and that they both 
point to the fact that consciousness is essentially dependent upon a dualism of subject and 
object. For Thought to be “liberated from” or “unencumbered by” this opposition, then, would 
be precisely for it to be neutral, neither subject nor object. But before all this can be argued for, it 
is essential first to understand Hegel’s use of the two key terms ‘finite’ and ‘consciousness.’ 
To begin with, note that Hegel does not use the word ‘finite’ in a mathematical sense, 
though his use is related to the mathematical use. Instead, for something to be finite, as Hegel 
uses the word, is for it to be essentially defined through relation to something external to itself. 
He gives a relatively succinct definition of it in these terms in the  Encyclopedia Logic : “To put it 
formally, that which comes to an end, that which [merely]  is , is called finite, and it ceases where 
it is connected to its other and is thus limited by the latter. The finite therefore consists in its 
relation to its other which is its negation, and presents itself as its boundary.”  A thing’s 277
finitude, then, consists in its relation to something which is its negation, which is not it. This 
other, this negation, limits and constrains the nature of the first, but in a way that is necessary 
for both of them to be what they are.  
As an example of finitude, take efficient causation. There would be no causes without 
effects, so that causation is defined in terms of its relation to something else, its other. Effect, in 
turn, is defined by its relation to causation; it is what is caused. Each of these negates the other 
in that each is defined by its opposition to the other. A cause cannot simultaneously be its own 
277 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 28, addition. See also Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.105 and 21.116. 
Hegel’s language in the  Science of Logic  is more obscure, but it communicates essentially the same point: 
“the something, posited with its immanent limit as the contradiction of itself by virtue of which it is 
directed and driven out and beyond itself, is the  finite .” Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.116. 
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effect, and an effect cannot be its own cause. Thus effect is a kind of limit on causation, and 
causation a limit on effect, with each excluding the other. 
By contrast, freedom, as Hegel understands it, is an example of infinity. At first glance it 
might seem as if freedom might be defined by its opposition to causation, as if freedom were 
simply the absence of causation. But in fact freedom is a kind of self-determination in which the 
cause and effect are identical; the free agent causes their own actions. In this case then, freedom 
does not rely on anything external to it for its nature, and is not defined by its opposition to 
something external. In this sense, because freedom contains within itself its own defining 
features (cause and effect), it is infinite.  Efficient causation, which is defined by its opposition 278
to its negation, effect, is finite. Understood this way, it is clear that whether Hegel speaks of the 
‘opposition’ of consciousness or the ‘finitude’ of consciousness, he is making the same point: 
consciousness is essentially defined by something external to it to which it is opposed, and which 
restricts it. 
This brings us to the issue of how to understand consciousness in Hegel’s work. 
Consciousness here means our awareness of the world around us. It includes our sensory 
awareness and our awareness of our own thinking. Hegel also agrees with Kant that 
consciousness always contains the capacity for self-consciousness.  But the most important 279
feature of consciousness is that it is by definition relational - consciousness is always related to 
something external to it. “Consciousness constitutes the stage of the mind's reflexion or 
relationship,” Hegel writes in the  Philosophy of Spirit .  Indeed, we find this fact captured in 280
278 This is not strictly speaking true. Every stage of the Hegelian dialectic is finite in some sense, and there 
is only one truly infinite thing - the Absolute Idea. Indeed, this finitude is what drives the dialectic 
forward. That said, freedom is hopefully an instructive example of the kind of infinity Hegel has in mind, 
and Hegel does not hesitate to describe freedom (and other parts of the dialectic) as infinite, though their 
infinity can only be relative. See for example   Hegel,  Science of Logic , 11.364.  
279 “All consciousness of another object is self-consciousness; I am aware of the object as mine (it is my 
representation), thus in it I am aware of me.” Hegel,  Philosophy of Spirit , sect. 424.  
280 Hegel,  Philosophy of Spirit , sect. 413. “Reflexion” in general refers to a definitional relatedness, as in 
the relation of cause and effect described above. See Hegel,  Science of Logic , 11.249, 11.407-408. Note also 
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the common-place truism that consciousness is always consciousness  of  something. The relation 
between a conscious subject and the object of which it is conscious is constitutive of 
consciousness.  
But the object of consciousness always lies  outside  of consciousness, external to it. In 
consciousness, the object is appears as a representation, but not as it is in itself. The object, the 
thing-in-itself, is a the negation, the limiting boundary of consciousness. In this way, 
consciousness is defined by its relation to something external to it; it is finite. To the extent that 
thought is understood as a something dependent upon consciousness, as the act of a conscious 
being, it will be similarly finite.  
Bringing these points together, we should now have a clearer picture of what Hegel 
means by the ‘finitude of consciousness.’ This phrase, and the synonymous ‘opposition of 
consciousness,’ expresses the fact that consciousness is essentially dependent upon something 
external for its nature, it is defined by the opposition between subject and object.  281
Consciousness would not  be  consciousness if there was no object  of  consciousness.  
This is no small matter. The fact that consciousness is defined in terms of this opposition 
is, in effect, the heart of the problem. It is because of this opposition that Kant, focusing on the 
transcendental unity of apperception as a unity  of consciousness , was never able to comprehend 
the object as it is in itself. And by taking this opposition for granted, Kant failed to critically 
examine it, thus leaving him unable to explain the opposition of subject of object that is so 
critical to his philosophy. Hegel’s solution to this problem is to work with Thought as it is 
the position of consciousness in the Hegelian system, where it arises quite late, indicating that it is not a 
basic logical determination but something purely mental, to be discussed in the  Philosophy of Spirit.  
281 In a way, then, the phrase ‘finitude of consciousness’ is a way of expressing the restriction we saw Kant 
placing on the transcendental unity of apperception in the previous chapter. It captures the fact that 
consciousness, which for Kant is essentially the self-consciousness of the transcendental unity of 
apperception, is dependent upon the external and limited by it. This, and the fact that in connection to it 
Hegel often mentions that transcendental unity of apperception by name, lends further textual support to 
the analysis of Hegel’s criticisms provided in the previous chapter. 
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“unencumbered by the finitude of consciousness,”  “liberated from the opposition of 282
consciousness.”  Thought, understood in this way, is infinite Thought, pure Thought, the 283
subject/object neutral Thought described above. This Thought would be wholly self-determining 
and self-defining, not the thought of a particular conscious subject, which must always be 
constrained by that subject’s character and the nature of the object they are related to.  
We thus have the first major feature that distinguishes Hegel’s Thought from our 
everyday conception. Thought, for Hegel, is not restricted to the minds of conscious beings, nor 
is it something we need to be conscious of.  Consciousness, as such, is always finite and 284
restricted by its relation to what lies outside it. But infinite Thought, as Hegel understands it, 
cannot be restricted in this way. It is neither subject nor object, but the self-determining neutral 
element that generates the finite forms of subject and object out of itself. 
This reading of Hegel’s conception of Thought, however, is not universally accepted. 
Indeed, other readers have taken Hegel’s entire philosophy to be a study of consciousness. 
Perhaps most prominent among them is Robert Pippin, who argues that the  Science of Logic  is 
Hegel’s exploration of the conditions on self-consciousness.  Pippin might accept the above 285
discussion of the finitude of consciousness, but claim that self-consciousness is a special case. In 
self-consciousness, we are not aware of external objects, but of ourselves. The difference 
between subject and object thus disappears in the case of self-consciousness, and we have 
something that could perhaps be understood as infinite Thought.  
Perhaps the most telling text for this reading is a quote from the introduction of the 
Science of Logic , where Hegel writes that “As science, truth is pure self-consciousness as it 
282 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.47-48. 
283 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.34. 
284 Hegel even goes so far as to describe nature as “the system of unconscious thoughts.” Hegel, 
Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, addition 1.  
285 Pippin, “The Significance of Self-Consciousness in Idealist Theories of Logic.”  
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develops itself and has the shape of the self, so that that which exists in and for itself is the 
conscious concept and the concept as such is that which exists in and for itself.”  This quote, 286
however, does not run counter to the reading I have presented here, and for two main reasons.  
First, Hegel prefaces this remark with the claim that this is truth “as science.” In other 
words, this is truth insofar as it is systematically developed by human beings in the course of 
their studies. Thus, that there is mention made of consciousness here does not mean that logic 
itself is the study of consciousness. Instead, it is simply a nod to the fact that all scientific 
enterprises are performed by conscious human subjects, so that insofar as it is a science, the 
Science of Logic  must be the development of a self-conscious subject. This is supported by the 
references to knowledge in the passage, and to the position of this quote immediately after a 
discussion of the  Phenomenology of Spirit , which focuses on the development of human 
consciousness into a science.  287
Second and more importantly, the claim that Thought is neutral does not mean that 
Thought is  not  something we are conscious of. It is just the claim that Thought is not necessarily 
tied to consciousness, that consciousness is just one side of Thought.  As we shall see in more 288
detail in the section that follows, Thought does in fact appear in consciousness. But to think of 
Thought as  only  or  primarily  the operation of conscious beings would be a mistake. It should 
not be overlooked that in Pippin’s passage, the terms “conscious concept” and 
“self-consciousness” are balanced by references to what “exists in and for itself.” To focus on 
consciousness alone would be a mistake; Thought is not merely consciousness, but the neutral 
root of both finite consciousness and the independently existing world. Far from supporting a 
286 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.33. Pippin opens his argument with this quote in “The Significance of 
Self-Consciousness in Idealist Theories of Logic,” 7. 
287 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.33. 
288 This is corroborated by the fact that consciousness arises late in the dialectic, coming up only the 
Philosophy of Spirit , after Thought has divided itself into Nature and Spirit. Hegel,  Philosophy of Spirit , 
sect. 413. 
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consciousness-centric reading of Hegel, this quote in fact supports the Thought-as-neutral 
reading I have been advancing here. 
In sum then, Hegel’s frequent reference to Thought as unencumbered by the finitude of 
consciousness should be understood as a way of describing the fact that Thought is not 
something tied to consciousness or conscious beings. This marks a major advance on Kant’s 
conception of thought as essentially tied to consciousness and hence as limited by what is 
outside of consciousness - the thing-in-itself. Hegel takes this finite conception of thought and 
replaces it with his conception of Thought as infinite and hence as subject/object neutral 
Thought. I turn now to a consideration of what Hegel might mean by saying that Thought is the 
‘foundation of everything’ and the ‘substance of things.’  
 
2.3 Thought as the Substance of Things 
The fact that Thought is not to be thought of as a matter of conscious representations, 
but as something underlying both conscious subject and the object of consciousness, gives us a 
starting point in trying to understand what it might mean to say that Thought is the “substance 
of external things,” the “principle of the world,” or the “foundation of everything.”  Such a 289
claim would be an absurdity if Thought were understood as the subject’s act of manipulating 
representations. But if Thought is subject/object neutral, independent of our individual minds, 
then it can go beyond our finite consciousnesses and determine the nature of reality as it is in 
itself. Still, more has to be said to make sense of Hegel’s claims here. 
Luckily, Hegel himself gives us a clue here by pointing to one key way we use the word 
‘thought’ in everyday conversation. Consider the phrase ‘thinking things over.’ Hegel points out 
that to think things over is an activity that aims to get at the universal, essential nature of a 
289 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, addition 1; Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.34. 
127 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 128/182
thing: “that whatever is truthful in objects, the constitutions of things or events is the inner, the 
essential dimension, the basic matter on which something hinges, … that it is not what 
appearances first present and what first occurs to one; that instead one must first  think it over  in 
order to arrive at the true constitution of the object.”  Here thinking something over seems to 290
be the activity of trying to discover the universal and essential element of something, to get at its 
inner nature. This is further elaborated on in Hegel’s discussion of the scientific method, where 
he describes scientists as aiming to arrive at “ laws ,  general propositions , a  theory  - i.e. the 
thoughts  of what there is.”  Here too, Thought is identified with the universal, general element, 291
and distinguished from merely dealing with particular events and contingent happenings. When 
we think things over, we are trying to find their universal features, their essences, and the laws 
or necessary connections between them. 
Thought is this essential, universal element in things.  It forms the essence of any 292
particular entity, and in this sense it is that entity’s substance; it makes it what it is. To take 
Hegel’s own example, without the universal feature of animalness, there could be no dogs.  293
And ‘animal’ here is simply an example close to hand. Other features, such as being, existence, 
or causality, are even more general and foundational. Taken together and with all their 
interrelationships, these different universals constitute the essential structure of the world as a 
whole. Thought, as the system of these universals (Hegel’s term is ‘thought-determinations’), is 
the “substance of the world” in that it constitutes the essential structure of the world, giving the 
world the shape it has and making it what it is. 
290 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 21. 
291 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 7. It may seem as if ‘thoughts’ is used in a purely subjective sense here, 
as associated with theories and propositions. This need not trouble us, however - as subject/object 
neutral, Thought can appear both as general propositions in the minds of subjects and as universal laws 
governing objects. This point is elaborated in more detail in the rest of this section. 
292 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, and sect. 24, addition 1. 
293 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, addition 1. 
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The role of Thought as “substance of the world” in this sense has three different facets.  294
The first of these is discussed in the  Science of Logic  and the  Encyclopedia Logic , where Hegel 
deals with ‘pure Thought,’ or Thought as it is independent of the natural or mental worlds. This 
is the logical dimension, where we find universal features that are shared between both nature 
and the mental. In fact, Hegel even provides an analogy to traditional logic to help us 
understand what he is getting at, and in precisely what sense Thought could be subject/object 
neutral. Logic, even in its traditional guise, has typically been assumed to describe not just 
features of how we think, but also features of how parts of the world must fit together.  295
Without this basic assumption in place, the entire project of using concepts and inference to 
study nature would be unworkable: if the laws of inference didn’t track the actual connections 
between objects, what purpose could inference serve? Pure Thought, in Hegel’s sense, is just this 
common logical element so ubiquitously assumed to be present, an element that must be neutral 
in that it is not merely a feature of the subject’s mind, nor is it only a feature of objects in 
themselves.  
Historically, logicians have not studied this neutrality explicitly, taking it simply as 
granted and not considering why logical operations and forms could be legitimate. Kant was one 
of the first to take these questions seriously, but his answer remained within the subjective 
sphere, and he treated logical forms as something that the subject imposes upon experience. 
Hegel grants to logic a true neutrality, not as a form imposed on anything external, but as the 
fundamental substance of things: a substance we can access through representation, but which 
also underlies things as they are in themselves. Pure Thought, understood this way, is not so 
294 I name these and present them briefly here, but they will be discussed in more detail when we come to 
Hegel’s dialectic and how it derives the subject/object distinction. 
295 “One can appeal to the representations typical of ordinary logic; for it is assumed that in definitions, for 
example, the determinations are not just of the knowing subject but are rather determinations of the 
subject matter, such that constitute its innermost essential nature. … Everywhere presupposed by the use 
of the forms of the concept, of judgement, inference, definition, division, etc., is that they are not merely 
forms of self-conscious thinking but also of objective understanding.” Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.34-35. 
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strange as it might seem - it is the logical element that philosophers have taken for granted for 
so long, but here the subject/object neutrality of that element is made explicit, and Hegel’s 
philosophy moves forward with a clear awareness of that neutrality. 
But Thought does not remain in this pure logical state alone; it also manifests itself in the 
natural world. Universal features such as space and time are specific to the natural world, and 
Hegel deals with them in the second part of the  Encyclopedia , the  Philosophy of Nature.  One of 
Hegel’s challenges will be to explain why and how the purely logical element also structures the 
natural world of everyday experience. Third and finally, Thought also manifests itself in the 
mental realm, which Hegel describes as “spiritual activity.”  In that context, we have universals 296
such as ‘consciousness,’ ‘perception,’ and ‘willing’ that determine the essential nature of the 
mind. Moreover, the various thought-determinations can appear in the finite mind as objects of 
representation; we can represent the universal features of the world to ourselves. This explains 
why Hegel can use the word ‘Thought’ to describe both mental phenomena  and  physical 
phenomena, Thought structures both of these, and appears in both.  
As in the last section, however, this reading of Hegel’s claims is not uncontroversial. A 
number of commentators see the  Science of Logic  as not dealing with the substance of the world 
in the robust sense described here, but instead see it as a theory of categories analogous to 
Kant’s.  For them, Hegel is describing how we as subjects must  think  about the world. Since 297
our only access to the world is conditioned by how we must think about it, the rules of thought 
can be understood as forming the substance of the world in the sense that they provide the basis 
for all our experience of the world.  
296 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, addition 1. 
297 Burbridge, for example, reads Hegel as developing a category theory, but with additional wrinkle that 
the categories are dynamically interrelated and developed over time by intersubjective discourse. See 
“Hegel’s Conception of Logic , ” 92-94, 100. Pinkard argues along similar lines, describing the  Logic  as an 
explanation of the basic concepts we use to understand the world. See Pinkard,  Hegel’s Dialectic , 13-14.  
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But such a reading would leave Hegel saddled with many of the same objections we saw 
him raising against Kant. It would leave him trapped within experience without any legitimate 
claim to know things as they are in themselves and would have him assume the distinction 
between subjects and objects rather than explaining it. Moreover, this reading also fits 
uncomfortably with Hegel’s texts. Hegel persistently objects to the idea that Thought is formal, 
that it gives a form to any external content.  But to take Thought to be the substance of the 298
world because it gives a form to raw experience and renders it intelligible, is precisely to think of 
Thought as a form applied to some external content. Such a reading also restricts Thought to an 
activity of conscious beings, leaving it unable to account for the claims regarding the ‘finitude of 
consciousness’ described above. Hegel’s texts thus cannot fit with an understanding of Thought 
as forming a set of necessary conceptual categories. Instead, the claims about Thought as the 
principle of reality or the substance of things should be taken as an expression of the fact that it 
is the universal, essential element of the world that makes things what they are. ‘Thought’ is 
Hegel’s term for precisely this universal element, the necessary structure, of the world.  
The overall picture emerging from this discussion so far, then, is one of Thought as a 
network of universal determinations that constitutes the structure of the world, dividing and 
interrelating all the various parts of it.  In this, it has the neutrality typical of traditional logic 299
in that it is something present in both mental operations and the world as it is in itself. This 
purely neutral Thought, then, also comes to encompass both the natural and mental spheres, 
structuring these in turn, and determining them with the features constitutive of them. And 
298 See Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.27, 21.29.  
299 This might be misleading in that it implies that there is something external to Thought that it 
structures, something particular that lies outside the universal determinations. Hegel does acknowledge 
the presence of contingency and particularity, but sees the existence of these as themselves necessary and 
in that sense as parts of Thought in turn. Contingency and particularity are thus not opposed to Thought, 
but are necessitated by Thought itself and form a part of its structuring activity. This point is central to 
Hegel’s philosophy of Nature, and I will discuss it in more detail when we come to that stage of the 
dialectic.  
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recall that all of this structuring occurs prior to any conscious awareness of it, and indeed the 
existence of consciousness is one of the parts of that structure. To take Thought to be 
subject/object neutral in Hegel’s sense, is to take Thought to be this structuring and determining 
force independent of minds and of the physical world, but operative in both. 
But one important feature of Thought has yet to be mentioned here: how does Thought 
do all this? Hegel is clear that Thought structures not something external to itself, but in all this 
it is generating its own determinacy, providing its own content.  Thought is, so to speak, 300
thinking itself. Indeed, it is this self-determining character of Thought that makes it infinite in 
the sense described above. Hegel’s name for Thought’s self-determining activity is ‘dialectic,’ 
and it through the dialectic that Hegel aims to achieve his main philosophical goals. So it is to 
the dialectic that I now turn. 
 
3 An Example of the Hegelian Dialectic ­ from Pure Being to Becoming 
In trying to understand the nature of Thought, Hegel cannot study it primarily in its 
manifestation in the human mind, nor can he study it as it appears in the natural world. Pure 
Thought is neutral between these two, and forms the essential logical substance of both the 
mental and the physical world. So Hegel aims to begin without any assumptions, taking Thought 
as wholly indeterminate. At the beginning of the dialectic, all that we can say about Thought is 
that it is. Hegel describes this as “being, pure being - without further determination.”  In other 301
words, Thought simply  is  - the only universal determination of reality is that there  is  reality. 
Thought at this stage is so indeterminate that it is not even distinct from anything else, it is not 
300 See for example, Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.48. 
301 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.68. 
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related to anything else. The only thing that can be said of it is that it has being. One might 
imagine here a universe whose only feature is that it is. This is Thought as being.   302
But, if Thought is being, Hegel points out, it must also be nothing. To make vivid why 
this is the case, imagine you are describing something. If you describe it by saying that it is, you 
have, in effect, said nothing about the thing. To say that something is, in this wholly 
indeterminate way, says nothing, and to say that something is nothing is just to say that it is 
wholly indeterminate; nothingness just is this total lack of determinacy.  It is at this point that 303
Thought as being reveals a kind of instability - Thought cannot just be indeterminate being, 
since if it is, then it must also be nothing. Or, thinking again in terms of universal 
determinations of reality, Hegel’s point here is that the universe could not have only this one 
feature of being. Such a universe would be internally inconsistent, in that its being would wholly 
indeterminate, and hence would be the same as its own non-being. It is for this reason that 
Thought transforms from being to nothing. Hegel describes this as Thought ‘passing over’ from 
being into nothing.    304 305
Next, Hegel points out that nothing, as pure indeterminacy, immediately passes back 
over into being.  Again, a linguistic example might help clarify Hegel’s reasoning. Here one can 306
302 There may seem to be a tension here: are we starting with the claim that the first 
thought-determination is Being, or are we starting with the claim that Thought has being? Both of these 
claims, however, amount to the same. To say that Being is the first thought-determination is to say that at 
this point being is the only universal feature of reality. But reality, at least at this point, is just pure, 
neutral, Thought itself. Thus to say that being is the only universal feature of reality is to say that Thought 
has no feature other than being. 
303 “ Nothing, pure nothingness ; it is simple equality with itself, complete emptiness, complete absence of 
determination and content; lack of all distinction within” Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.69.  
“Being is absolutely devoid of all determination, and nothing is the very same lack of determination.” 
Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 87, addition 1.  
304 “The truth is neither being nor nothing, but rather that being has passed over into nothing and nothing 
into being.” Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.69. 
305 This passing over should not be understood in temporal terms (time is a thought determination that 
arises much later in the dialectic) but in purely logical terms. In that context, to pass over indicates the 
logical relation between being and nothing, such that each is apparently identical to the other. 
306 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.69. 
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think of how even when we say that something is nothing, we are at the same time 
acknowledging that it is, even if we deny it any properties and leave it wholly indeterminate. In 
this way, nothing is just as much the same as being as being is the same nothing. So, 
immediately after shifting from being to nothing, Thought finds itself again shifting back from 
nothing to being. And as soon as it has become being, it again passes over into nothing - neither 
being nor non-being can be the sole universal determinations of reality. As long as we remain 
only with these two, their instability generates a constant motion between being and nothing, 
each passing over into the other.   307
Hegel, however, does not stop here. We have seen how being, because of its instability, 
passes over into nothing, which then passes back into being in turn. But this whole endless 
process of transformation is itself Thought’s next stage: becoming. Becoming just is the 
transitioning of being into nothing and vice versa.  The universe we were imagining is no 308
longer determined as merely being or nothing, but as the process of transition between the two.
 At a conceptual level, the idea of something becoming includes both something being, but 309
also the element of its disappearance, of nothing. Becoming thus resolves the instability inherent 
in being and nothing, since they are no longer seen as having this problematic identity, but are 
preserved as distinct moments in the process of becoming. At this third stage of becoming we 
find a new form that includes both of the others while preserving their distinct natures. This 
relationship of inclusion, which simultaneously preserves the previous forms but also 
transforms them by relating them to one another, Hegel calls ‘sublating.’ Becoming is the 
sublation of being and nothing.  
307 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.70. 
308 “Their truth is therefore this  movement  of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: 
becoming .” Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.70;  
“The truth of being as well as of nothing is therefore the  unity  of both; this unity is  becoming .” Hegel, 
Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 88. 
309 Again, note that the the imagined universe in these examples is not something distinct from Thought 
itself; Thought is that universe, which consists (at this point) merely of these determinations. 
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As the dialectic continues, becoming will in turn reveal itself to be unstable, and more 
and more complex forms of Thought will arise, each intrinsically dependent upon those prior to 
it for its content, just as the prior forms depend on those that follow them for their stability.  310
The details of these further stages, while interesting in their own right, are not enormously 
relevant to our goals here. Instead, I want to note a few features of the dialectical method, and 
ultimately show how the dialectic, as a process of deriving new forms of Thought, mirrors the 
Kantian derivation of the categories.  
 
3.1  Major Features of the Dialectic 
In the dialectic, Hegel describes Thought as it changes in response to the instabilities 
inherent to each of its stages. To each of these stages he gives a different name which is intended 
to reflect the word we use to describe that particular stage in our everyday language. If we look 
at how we think about ‘becoming,’ for example, it should not be too difficult to notice that we see 
things that are becoming as including some degree of being but also some degree of nothing. 
One could think of the prototypical example of becoming, the passage of time, as an alternation 
between the alternating being and nothing of moments, as each exists and then passes into 
nothingness.  
Hegel calls these different stages of Thought ‘thought determinations.’  These thought 311
determinations are analogous to the Kantian categories in a number of key ways that will be 
presented throughout this chapter.  Here, however, I would like to begin by noting that just as 312
310 In our example, becoming would not have its nature if it did not include the stages of being and 
nothing. Being and nothing, in turn, would not have their stable identities unless they were united in the 
process of becoming. 
311 See Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, addition 1, and Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.34, for examples. 
The phrase ‘thought determination’ and reference to the stages of the dialectic as ‘determinations’ is 
ubiquitous.  
312 Hegel makes this analogy clear himself. In section 41 of the  Encyclopedia Logic , for example, he 
mentions the Kantian concepts of the understanding, and in the next sentence refers to them as “these 
thought determinations.” See also Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 42.  
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for Kant, the categories are necessary features of the objects of experience, Hegelian thought 
determinations are necessary features of the world itself. Recall that at the outset, the Hegelian 
ontology consists only of Thought, and wholly indeterminate Thought at that. By going through 
the various thought-determinations, Hegel reveals different determinations of the most 
fundamental entity in his ontology. Since each of these determinations flows necessarily from 
the ones prior to it, each of these determinations represents a necessary feature of Thought. 
Thought is necessarily determined as being, as becoming, etc.; for there to be any being, there 
must also be a becoming.  
But where for Kant, these determinations would be applied to some externally given 
sensations, for Hegel, Thought is  identical  with its determinations. As we noted above, Thought 
is the system of universal features of reality. There, I presented that interpretation on the basis 
of Hegel’s texts, but did not present his argument for it. Hegel’s argument is the dialectic itself; 
in the course of the dialectic, Thought comes to be determined not merely as being, nothing, etc., 
but as the encompassing, self-determining, system of universal features which we described as 
Thought and which Hegel renames, at the end of the dialectic, the ‘Absolute Idea.’  Starting as 313
an indeterminate, subject/object neutral being, Thought develops dialectically until it takes the 
form of the Absolute Idea, the foundational of all things recognizable from the discussion above. 
This dialectical development is Thought’s own development of its own internal character, so 
that, in the dialectic, Thought is both determined  and  determiner. Thought is thus not, for 
Hegel, something applied by subjects to external objects. It is a self-determining network of 
313 It is for this reason that while at the beginning of the logic, Hegel names Thought as the subject of his 
text, at the conclusion, he writes that the absolute idea is the “sole subject matter and content of 
philosophy.” Hegel,  Science of Logic , sect. 12.236.  
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universal features of reality; in the course of the dialectic, Hegel shows that reality itself is 
precisely this self-determining network of universal features.   314
This character of Thought makes it radically different than the Kantian categories. The 
categories are only necessary features of experience, imposed upon our representations by the 
transcendental unity of apperception. Thought determinations, on the other hand, are necessary 
features of the world itself, immanent in it due to an inherent instability that pushes each 
thought determination in turn to generate its opposite and ultimately unify with it. Thought 
determinations thus belong to a different ontological class than the Kantian categories - they are 
not representations, but elements of Thought, the neutral third element we described above. 
They appear both in our experience (we think of things as beings, as becoming, etc.) and in the 
things as they are in themselves (these things are, become, etc.). Moreover, where Kant had to 
demonstrate the necessary role the categories have in constructing a necessarily unified 
experience out of our raw sensations, Hegel does not have to engage in any such argumentation. 
The thought determinations are not imposed upon sensations or any other raw data, but are 
immanent in the world itself, as its necessary structuring features. 
These thought determinations form the basic elements of the Hegelian dialectic. But 
what is perhaps most distinctive about the dialectic is the way in which each of these thought 
determinations gives way to the next. This process has three major stages. In the first, we begin 
with some thought determination or other. At the very beginning of the dialectic, we have only 
being, but as we go, more and more complex thought determinations arise.  Second, this 315
original thought determination (e.g., being) has its identity problematized by a relation to 
314 It would be reasonable to ask at this point what these are universal features  of ? Hegel’s idea is that 
Thought itself generates particularity as one of the universal features of reality, thus determining itself as 
both the universal and the particular element in things. As Hegel puts it in the  Science of Logic , 
particularity is “the universal’s own immanent moment; in particularity, therefore, the universal is not in 
an other but simply and solely with itself.” Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.37. See also Hegel,  Encyclopedia 
Logic , sect. 24, sect 167.  
315 See Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 80, and sect. 80, addition. 
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another thought determination (e.g., nothing). In the case of our example, being was found to be 
identical to what should be its opposite: nothing. But this identity of opposites renders each of 
the two thought determinations incoherent - if being is nothing, then the term ‘being’ loses all 
meaning. Another example is Hegel’s discussion of cause and effect. At first, we think of the 
effect as something caused by the cause. But it is also the case that the cause would not be a 
cause if it did not have an effect. In this second sense, it seems as if it is in fact the effect which is 
the cause of the cause, since without the effect the cause would not be cause at all. Cause and 
effect, just like being and nothing, are threatened with incoherence, and each seems to lose its 
distinct nature in the other.   316
This incoherence and blurring of determinacy is distinctive of the second stage which 
Hegel describes as the “self-sublation of such finite determinations by themselves and their 
transition into their opposites.”  Important to note here is that each first term has one and only 317
one corresponding opposite term, and the nature of the relation between them is unique in every 
case, since it arises from the specific terms involved.  This allows Hegel to claim that Thought 318
is developing itself in the dialectic, since the uniqueness of the opposed pairs means that the 
dialectic is a rigorous derivation of thought determinations, one from the next, as opposed to a 
series of stages invented by Hegel himself.  
The third stage, sometimes called ‘synthesis,’ or the ‘speculative’ moment, aims to 
resolve the incoherence in the prior stage.  It does this by bringing the previous thought 319
316 See Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 153-155 and Hegel,  Science of Logic , 11.396-11.409 for Hegel’s 
discussion of cause and effect. 
317 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 81. 
318 “The dialectic has a  positive  result, because it has a  determinate content  or because its result is in truth 
not an  empty, abstract nothing , but instead the negation of  definite determinations  that are contained in 
the result precisely because it is not an  immediate nothing , but a result instead.” Hegel,  Encyclopedia 
Logic , sect. 82. See also Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.38; Hegel,  Phenomenology of Spirit , sect. 59. This is 
sometimes referred to, as in these latter passages, as the Hegelian doctrine of ‘determinate negation.’  
319 “The  speculative  or the  positively rational  grasps the unity of the determinations in their opposition, 
the  affirmative  that is contained in their dissolution and their passing over into something else.” Hegel, 
Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 82.  
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determinations into a single whole, where each has a distinct role to play. Thus defined by their 
role in the unifying whole, they are distinguished from one another in a way that they could not 
be if examined on their own.  Being and nothing, for example, are in themselves problematic 320
in that they are distinct yet also identical to one another. But at the level of becoming, the 
passing over of one into the other assigns to each a role in the process, thus distinguishing them 
as elements (Hegel’s term is ‘moments’) in the thought determination of becoming.  Through 321
synthesis, the different stages of Thought are not destroyed or superceded, but instead they are 
preserved and maintained throughout the process. Thought thus does not have different stages 
in the way a river travels through different cities. Instead, the different stages are like waves in 
the ocean - each contained within the ocean itself. Just as becoming includes being and nothing, 
the final culmination of the dialectic includes all the thought determinations that came before it, 
preserved in a complex and harmonious web of mutually determining relationships. Indeed, it is 
only at this stage that any of the prior ones truly attains a completely determinate content, and it 
is this drive toward determinate content that drives the unifying activity of the dialectic. Lastly, 
note that as in the previous stage, there is only one synthesis appropriate for any pair of 
opposites; this stage, too, consists of a rigorous derivation based on content and not on the 
writer’s fancy. 
This reading of the dialectic as falling into the three stages presented above is widely 
accepted among scholars, although there is some debate as to how strictly Hegel stuck to this 
exact pattern. Exactly why the dialectic takes on this form, however, is a matter that could be 
debated. On the one hand, if we see Thought as subjective, as part of the subject’s mental 
320 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 82. 
321 As Hegel’s description of existence: “existence is (1) the unity of being and nothing in which the 
immediacy of these determinations has disappeared and with ith the contradiction in their relationship, - 
a nity in which they are now only moments.” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 89. See also Hegel,  Science 
of Logic , 21.92-93, where being and nothing are described as moments of becoming. As the first two 
thought determinations, being and nothing are carried throughout the dialectic, and form moments of all 
the thought determinations that follow. 
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faculties, then the driving force of the dialectic is the subject’s own dissatisfaction with the 
previous stages. On this reading, it is not so much that Thought itself has any incoherence, but 
that the subject, in attempting to make use of the concept ‘being’ for example, finds that concept 
to be incoherent unless the concept ‘becoming’ is also present as part of their conceptual 
scheme. In this way, the driving force of the dialectic is the internal inadequacies of the thought 
determinations  for the subject’s use , not any inadequacy they have in and of themselves. A 
reading of this sort would be appropriate for readers like Pippin or Brandom, who see Hegel as 
analyzing the necessary conditions for experience or self-consciousness.  322
But on the reading presented here, the subject’s needs are not operative in the dialectic. 
If they were, then the dialectic would remain at the level of the subject and its representations, 
and would thus not be able to respond appropriately to the challenges Hegel raises against Kant. 
Moreover, in addition to this systematic reason, there is good textual evidence against the idea 
that it is the subject’s requirements that push the dialectic forward. First, there is a conspicuous 
lack of reference to the needs of a thinking subject in Hegel’s texts themselves. In his description 
of the dialectic, Hegel never talks as if it is the subject’s inability to determinately represent 
something as, for example, being, that moves the dialectic forward to its next stage. That he does 
not mention the subject in this way over the course of 700 pages devoted to discussing the 
dialectic makes it implausible that the subject’s requirement for determinacy is the operative 
force here. Instead, Hegel consistently speaks as if it is the thought determinations themselves 
that lead to one another. He writes, for example, that “pure being and pure nothing are therefore 
the same,” not that “pure being and pure nothing are therefore  thought of as  the same.”  The 323
relationships he describes are grounded in the natures of the thought determinations, not in the 
subject’s requirements. 
322 See Pippin,  Hegel’s Idealism , and Brandom,  Reason in Philosophy . 
323 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.69. 
140 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 141/182
Moreover, in his focused discussions of his method, Hegel emphasizes the fact that in his 
method, Thought determines  itself , and is not determined from without by subjective demands. 
He emphasizes the “immanent emergence of distinctions,” arguing that without it, the thought 
determinations would be brought up merely according to the subject’s whims, and not with the 
rigorous systematicity befitting a proper philosophical science.  In describing the transition of 324
thought determinations into one another, he describes it as something done “by themselves.”  325
In these same contexts, Hegel is careful to distinguish what he is doing from any “subjective 
seesaw system” and attacks the idea that dialectic is “an external and negative activity which 
does not belong to the fact itself but is rooted in mere conceit, in a subjective obsession for 
subverting and bringing to naught everything firm and true.”  In both his positive and negative 326
remarks, then, Hegel makes clear that the dialectic is not motivated by the needs of a subject, 
but by the nature of Thought itself, and the incoherence Thought itself faces in each of its 
determinations. This fact further supports a reading that takes Hegel’s metaphysics seriously, 
and would be difficult to make sense of on a reading that sees Hegel as focused on subjective 
conditions on representations. The dialectic, like Hegel’s philosophy in general, should be 
understood not as focused on the subject’s needs, but as a study of the necessary features of 
subject/object neutral Thought. 
Hegel’s dialectical study of Thought proceeds through three books that together make up 
his  Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences .  The first book, called the  Logic , deals with the 327
purely logical dimension of Thought. These thought determinations culminate in what Hegel 
324 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.39-21.40. 
325 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 81. 
326 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 81; Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.40. For a more specific example, see 
Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature,  sect. 257, addition 1, where Hegel describes the transition between space 
and time. There he writes that “the transition to time is not made subjectively by us, but made by space 
itself.” 
327 He applies the dialectic in other texts as well, but these three provide the outline of his systematic 
philosophy in general, with other are more focused, dealing with subjects such as the history of 
philosophy. 
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describes as the ‘Absolute Idea,’ at which point Thought has become an entire universe, 
containing both subjectivity and objectivity, as well as any number of other important thought 
determinations such as causality, necessity, purpose, and various syllogistic forms. But Hegel 
does not end the dialectic with the logical Absolute Idea. Where he goes next is crucial for 
understanding Hegel’s answer to the question of how this neutral element could yield the 
subject and object distinction, and, based on that distinction, make sense of our knowledge of 
the world. 
 
3.2  Logic, Nature, and Spirit ­ Hegel and the Subject/Object Distinction 
At the beginning of the  Logic , Thought was taken as wholly indeterminate being, and it is 
through the stages of the dialectic that it reveals its nature as the universal logical element of 
reality, both subjective and objective. The various thought determinations presented in this 
dialectic are purely logical, features of the world that are present both in the physical and the 
mental. For example, being is ascribed indiscriminately to both the physical world and the 
sphere of representations. Likewise, causality can be used to describe both relations between 
representations or relations between physical objects. At the culmination of the  Logic , Hegel 
describes a thought determination he calls the ‘Absolute Idea.’ The Absolute Idea combines all of 
the determinations that came before it - it is a self-determining whole, both knowing itself and 
acting purposefully for its own development. Yet something crucial is missing. At this stage, 
Thought is still inadequate and in need of further development, here because it is merely the 
domain of logical truth. At the level of the logical Idea, causality is as yet not the causality of 
particular spatio-temporal objects or of representations - it is just causality as a pure thought 
determination.  The logical Idea lacks physicality, corporeality; as Hegel describes it through a 328
328 This way of motivating the dialectical transition from the  Logic  to the  Philosophy of Nature  is not 
universally accepted. Houlgate, for example, sees the transition as a result of the fact that in the logical 
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characteristic Christian metaphor, Thought must be made incarnate.  Thus even the entire first 329
book of his system, and its culmination in the Absolute Idea, serves only as the first in the 
overarching dialectical triad of the Hegelian system. 
This deficiency in the Idea, like the deficiency in thought determinations prior to it, leads 
it to pass into its opposite. For Hegel, the existence of the physical world is a necessary 
consequence of the dialectic: without the physical, the logical would be incoherent. In this way, 
the neutral element of pure Thought is used to dialectically derive the existence of the physical 
universe.  Just as being led to nothing, the Idea of the logical universe governed by necessary 330
relations between thought determinations has as its opposite the messy and contingent physical 
world.  As Hegel puts it, “In Nature, not only is the play of forms a prey to boundless and 331
unchecked contingency, but each separate entity is without the [concept] of itself.”  Being 332
‘without the concept of itself’ is Hegel’s way of saying that the particular entities that make up 
the natural world are imperfect copies of their concepts, in a way analogous to Plato’s 
Idea, “ the Idea is not just being that determines itself and develops in a certain manner, but also being 
that is  immediately  itself, being that simply is what it is.” Houlgate,  An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, 
Truth, and History,  106-108. This immediacy, he takes it, is embodied in the natural world. I find this 
reading inadequate, however, because Hegel stresses externality and otherness, not immediacy, in his 
discussion of the transition: “Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of  otherness . Since 
therefore the Idea is the negative of itself, or is  external to itself , Nature is not merely external in relation 
to this Idea (and its subjective existence Spirit); the truth is rather that  externality  constitutes the specific 
character in which Nature, as Nature, exists.”  Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 247. 
This externality and otherness to the Idea is found in the contingency of nature, whereas merely pointing 
to immediacy would not make sense of the transition. Ultimately, however, the key point here is not the 
details of how this transition occurs, but the fact that occurs at all. See Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 
247-251 for the emphasis on externality and contingency. 
329 See Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 247, addition. I describe this transition as a ‘becoming 
incarnate,’ where Thought literally generates the spatiotemporal physical universe. Like all relations 
between thought determinations (Hegel sees ‘space’ and ‘physical’ as thought determinations), the 
relation between the logical Idea and physical reality is a logical relation. To speak of ‘generation’ in this 
context is the Hegelian way of describing how the dialectical requirements make necessary a further stage 
- the stage of the logical Idea requires those of the physical universe. Readers who see the dialectic as a 
Kantian exploration of the mind’s operations only would read this as a derivation of the  concept  of the 
physical world. I oppose this reading for the reasons rehearsed above.  
330 Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , introduction. 
331 Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 248. See also Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , 249, 250.  
332 Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 248.  
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conception of the Forms.  This kind of immersion in imperfection is characteristic of the Idea 333
as it appears in the natural world, to the point that Hegel describes nature as the 
“self-degradation of the Idea.”  Nature itself is a part of Thought, but it is Thought as 334
enmeshed in contingency and arbitrariness. Although Nature is governed by certain necessary 
structures (space, time, chemism, and others), each of these is at the same time conditioned by a 
great deal of contingency. While it is necessary that natural world be spatial, for example, it is 
merely contingent how objects fill that space. Yet at the same time, this contingency is itself a 
necessary feature of reality, so that at no point do we ever leave the sphere of Thought. Nature, 
for all its contingency, is still a necessary element of reality, and hence a part of Thought. 
In his discussion of nature, to which the second book of his  Encyclopedia  is devoted, 
Hegel describes the necessary structure of the natural world. He describes this study as an act of 
discerning the element of Thought in the natural; pure Thought, as discussed in the  Logic , is 
always the necessary, the universal, and even in the natural world, certain governing features 
emerge, albeit always surrounded by an element of contingency.  The dialectic in Hegel’s 335
philosophy of nature describes these governing features, thought determinations in the sphere 
of nature. Among them are determinations such as space, time, gravity, and mechanics. 
As the dialectic proceeds through the thought determinations that govern the natural 
world, the prevailing trend is toward greater and greater order and unity. We go from space, 
which is characterized by the indifferent coexistence of things, to gravity, an external law set 
upon physical things to govern their interrelations, and which governs their interrelationship. 
333 Hegel makes explicit reference to the Platonic Forms in this connection at Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , 
sect. 246, addition. 
334 Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 248.  
335 “It is precisely externality which is characteristic of Nature, that is, differences are allowed to fall apart 
and to appear as indifferent to each other: the dialectical Notion which leads forward the  stages , is the 
inner side of them. A thinking consideration must reject such nebulous, at bottom, sensuous ideas.” 
Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 249, remark. See also Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 246 and sect. 
246, remark. 
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Further stages include the animal organism, which freely governs itself. Ultimately the dialectic 
of nature leads to the genesis of  Geist , a term usually translated as ‘spirit,’ but which can also be 
used to mean ‘mind.’ Thought, after moving through the thought determinations of the natural 
world, is ultimately led to manifest itself as not just a sphere of empty logical relations, nor as an 
ordered natural world, but also as a thinking being. 
Hegel picks up the third and last book of his  Encyclopedia  at this point, and, just as 
before, dialectically derives various thought determinations, this time those that govern the 
nature of thinking beings. In this book, the  Philosophy of Spirit , Hegel derives mental features 
such as memory and imagination, but also goes farther, showing how thinking beings are led to 
have goals and morals and to form societies. The dialectic of spirit goes through various 
governmental forms and cultural developments, each of which is demonstrated as a necessary 
consequence of the former, and so, as a necessary development of the pure indeterminate 
Thought with which we started. Ultimately, this dialectic culminates in the final development of 
the Hegelian system: philosophy. At its peak, Thought as a thinking society comes to reflect 
upon the world around it. This world, however, is itself the manifestation of Thought, so that in 
doing so, Thought is reflecting upon itself.  This, then, is philosophy: Thought thinking itself, 336
and, ultimately, discovering that it is one and the same in its various forms, from pure logical 
category through the natural world and on to the philosophers themselves. 
At this point, the Hegelian system is completed, and this completion is marked by the 
fact that it circles around to begin again, since the philosophical project begins with taking pure, 
indeterminate Thought as a starting point. Stepping back then, we can take in the system as a 
336 With regard to the Absolute Idea, which is the fully developed nature of Thought, Hegel writes that 
“Nature and spirit are in general different modes of exhibiting  its existence , art and religion its different 
modes of apprehending itself and giving itself appropriate existence. Philosophy has the same content and 
the same purpose as art and religion, but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute idea, 
because its mode, that of the concept, is the highest.” Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.236. 
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whole. This whole is a network of thought determinations, of necessary features of reality. Their 
necessity is ensured by the dialectical process, where each is derived as a necessary correlate of 
the prior form. If there is to be anything at all, there must be the whole system, since the whole 
system is a necessary consequence of even a wholly indeterminate being. In the process of this 
dialectic, Hegel has derived the logical features of reality that span both the physical and the 
mental, but also the specific features of the physical world and the mental world as well.  
Thought itself encompasses all of these stages. In the  Logic  we see it in its pure logical 
element. But in the  Philosophy of Nature , Hegel explicates the nature of Thought insofar as it is 
embodied in the natural world, and in the  Philosophy of Spirit , he describes it in its form as a 
natural organism with the power to form representations and ultimately to come to an 
awareness of its true nature. Each of these is presented as the natural development of one and 
the same thing, as each stage tries to overcome the deficiency inherent to it. Only at the final 
stage does Thought attain a wholly stable, because wholly complete, totality. This stage, which 
encompases all those prior to it, Hegel calls the Absolute, and he identifies it with God.   337
In this way, Thought is used by Hegel to explain the dichotomy between representing 
subjects and objects represented. In answer to the question of why there should be such a 
fundamental ontological distinction, Hegel can point to the fact that Thought necessary takes on 
both of these forms as it moves through the stages of the dialectic. The distinction between 
mental and non-mental phenomena arises at the transition from the philosophy of nature to the 
philosophy of spirit. At that point, the natural world has taken on such a level of order and 
self-determination that it manifests as an animal organism.  But the animal organism’s highest 338
stage comes when it becomes consciously aware of its environment and thus takes the first step 
337 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 11.368. 
338 Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 350-376. 
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to breaking out of its merely finite instinctive behavior.  This conscious awareness of the 339
natural world is the first step in the dialectic of Spirit.  340
By showing that Thought takes the form a representing being in this way, Hegel has 
simultaneously shown that there must be a metaphysical distinction between representations, 
those that have them (subjects), and what they represent (objects). What Kant assumed at the 
outset of his system, Hegel can claim to explain. Through the dialectic, he has proven that such a 
distinction is necessary, that it is written into the nature of being itself. There could not be a 
universe without a distinction between mental and non-mental, subjects and objects, since that 
distinction is a requirement for there to be any being whatsoever.   341
Unlike the Kantian attempt at explaining this distinction, Hegel’s system presents the 
distinction between subject and object not merely as occurring  within  representations. Instead, 
since Thought is neither subjective nor objective, the distinction is no longer a matter of how the 
subject handles their own representations, but is a matter of what reality itself must contain. It 
is not that we have to represent the world in experience as divided between subjective 
representations and objective, but rather that the world itself contains representations and the 
objects that they represent.  
339 Hegel,  Philosophy of Nature , sect. 376. 
340  “For us mind has nature as its presupposition, though mind is the truth of nature, and is thus 
absolutely first with respect to it. In this truth nature has vanished, and mind has emerged as the Idea that 
has reached its being-for-self.” Hegel,  Philosophy of Spirit , sect. 381. Recall that to describe one stage as 
the ‘truth’ of another is to say that it is the dialectical development of it. 
341 The distinction between subjective and objective that Hegel derives is subtly distinct from the Kantian 
one in the way noted above. For Kant, the distinction is a matter of some representations demanding 
intersubjective agreement, and others being unique to the individual. For Hegel, the distinction appears in 
two ways: as the difference between mental as opposed to non-mental features of the world, and as the 
difference between subjects as representers and objects as things they represent (which could be mental 
or non-mental). Both of these are derived in the course of the dialectic, when the transition is made from 
the philosophy of nature to the philosophy of spirit. This difference is rooted in the fact that Kant already 
assumed a distinction between mental and non-mental, and focused his attention on describing the 
difference between subjective and objective in the subject’s experience. Hegel’s focus is on the more basic 
distinction which Kant takes for granted.  
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With this, it is hopefully evident how Hegel attempts to correct the perceived flaws of the 
Kantian system by beginning with the neutral element of Thought and presenting its internal, 
dialectical development. The form of the dialectic provides a derivation of the categories that is 
systematic and self-contained, and the particular divisions of the dialectic into nature and spirit 
lay the groundwork for Hegel’s solution to Kant’s epistemic worries by explaining the distinction 
between the subjective and objective.  Thus it is only through this reading of Thought as the 342
neutral element, that this kind of solution to the Kantian problems can be found. Having 
defended this reading and shown how it allows Hegel to resolve some of the tensions in Kant’s 
position, I now focus more directly on Hegel’s connection to Kant. 
 
4 Kant & Hegel ­ Thought as the Successor to the Transcendental Unity of 
Apperception 
The preceding sections of this chapter were directed at presenting and defending a 
reading of Hegel that takes Thought to be the ontologically neutral starting point from which 
Hegel derives the necessary structure of the world. In so doing, I established a number of 
similarities between the theoretical roles that Thought and the transcendental unity of 
apperception play in their respective philosopher’s systems. This in itself establishes a  prima 
facie  case for conceiving of one concept as the successor of the other. In this section and the 
next, I focus more precisely on the this claim of succession. I defend that claim first by providing 
textual evidence that Hegel himself saw Thought in this way, and second by showing how 
various differences between them are fundamentally rooted in the transition from the Kantian 
condition on representations to the Hegelian condition on being itself. If successful, these 
arguments will establish not only that Hegel’s Thought is the appropriate analogue of Kant’s 
342 I say more about Hegel’s responses to the kinds of skepticism Kant was worried about in section 4.1 of 
this chapter. 
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transcendental unity of apperception but also that the metaphysical difference between these 
concepts marks the primary point of distinction between the two philosophers.  
I begin with Hegel’s explicit comments on the Kantian transcendental unity of 
apperception. Consider the following passage, which I quoted above but repeat here to 
emphasize a new point: 
“[Kant’s] principle idea is to vindicate the  categories for self-consciousness                   
understood as the  subjective ‘I’. Because of this determination, his point of view                         
remains confined within consciousness and its opposition, and, besides the                   
empirical element of feeling and intuition, is left with something else not posited                         
or determined by thinking self-consciousness, a  thing­in­itself , something alien                 
and external to thinking - although it is easy to see that such an abstract entity as                                 
the  thing­in­itself is itself only the product of thought, and of merely abstractive                         
thought at that. - If other Kantians have expanded on the determining of the                           
intended object by the ‘I’ by saying that the objectifying of the ‘I’ is to be regarded                                 
as an original and necessary deed of consciousness, so that in this original deed                           
there is not yet the representation of the ‘I’ … then this objectifying deed,                           
liberated from the opposition of consciousness, is closer to what may be called                         
simply  thinking  as such. But this deed should no longer be called consciousness;                         
for consciousness holds within itself the opposition of the ‘I’ and its intended                         
object which is not to be found in that original deed. The name ‘consciousness’                           
gives it more of a semblance of subjectivity than does the term ‘ thought ,’ which                           
here, however, is to be taken in the absolute sense of  infinite thought , not as                             
encumbered by the finitude of consciousness; in short,  thought as such .”  343
 
In this passage, Hegel begins by remarking that Kant’s focus is on the “subjective ‘I’” - 
Hegel’s way of describing the transcendental unity of apperception.  He then proceeds to 344
343 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.47-48. 
344 This way of referring to the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception is used systematically by 
Hegel throughout his writings. For a direct identification of the two, see sect. 42 of the  Encyclopedia 
Logic , where, in discussing Kant, Hegel writes, “this philosophy identifies the original identity of the I in 
thinking (i.e. the transcendental unity of self-consciousness) as the specific ground of the concepts of the 
understanding.” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 42 - the parenthetical remark is Hegel’s own. As noted 
in the previous chapter, Hegel’s predecessor’s made a similar terminological shift, as in Schelling’s “Of the 
I as the Principle of Philosophy,” and Fichte’s  Science of Knowledge . Of course, in all these figures, the 
transcendental unity of apperception takes on a new form, but all of them give it pride of place and 
identify it with the Kantian notion. For example, Fichte is explicit that his system is “nothing other than 
the Kantian,” and Schelling restates Kant’s question about synthetic a priori judgements explicitly in 
terms of the I. See Fichte, “Science of Knowledge: First Introduction,” 43 and Schelling, “Of the I as the 
Principle of Philosophy,” 73. 
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present the criticism attributed to him above, namely that this way of proceeding is restricted by 
its inability to reach the thing-in-itself. He then turns to a consideration of the “objectifying 
deed” that this ‘I’ performs. This is the act of judgement through which, as described in the first 
chapter, the transcendental unity of apperception molds sensations into objects and ultimately 
into a unified world of experience. The crucial section of the passage comes immediately after 
this, where Hegel argues that this deed should not be called ‘consciousness’; instead the term 
‘thinking’ should be used. In other words, Hegel explicitly connects his conception of Thought to 
the transcendental unity of apperception, claiming that Thought is better suited to play the 
crucial objectifying role played by the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant. As a final 
point, observe that the reason for this shift is precisely the one we have presented above; 
restricting that objectifying activity to the activity of a conscious being presents it as excessively 
subjective. Instead, Thought should be understood as ‘infinite,’ as unrestricted, and, accordingly, 
as both subjective  and  objective. 
Later passages in the  Science of Logic  also support the connection between Thought and 
the transcendental unity of apperception. On the following page we find Hegel arguing that 
Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception was a valuable contribution to philosophy, but his 
handling of it obscured crucial issues: 
“Now because the interest of the Kantian philosophy was directed to the so-called                         
transcendental nature of the categories, the treatment itself of such categories                     
came up empty. What they are in themselves apart from their abstract relation to                           
the ‘I,’ a relation which is the same for all, how they are determined and related to                                 
each other, this was not made a subject of consideration, and therefore                       
knowledge of their nature was not in the least advanced by this philosophy. What                           
alone is of interest in this connection comes only in the Critique of Ideas. -                             
However, if there was to be any real progress in philosophy, it was necessary that                             
the interest of thought should be drawn to the consideration of the formal side, of                             
the ‘I’ of consciousness as such, that is, of the abstract reference of a subjective                             
awareness to an object, and that in this way the path should be opened for the                               
cognition of the  infinite form , that is, of the concept. Yet, in order to arrive at this                                 
cognition, the finite determinateness in which that form is as ‘I,’ as                       
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consciousness, must be shed. The form, when thought out in its purity, will then                           
have within itself the capacity to  determine itself, that is, to give itself a content,                             
and to give it as a necessary content - as a system of thought-determinations.”   345
 
Here Hegel first reiterates the point that Kant’s focus on the epistemic status of the 
categories, his consideration of them as necessary tools for the mind, distracted him from 
adequately deriving them.  But he does give Kant credit for drawing our attention to the ‘I’ of 346
consciousness. Yet the ‘I’ as Kant had it, must be modified: it must shed its finitude. In other 
words, it must be understood not as the operation of a particular subject opposed to an object, 
but as infinite Thought.  Re-understood as infinite, subject/object neutral Thought, it becomes 347
possible to dialectically derive the system of necessary features of reality - the system of 
thought-determinations. In this way, Hegel directly relates the Kantian unity of apperception to 
his conception of Thought. 
This identification goes the other way as well. Not only does Hegel show how Thought is 
a modification of the ‘I,’ or from the transcendental unity of apperception, but he also claims 
that the conscious ‘I’ is a part of Thought - it is Thought  as subject . Hegel writes that “we can say 
that ‘I’ and thought are the same; or more specifically, ‘I’ is the thinking as someone thinking”  348
and that “represented as a  subject , thinking is a  thinking being , and the simple expression for a 
concretely existing subject that thinks is I.”  The Kantian ‘I’ thus comes to be seen as a specific 349
345 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.48. 
346 This point is discussed at length in the previous chapter, section 3.2. 
347 In the passage cited, Hegel’s term is ‘concept,’ but, the concept is one of the last and richest thought 
determinations. We noted above how Thought is identical to its determinations, so that Thought is the 
Absolute Idea. A similar point holds here - the concept Hegel refers to in this passage is Thought itself, but 
only at a certain stage where it is infinite  form . At the culmination of the dialectic in the Absolute Idea, 
Thought is both form and matter. 
348 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, addition 1. 
349 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 20. Although Hegel uses the phrase ‘concretely existing’ here, he is 
clear that the ‘I’ as he understands it is not an empirical self-awareness, but the pure apperception Kant 
has in mind. He writes, for example, that “When I say ‘I,’ I mean to refer to myself as this individual, 
indeed as this determinate person. Actually, however, I do not thereby say anything specific about myself. 
Everybody else is ‘I’ as well, and although in denoting myself as ‘I’ I mean myself, this individual being, I 
simultaneously utter something completely universal. ‘I’ is pure being-for-itself in which all that is 
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determination of Thought, rather than Thought in general. When Thought turns to reflect upon 
itself, and considers itself as the agent of the dialectical activity, it sees itself as a subject, as an 
‘I.’ This ‘I’ has the quality of universality, in that can be attached to all our representations, and 
also has the quality of necessity, in that it attaches to them necessarily. These features are 
characteristic of Thought and represent its similarity to the ‘I.’ But when the ‘I’ is used in 
consciousness, it becomes related to an object and hence cannot be understood except as finite. 
As a result, the ‘I’ of self-consciousness cannot be Thought properly speaking; instead it is only 
Thought in one of its particular forms, as a subject. In this way, Kant pointed us in the right 
direction by drawing our attention to the universality and necessity built into the ‘I’, into all 
subjectivity, but he did not go far enough, since he continued to restrict this to particular 
subjects, and thus did not give us the unrestricted universality and necessity that are the marks 
of infinite, unrestricted Thought. 
At this point I hope to have shown that my identification of Thought as the successor to 
Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception is not based only on their theoretical roles, but, 
given the passages cited above, is something Hegel himself would likely endorse. But there are 
other candidates that might be put forth as the successor in Thought’s place. Robert Pippin, in 
particular, puts forth a different option. He writes:  “What Kant called the original synthetic 
unity of apperception is what Hegel calls “the essence of the unity of the concept.’”  The 350
principal textual motivation for this claim is a passage in the  Science of Logic , where Hegel 
seems to make precisely the claim Pippin attributes to him. Here is the passage in full: 
“It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the Critique of 
Reason that the unity which constitutes the essence of the concept is recognized 
as the original synthetic unity of apperception, the unity of the “I think,” or of 
particular has been negated and sublated; it is the ultimate, simple, and pure element of consciousness.” 
Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, addition 1. In other words, although our everyday use of the word ‘I’ 
may appear to refer to a specifically determined individual, it is in fact wholly universal, expressing the 
universal character of Thought in general. 
350 Pippin, ‘The Significance of Self-Consciousness in Idealist Theories of Logic,’ 2. 
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self-consciousness. – This proposition is all that there is to the so-called 
transcendental deduction of the categories which, from the beginning, has 
however been regarded as the most difficult piece of Kantian philosophy”  351
 
The concept is one of the later stages of the Hegelian dialectic. Like all the stages, it is a form of 
Thought. Pippin’s claim then is that it is not Thought itself, but only a specific form of it called 
the ‘concept,’ that is the successor to the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception.  
Whether one decides on Pippin’s reading or on my own depends on what one takes to be 
the key feature of the transcendental unity of apperception. On the one hand, Kant clearly takes 
the unity of apperception to intrinsically involve a kind of pure self-consciousness. Hegel here 
discusses that self-consciousness in the context of the concept, a specific stage of Thought’s 
dialectical development. If we take self-consciousness to be the pivotal feature of the 
transcendental unity of apperception, then it might be appropriate to take Hegel at his word 
here and say that the corresponding element of Hegel’s philosophy is not Thought in general, 
but the specific stage of Thought Hegel calls the ‘concept.’  352
But the transcendental unity of apperception is more than simply a special kind of 
self-awareness. It plays an important theoretical role in Kant’s philosophy in solidifying our 
knowledge of a priori truths and explaining the distinction between subjective and objective 
features of experience. As outlined above, it is Thought as a whole that plays this role for Hegel, 
not the specific stage of the concept. In fact, the concept is able to play this role at all only 
insofar as it is a part of the subject/object self-determining Thought described above. To focus 
on this specific stage of Thought would be to miss the crucial feature of Thought, which is its 
subject/object neutral nature. 
351 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 12.18. 
352 Note that even if we take self-consciousness to be the crucial mark of the transcendental unity of 
apperception, another point in the Hegelian system would also recommend themselves as successors to 
the Kantian conception. Hegel specifically derives self-consciousness only much later in the dialectic, in 
the  Philosophy of Spirit , sect. 424-437. 
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Moreover, just as Pippin has this specific passage identifying the unity of apperception 
with the unity of the concept, there are other passages, cited above, that identify the unity of 
apperception with Thought.  Pippin’s interpretation is thus not alone in having textual 353
support. In sum, since the textual evidence for such a connection is not conclusive, it would be 
best to let theoretical considerations decide the issue. And it is Thought, in all of its stages, that 
plays the relevant theoretical role for Hegel. Hence it is Thought that should be taken as the 
successor to the transcendental unity of apperception, not its specific determination as the 
concept.  
 
4.1 Kant & Hegel ­ The Metaphysical Shift 
In the previous section, I argued, on the basis of textual evidence, that Thought was the 
successor concept to the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception. In this section, I argue 
that the primary distinction that marks the transition from the Kantian to the Hegelian way of 
thinking is that Hegel sees Thought as a purely logical, subject/object neutral entity, where Kant 
understands the transcendental unity of apperception as a requirement on the subject’s 
representations. That Hegel does in fact understand Thought in this way has been show above; 
here I show how a number of commonly cited differences between the two philosophers have 
their roots in this crucial difference in the ontological status of their central concepts. In so 
doing, I further strengthen the case for connecting these concepts - if such a connection can 
explain major differences between these philosophers, then it has an explanatory value that 
other interpretations might lack. 
Perhaps the most obvious difference between Kant and Hegel is in the overall 
metaphysical picture the two philosophers present. Kant sees the transcendental unity of 
353 See especially Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.48. 
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apperception as a condition on the subject’s representations, and in doing so he begins from an 
ontology that views the world as divided into perceiving subjects and objects in-themselves. The 
interaction between these two generates all of the rich world of experience through the subject’s 
operation on the sensations it receives from the object. But this basic ontological starting point 
remains fixed and unaltered throughout the Kantian system. Indeed, it is the fact that he starts 
here that makes him unable to explain the distinction between subjects and objects; for him, 
that distinction is a starting point, and cannot itself be explained. By contrast, Hegel’s ontology 
consists of only one entity: Thought. Through the dialectic, Hegel tries to show how this entity 
comes to generate what we recognize as the natural and physical worlds, as well as the 
distinction between representing subjects and the objects they represent. So where Kant 
remains essentially a dualist, Hegel presents a monistic position.  354
With regard to the epistemic consequences, because Kant restricts the transcendental 
unity of apperception to a condition on representations, he is able to secure our knowledge not 
of the world as it is in itself, but as we experience it. In other words, we can know necessary 
truths about our experience of the world, and hence of all the natural world and the results of 
the natural sciences, but we cannot know necessary truths (or any substantive truths) about 
things as they are in themselves. Since the transcendental unity of apperception conditions our 
representations, it provides necessary laws only for these representations, and not for things as 
they are in themselves. Accordingly, with regard to extra-experiential entities like God or the 
free subject, Kant claims that we cannot have theoretical knowledge regarding their existence. 
For Kant, this strict agnosticism is a powerful tool in securing the solidity of our faith in these 
354 Hegel explicitly describes Kant as a dualist and attacks him for it: “In every dualistic system, and 
especially in the Kantian system, its basic flaw reveals itself through the inconsistency of  combining  what 
a moment ago has been declared to be independent and thus  incompatible .” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , 
sect. 60. 
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things, but for Hegel, both this agnosticism and the restriction of our knowledge to experience 
are unacceptable conclusions, which he sees as founded on a false humility.  355
Hegel’s system of thought determinations aims to secure for us our knowledge both of 
metaphysical truths in general and of God and freedom in particular. This is done on the one 
hand by demonstrating that the relevant metaphysical concepts are indeed stages of Thoughts’ 
development, and on the other hand by demonstrating that human beings capable of knowing 
these metaphysical truths are also a necessary stage of Thought’s development. In the first case, 
since the dialectic demonstrates that the thought determinations are necessary features of the 
world, when we represent the world as having these features, we can be assured that our 
representations are accurate.  Hegel even goes so far as to say that it is only insofar as we 356
represent these thought determinations that we truly think, and they alone are thoughts; all else 
is mere sensing, imagining, or remembering, though these mental acts, too, have some element 
of Thought.  What’s more, Hegel also shows that human beings that represent the world 357
accurately are also necessary features of that world, again solidifying the epistemological 
foundations of our claims to knowledge. The ability to grant us knowledge of things in 
themselves is rooted, ultimately in the fact that Thought is both subject and object of this 
knowledge, where the corresponding Kantian inability to grant us this kind of knowledge springs 
from the Kantian restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception to the subject’s 
representations. 
355 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic,  sect. 19, addition 1. 
356 This is so for necessary truths, but Hegel is not committed to the idea that all our assertions are always 
true. As finite human beings, we may be lead to make assertions not based purely on thought 
determinations but on the contingent context that surrounds us. 
357 “In our ordinary consciousness, thoughts are clothed in and combined with familiar sensuous and 
spiritual material, and when we think things over, reflect, or reason about them, we intermingle our 
feelings, intuitions, and representations with thoughts (in every sentence with a quite sensuous content - 
as for instance in ‘this leaf is green’ -, categories such as being, singularity, are already part of the mix)” 
Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 3. Note also that Hegel does not take assertions about purely contingent 
matters of fact (e.g., ‘Caesar was born in Rome in 100 BC’) to be judgements properly speaking. Hegel, 
Encyclopedia Logic,  sect. 167. 
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Aside from these large-scale metaphysical and epistemological consequences, however, 
Kant’s restriction of the transcendental unity of apperception to representations, together with 
Hegel’s corresponding lack of such restriction, also creates some more subtle methodological 
differences between the two philosophers. To see these, recall first that Kant sees that 
transcendental unity of apperception as acting to unify not just representations in general, but 
specifically representations given to the subject from the object through sensation. This element 
of externality requires Kant to follow a two-step procedure in the  Critique ’s argumentation. 
First, he describes the basic forms of judgement, and second, he shows that judgement (and 
hence those forms), is in fact operative in generating experience out of the blur of sensations 
originally given to the subject. The first stage is the derivation of the categories, and the second 
is the deduction of their legitimate application. Kant’s project breaks into these stages precisely 
because the transcendental unity of apperception is seen as dependent upon sensation for its 
content. Since it operates on representations given from without, Kant must first outline the 
exact forms the mind works with in this operation. Yet even when that is done, it remains an 
open question whether these forms are in fact imposed on sensation or not. The transcendental 
unity of apperception, as a condition on experience, is aimed at answering this question in the 
affirmative. 
Hegel, however, combines both these steps into one; the dialectic is both derivation and 
deduction.  On the one hand, each thought determination follows necessarily from the one 358
prior to it, based on the specific deficiency of its predecessor. In this way, the dialectic explicitly 
derives precisely which thought determinations have a legitimate claim to being necessary 
features of reality. This is the derivation side of the project. But at the same time, by dialectically 
deriving these thought determinations, Hegel shows them to be necessary features of Thought, 
358 Sebastian Rödl makes this observation in Rödl, “Eliminating Externality,” 185-188. 
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of the single truly real entity. This being the case, unlike the Kantian project, Hegel faces no 
question of whether the derived forms have legitimate claim to reality. Thus, the dialectical 
derivation is simultaneously a dialectical deduction. There must be the specific stage of 
becoming, for example, because it and only it can resolve the passing over process occurring 
between being and nothing. At the same time, becoming must truly be a feature of reality, since 
without it being and nothing would remain in tension. The two stages of derivation and 
deduction are, in Hegel, merely different ways of viewing the same dialectical process. 
A similar subtle distinction between the Kantian and Hegelian approach is in where they 
locate the basic drive toward unity which operates in their systems. For Kant, unity is built into 
the nature of the subject. It is because the ‘I’ must be one and the same in all of its appearances 
that there must be a corresponding necessary unity among the subject’s representations. Just as 
above, there is a two-step process here. The ‘I’ must be unified, and hence it imposes this unity 
on its representations; the representations themselves, whether sensory or conceptual, do not 
have any unity in and of themselves. In Hegel’s case, however, unity is not imposed on anything 
from without. Instead, it is a need inherent in the thought determinations themselves. Every 
stage of the dialectic requires the one after it because of a fundamental instability or dependency 
in the first stage’s identity. The synthetic unity of antithesis and thesis is an attempt to reconcile 
and stabilize these thought determinations. In this way, Hegel sees the drive to unity as 
immanent in the thought determinations where Kant sees unity as imposed upon 
representations by the subject.   359
As a final point of comparison, I want to draw attention to the reflexive element found in 
both the transcendental unity of apperception and Hegel’s conception of thought. In Kant, this 
element is explicit; the transcendental unity of apperception includes the element of 
359 On this point interpreters who read the dialectic as a description of the requirements for a subject’s 
thought of the world will disagree with me. I hope to have addressed such criticism above. 
158 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 159/182
self-consciousness in its very name, and begins from the demand that our thoughts should be 
reflexively available to us as our own. Kant thus begins from our self-consciousness, and the 
transcendental unity of apperception is in many ways a set of conditions on the possibility of our 
awareness of ourselves, just as much as it is a condition on our experience of external objects.  
Hegel does not gives self-consciousness such a privileged role, but it is a persistent theme 
in his writing, especially in the  Philosophy of Spirit , that Thought always strives to reach 
self-awareness.  Indeed, given the way the dialectic ends, it is no exaggeration to say that it is 360
only when Thought finally knows itself as Thought that the system reaches its completion. All 
the prior stages of the dialectic are, then, conditions for the possibility of Thought’s 
self-awareness, just the analytic, synthetic, and objective unities of apperception are conditions 
for the possibility of the subject’s self-awareness in Kant. And just as in Kant, Hegel is emphatic 
that in the dialectic, dependence goes both ways. The self-awareness of Thought is the 
precondition for the whole system as well, since it is only at that point that all the prior thought 
determinations find their resolution. So while the nature of the self-conscious entity has 
radically shifted from Kant’s individual human subject to the all-encompassing totality that is 
Hegel’s Thought, both systems are propelled forward by a drive for self-consciousness, and 
conclude by demonstrating the conditions under which that self-consciousness is possible. In 
this, perhaps more than any other commonality between them, it becomes clear the extent to 
which Hegel’s Thought is the philosophical successor to the Kantian transcendental unity of 
apperception.  
On that note, I want to close this section by emphasizing again the similarities between 
these thinkers’ two central concepts. Despite the differences described above, it remains the case 
360 Charles Taylor, in his book  Hegel , also places great emphasis on the need for self-awareness. He, 
however, sees this as the need of a universal Spirit, where I describe it as the need of Thought. Universal 
Spirit is one of Thought’s stages, indeed is sometimes described as its final and most complete form; this 
difference between our readings is for the most part only in the words we choose. 
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that like the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception, Hegel’s Thought is a series of 
interdependent conditions for the possibility of self-consciousness. Like the transcendental 
unity of apperception, it demonstrates the legitimacy of our knowledge of necessary features of 
reality. And like the transcendental unity of apperception, it explains the distinction between the 
subjective and the objective. Hegel’s key innovation was to take the Kantian unifying condition 
out of the subject’s mental faculty and write it into a non-subject, non-object, neutral entity: 
Thought. The differences between his system and the Kantian are rooted in this shift. 
At this point I hope to have made the positive case for a reading of Hegel that takes his 
connection to the transcendental unity of apperception as a central guiding thread. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will defend this interpretation against two key alternative views, 
which I call the ‘sociality of reason’ interpretation and the ‘unity of the faculties’ interpretation. 
 
5.1 The Sociality of Reason Interpretation 
What I call the ‘Sociality of Reason’ interpretation is an interpretative approach to Hegel 
shared by philosophers Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, Robert Brandom, among others.  361
Although there are differences in the various approaches to Hegel taken by these philosophers, 
one can nonetheless identify a few key interpretative claims that they share. In this section, I 
briefly outline these claims and detail the ways in which they contrast with the claims I make 
above. Following this, I argue that while this approach captures important elements of Hegel’s 
thought, it fails to do justice to the metaphysical dimension of his philosophy, thereby ignoring 
important themes in Hegel’s texts and leaving him open to the same objections that he himself 
raises against Kant.  
361 See for example, Pippin, “Hegel and Category Theory”; Pippin,  Hegel’s Idealism;  Pinkard,  Hegel’s 
Phenomenology;  Brandom,  Reason in Philosophy . 
160 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 161/182
The readings of Hegel presented by Pippin, Pinkard, and Brandom share at least three 
important features. To begin with, they tend to emphasize Hegel’s relationship to the overall 
tradition of German Idealism, and especially to the founder of that tradition, Kant.  In so 362
doing, they hope to do justice to Hegel’s own extensive engagement with the thinkers of that 
tradition, as well as to his repeated claims to be building on them. Moreover, a focus on Hegel’s 
continuity with his predecessors, besides making good historical sense, also helps these 
interpretations avoid the pitfalls of past readers, many of whom seem to have read Hegel in 
isolation. As a result, Hegel came to be seen, despite his own protestations, as a dogmatic 
metaphysician in precisely the rationalist tradition Kant opposed. By emphasizing Hegel’s 
relation to Kant, such arch-rationalist readings are ruled out, and Hegel is in some sense 
sanitized and made more palatable to present-day analytic audiences. 
This brings me to a second central feature of the Sociality of Reason interpretation. In 
trying to avoid this kind of metaphysically-loaded rationalist reading of Hegel, and in focusing 
closely on Hegel’s relationship to Kant, these readers come to read Hegel as dealing primarily 
with the same issues as Kant deals with: namely, the structure of experience and the nature and 
limits of our knowledge.  Like Kant, Hegel is said to have emphasized that the nature of 363
experience depends crucially on the mind’s creative activity in applying concepts to organize the 
data provided by sensibility. But unlike Kant, Hegel sees that any individual’s ability to use 
concepts in this way depends crucially on that individual’s being a part of a larger society. 
362 Pippin, for example, spends the first three chapters of  Hegel’s Idealism  tracing the evolution of the 
transcendental unity of apperception from Kant through Fichte and Schelling before discussing its role in 
Hegel directly. Pinkard, for his part, has written a whole volume discussing the period of German Idealism 
between Kant and Hegel, and Brandom repeatedly compares Kant and Hegel throughout his work, 
especially in his  Reason and Philosophy .  
363 “Whatever else Hegel intends by asserting an ‘Absolute Idealism,’ it is clear by now that such a claim at 
the very least involves Hegel in a theory about pure concepts, and about the role of such concepts in 
human experience, particularly in any possible knowledge of objects, but also in various kinds of 
self-conscious, intentional activities.” Pippin,  Hegel’s Idealism , 91. See also Pinkard,  Hegel’s Dialectic , 
13-14.  
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Concepts have their meaning only within the wider context of a society’s normative practices, 
which governs their legitimate use. Hegel’s major innovation, according to this way of reading 
him, is to have recognized the role of social forces in determining the meaning of our concepts 
and, accordingly, in determining how we organize intuitions in the activity of constructing the 
empirical world.  
Together with this comes a third feature of the Sociality of Reason interpretation: a 
general refusal to attribute to Hegel any substantive metaphysical claims.  Hegel is read in this 364
light as primarily concerned with concepts, concept application, and in general with the 
operations of the mind. In this he is in keeping with Kant, who emphatically rejected the very 
possibility of metaphysics as a science of things-in-themselves. Hegel, as a good reader of Kant, 
could not (according to this interpretation) himself go in for the dogmatic metaphysical claims 
classically attributed to him. Instead, he confines himself to reassessing Kant’s account of the 
role of concepts in experience by noting the crucial contribution of social forces. 
For my part, I wholly agree with the emphasis this tradition of interpretation places on 
Hegel’s relationship to Kant, and have tried to describe that relationship at length, both here and 
in the previous chapter. Yet as should be clear from how I present Hegel’s views above, I would 
be at odds with any reading that sees Hegel as developing a theory of concept use alone. As I 
read him, Hegel is a full-blooded metaphysician aiming at knowledge not just of how the 
individual’s mind constructs a world, but of the world as it is independent of such construction. 
At the same time, however, he tries to respond to crucial Kantian insights about the role of the 
mind in experience and the need for a self-critical and systematic philosophy. Read like this, 
Hegel is seen not as a return to the dogmatic rationalism that Kant rejects, but as a genuinely 
post-Kantian metaphysician. 
364 Pippin,  Hegel’s Idealism , 6. 
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The principal reason for reading Hegel in this way is that it does justice to his repeated 
criticisms of Kant’s philosophy. Given the objections to Kant presented above, it is implausible 
that Hegel would concern himself only with the nature of concepts and their application. Such a 
study would leave him open to the same objections that were raised to Kant above: he would be 
committed to a formal and subjective understanding of concepts, would be unable to provide an 
adequate derivation of the necessary features of the world, and would leave us without 
knowledge of things as they are in themselves.  If we are to see Hegel as genuinely attempting 365
to produce a presuppositionless philosophy that can derive and demonstrate the necessary 
features of the world as it is in itself, then we cannot read him as a philosopher who studies the 
nature of the mind and the conditions of concept application alone. Instead, he must be read as 
a metaphysician, and his admittedly unusual metaphysics must be understood as he understood 
it: as the result of a protracted effort to overcome important Kantian criticisms of the very 
possibility of metaphysics. 
Moreover, I would argue that the Sociality of Reason interpretation outlined above 
actually correctly understands a number of key points in Hegel’s thought, but stops short of 
Hegel’s ultimate conclusions. In particular, philosophers reading Hegel in this way tend to focus 
on the  Phenomenology of Spirit , a text in which Hegel explicitly thematizes the role of the mind 
and of society in constructing and modifying various accounts of what could count as 
knowledge.  Looking at this text, it is easy to see Hegel as a direct descendant of the Kantian 366
tradition in focusing on the role of the mind in our attempts to know the world.  
365 For example, when Hegel compares his conception of objectivity to Kant’s, he writes that,  contra  Kant 
“the true objectivity of thinking consists in this: that thoughts are not merely our thoughts but at the same 
time the in itself of things and of the object-world.” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 41, addition 2.  
366 Pinkard, for example, develops the sociality of reason interpretation explicitly through an analysis of 
the  Phenomenology  - his book is titled  Hegel’s Phenomenology :  the Sociality of Reason . Pippin also uses 
primarily the  Phenomenology  to justify his reading of the relation between Kant and Hegel - see Pippin, 
Hegel’s Idealism,  36-39. 
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Yet it should not be forgotten that the  Phenomenology  is intended as a ground-clearing 
introduction to what Hegel considered his most important text: the  Science of Logic . In the 
introduction to the latter, Hegel explains that the purpose of the  Phenomenology  is to show, by 
way of an immanent critique of various understandings of the mind-world relationship, that the 
mind and the world are not fundamentally distinct but are in fact two facets of a single original 
unity.  With this in hand, Hegel is able to claim that the rules of the mind’s operation (i.e. 367
logic) and the structure of the world (i.e. metaphysics) are one and the same, since both mind 
and world are fundamentally one, united as different facets of thought. But this means then that 
the Hegelian project is at bottom a metaphysical project aimed at illuminating not only the 
nature of our representations of the world but the nature of the world itself. Hegel does examine 
the nature of the mind and our use of concepts in the  Phenomenology , but he does so in order to 
establish a metaphysical claim about the relation between the mind and the world.  It is only 368
once that claim is established that the main body of his philosophy begins. 
The sociality of reason interpretation, then, is inadequate because it fails to do justice to 
Hegel’s criticisms of Kant and because it does not give due importance to the texts that Hegel 
himself sees as most central to his project. As a result, it is not able to do justice to the real 
ontological differences between his position and the Kantian, and which are at the root of 
Hegel’s philosophy. 
 
 
 
367 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.32-21.34.  
368 This marks a point a at which Hegel takes himself to be more fully self-critical than Kant. Where Kant 
simply assumes a metaphysical picture wherein the world is fundamentally divided between subjects and 
objects, Hegel does not make this assumption, and ultimately comes to see the distinction between subject 
and object as springing from a more fundamental unity of the two. See especially the introduction to the 
Science of Logic . 
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5.2 The Unity of the Faculties Interpretation 
Above, I have emphasized that Hegel deviates from Kant in taking thought to be 
ontologically neutral, as opposed to being representational. By making this shift, and then 
deriving the various features of thought through the dialectic, Hegel is able to derive the 
necessary features both of the world and of how we think about it. The unity of faculties 
interpretation arrives at a similar end point, with Hegel affirming our knowledge of things in 
themselves and seeing thought as operative the world at large. Yet this interpretation, presented 
perhaps most notably by Stephen Houlgate and Sebastian Rödl, begins not from thought as an 
neutral entity but a critique of the Kantian analysis of the mind.  For them, the key restriction 369
is not that the transcendental unity of apperception operates on representations, but that it 
requires representations to be given to it through the senses, and does not make necessary any 
unity on representations not given thereby. As we saw in the previous chapter, however, that 
dependency of the transcendental unity of apperception on the senses is precisely the formalism 
that comes with the Kantian restriction of it to representations. As a result, this way of reading 
Hegel mislocates the central Hegelian objection and focuses on a derivative feature of his 
criticism of Kant. Here, however, I focus primarily on this reading’s view of Hegel’s positive 
philosophy, as opposed its position on Hegel’s criticism of Kant. 
Overall, while I agree with many of the conclusions of this interpretative strategy, I find 
the emphasis on the unity of faculties to be slightly misleading; the primary shift from Kant to 
Hegel is the ontological shift described above, not a modification of Kant’s theory of faculties. As 
we saw above, Hegel consistently emphasizes the fact that his philosophy does not present 
369 See for example Houlgate,  The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” and Rödl, 
“Eliminating Externality.” 
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merely an analysis of the subject’s capacities; focusing on the faculties would thus leave it 
unclear why the laws governing the faculties should be necessary features of the world itself.  370
But before presenting my reasons, it’s important to understand fully the interpretation 
presented by Houlgate and Rödl, among others. These readers emphasize that for Kant, the 
categories are, in and of themselves, merely empty concepts. In and of themselves, they would 
tell us nothing about the nature of experience, but would describe merely how we think. It is 
only when Kant has demonstrated that they must apply to sensations and intuitions given in 
space and time that the categories are, for him, given real content. As a result, the legitimate use 
of the categories is only in ordering the spatial and temporal world we experience - any use of 
them outside that context would be illegitimate, a mere fantasy at best. One way to put this is to 
say that the understanding (the faculty of concepts, to which the categories belong) is dependent 
upon sensibility (the faculty through which we receive sensations). Reason, as the faculty of 
judgement, is independent of sensibility, but this independence is precisely why so many errors 
are made; reason’s striving for the unconditioned pushes it to apply the categories beyond their 
legitimate sphere. 
Hegel often criticizes Kant’s claim that the categories are dependent upon sensibility, 
claiming that they in fact have a purely logical content of their own.  Kant’s restriction of them, 371
he says, is dogmatic and based in an insufficiently critical way of thinking.  But recall that the 372
categories are a priori concepts drawn from the logical forms of judgement. No longer 
dependent upon sensibility, they become necessary elements of all thought whatsoever. This 
breaks down the Kantian division between sensibility, understanding, and reason. 
370 “When we construe thinking in this way [i.e., as infinite thought], it appears in a different context from 
when we merely say that among and alongside other faculties such as perception, representation, willing, 
and so on we also possess the faculty of thinking.” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, addition 1. 
371 In the  Encyclopedia Logic , for example, Hegel writes that “to assert of the categories that, with respect 
to themselves, they are empty is unjustified insofar as they possess in any case content through the fact 
that they are determinate.” Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 42, addition 1.  
372 Houlgate attributes this criticism to Hegel in  The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , 17-19. 
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Understanding and reason were previously distinguished by the fact that the former conditioned 
sensations and was dependent upon them, while the latter was able to go beyond these. Freed 
from that dependency, understanding and reason would no longer be distinct faculties. Instead, 
the faculties would be unified and the mind’s a priori categories would condition all thinking, 
including thought about God, freedom, and other topics that Kant maintained agnosticism 
towards. 
In this way, by undermining the dependence on sensations, Hegel is able to expand the 
scope of our knowledge, and increase the number of necessary concepts beyond the Kantian 
twelve. The dialectical derivation of concepts emerges at this point as a way of showing which a 
priori concepts there must be.  At the same time, it is no longer necessary to establish that a 373
concept is used in the ordering of sensations, since the legitimacy of the concept is no longer 
dependent upon its being applied to sensation. This eliminates the deduction stage of the 
Kantian project, so that the dialectic, by deriving what a priori concepts there must be, at the 
same time demonstrates them to be necessary forms of our thinking.  374
According to this interpretation, Hegel also brings a similar charge of dogmatism against 
Kant’s claim that an understanding of the necessary structure of thought would not 
simultaneously give us an understanding of the world as it is in itself.  On this reading of 375
Hegel’s view, Kant restricts our knowledge to the subject’s experience of the world because he 
sees the forms of that experience as contributed to it by the subject. Since they have their origin 
in the subject, they cannot also be necessary features of the object.  To Hegel, this is merely a 376
373 Houlgate,  The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , 42-53. 
374 “Eliminating externality requires that we derive a pure concept in such a way that, by thus deriving it, 
we know it to be a form of knowledge. In other words, the Metaphysical and the Transcendental 
Deduction of the pure concepts will be one and the same derivation.” Rödl, “Eliminating Externality,” 184. 
375 “Before presenting his speculative logic, therefore, what Hegel can say is this: Kant’s restriction of the 
categories to experience rests on his uncritical adherence to the standpoint of understanding, and this ill 
befits a truly  critical  philosopher.” Houlgate, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” 26. 
376 Houlgate, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” 28. 
167 
5/28/2019 Numbered Section - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PcVNX8zUYtlzMDaDon5LvoVEYUBcF_qrZ2AAljtTi2A/edit 168/182
dogmatic assertion. By denying it, Hegel is able to make the final step that differentiates his 
philosophy from the Kantian - the claim to know things as they are in themselves. The necessary 
forms of our thinking, i.e., the a priori concepts or thought determinations derived through the 
dialectic, Hegel takes not to be merely forms of our subjective thinking, but of objects as they are 
in themselves. He achieves this result challenging the Kantian assumption to the contrary, and, 
in his  Logic,  showing that the thought determinations of objectivity and subjectivity are actually 
unified, not strictly separated as Kant would have them. 
Hegel’s philosophy, on this reading, is born from a demand to take the Kantian critical 
project to its final conclusion. Where Kant gave a thorough critique of many central elements of 
our conceptual system, he remained dogmatic about others. Hegel challenges these, and tries to 
start from a purely presuppositionless philosophy. This he does in the  Science of Logic , where he 
works from the bare thought of indeterminate being to develop a complete system of necessary a 
priori thought determinations which structure both our thinking and the world itself. 
Although the order of our expositions and the placement of our emphases are different, 
the reading I have advanced above shares many features in common with this one. Both 
emphasize a presuppositionless, neutral starting point, both agree that Hegel aims to give us 
knowledge of thing as they are in themselves, and both present the dialectic as simultaneously a 
derivation and a deduction of the a priori features of thought. Where we differ is in the emphasis 
I have placed on thought as an entity in its own right. I do not see the dialectic as the discussion 
of how humans must think or as a derivation of necessary concepts analogous to the Kantian 
categories. On my view, such a reading would leave Hegel stranded within the sphere of 
representations in a way that he consistently tries to deny and avoid. 
This issue comes out in how Houlgate tries to account for Hegel’s repeated claims that 
Thought is not merely representational, but gets at what things are in themselves. For Houlgate, 
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what Hegel is getting at is that human thinking has an immediate connection with objects as 
they are in themselves. Houlgate writes, for example, that “In Hegel’s view, perception or 
sensuous intuition discerns colors and sounds in space and time, and thought determines those 
spatio-temporal qualities actually to be there.”  It would seem then that on this reading, 377
Hegel’s version of thought is a kind of necessary structuring of how we think, but a structuring 
that also corresponds appropriately to what things are in themselves.  
The crucial question at this point is  why  this corresponding occurs. On what basis can 
Hegel claim, as he clearly wants to, that the determinations of thought are also the 
determinations of objects themselves? Houlgate’s reading seems to present two primary 
answers. According to the first, Houlgate’s Hegel charges Kant with dogmatically insisting that 
the human mind is dependent upon sensations, and as a result, that it can only know what is 
given to it through experience.  Kant’s denial that we can know the world as it is in itself rests 378
on this purportedly dogmatic assertion, which Hegel would overturn. Now, setting aside the 
issue of whether Kant’s claim here really is a matter of mere dogmatism, Hegel’s argument 
against it must run deeper than the mere charge of dogmatism. After all, it is just as much a 
mere dogmatic assertion to claim the opposite. Hegel’s argument against Kant, on this reading, 
would fall into simply a pair of mutually opposed assumptions, with Kant assuming that things 
in themselves do not correspond to our modes of thinking them, and Hegel assuming the 
opposite. This would not do justice to Hegel’s texts or to his abilities as a philosopher; Hegel 
cannot simply replace the Kantian assumption with his own. Instead, we must look for a more 
compelling argument for an identity between our representations and things as they are in 
themselves. 
377 Houlgate,  The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , 125. 
378 Houlgate,  The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , 18.  
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The more interesting second argument Houlgate attributes to Hegel is that the very 
concept of a ‘thing in itself’ is a part of our conceptual framework. For Kant, the thing in itself is 
a real entity, a mind-independent ground of our representations. Hegel’s argument against this 
is, as Houlgate writes, is “that the concept of the ‘thing in itself’ is the result of an act of 
abstraction by thought that remains mired in the perspective of ordinary consciousness insofar 
as it retains the idea that all thought relates to objects.”  Here Houlgate is describing what we 379
described as the ‘finitude of consciousness’ above: the idea that all consciousness (and hence all 
thought, since for Houlgate thought is something involving consciousness) is essentially related 
to objects. For him and for me, Hegel attacks Kant for taking thought as limited by this relation 
to something essentially external to it. The thing in itself should not be seen as a boundary on 
thought; instead, the idea of a thing in itself is just one of the many conceptual tools we use, and 
is thus  internal  to thought. Kant’s mistake was to take the concept at face value, thus assuming a 
certain ontological picture of minds in relation to external objects. Once we set this aside, we can 
see that how we think of things must correspond to how they are in themselves, since that latter 
concept is itself a part of how we think of them. 
There is much truth in this view, and I myself have insisted that Kant’s ontological 
assumption is a major sticking point between the two philosophers. But Houlgate’s reading of 
Hegel makes a crucial mistake. Despite these insights, Houlgate nonetheless continues to see 
Hegel’s conception of thought as essentially a matter of conscious representations.  As a result, 380
he reads Hegel as presenting a category theory, an analysis of how we as humans beings must 
conceive of the world. For him, although there is a deep mirroring between thought and things 
379 Houlgate,  The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , 134. 
380 “Thought is the direct awareness of such intelligible being.” Houlgate , The Opening of Hegel’s Logic , 
117. 
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in themselves, they remain distinct. This is a mistake for three reasons, which I present in the 
remainder of this section. 
First, if Hegel remains restricted to providing a category theory, then his claim that the 
thing in itself is a mere category cannot do any real damage to the Kantian position. Understood 
this way, Hegel is arguing that Kant’s concept of the thing in itself is itself based on our mental 
categories. Accordingly, Kant cannot know that there are such things in themselves, and so 
cannot use them to restrict our knowledge of the world. But if in his study of thought Hegel is 
himself engaged, as Houlgate argues, in a study of how we as human subjects must think, then 
the question of whether there are things in themselves outside this thinking remains undecided. 
Hegel cannot claim a real connection to such things in themselves; all he has shown is that when 
we think of them, we do not get outside the boundary of our thinking. This shows that the issue 
of connection to things in themselves is beyond resolution, but it does not show that there 
positively is such a connection. Hegel remains within the sphere of the subject, even if he can 
argue that idea of something external to that sphere is itself only part of that same subjective 
sphere. 
Second, if we truly separate thought from finitude, from a need for a relation to objects, 
then it no longer makes sense to think of it as a mental phenomenon. The essential feature of the 
mental is its representational quality, its relation to something external to it. If we separate 
thought from this as Houlgate wants to argue Hegel does, then thought becomes the Thought we 
have been discussing above: the non-mental, non-physical, neutral, and presuppositionless 
starting point of Hegel’s philosophy. At that point, we should no longer read Hegel as providing 
rules for how experience or conscious thought operates, but for how this neutral entity is 
structured. Houlgate does not reach this conclusion, but it is entailed by the arguments he (and 
I) attribute to Hegel. 
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Last, there are a pair of important textual points to be made here. First, consider the 
following passages: (1) “thought in so far as this thought is equally the fact as it is in itself;”  (2) 381
“thoughts are not merely our thoughts but at the same time the in itself of things.”  In these 382
passages and throughout his texts, Hegel does not speak as if thought  corresponds  to things in 
themselves, but as if it  is  those things. Thought  is  the essence of things, it  is  things in 
themselves. Hegel uses the language of identity, not the language of correspondence. As second 
textual point, note that Hegel also claims, in the passages we have cited above and elsewhere, 
that Thought is to be understood as “the system of thought-determinations for which the 
opposition between subjective and the objective falls away.”  For these passages, Houlgate 383
could argue that the ‘falling away’ of that opposition is just a deep symmetry between thought 
and being. But Hegel says that it is  for the thought determinations, for Thought itself  that the 
opposition has fallen away. This would imply not that thought remains to one side of a duality, 
but that it is thought itself that should be understood as neutral. My reading takes this neutrality 
seriously in an attempt to do justice to these passages of Hegel. Houlgate’s reading insists on 
reading thought as one side of the pair, as concerned with the realm of the mental, though 
nonetheless deeply connected to things as they are in themselves. I do not believe that reading to 
do full justice to the texts, nor to follow through on what separting thought from the opposition 
of consciousness should truly entail.  
In sum, then, the unity of faculties readings suffers from maintaining a separation 
between thought and being, despite acknowledging a deep correspondence between them. Such 
a separation is not compatible with Hegel’s theoretical aims nor with his texts as I read them. 
When we speak of presuppositionless thought, we should not think of this is a special kind of 
381 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.33. 
382 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 41, addition 2. 
383 Hegel,  Encyclopedia Logic , sect. 24, addition 1. 
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mental phenomenon, a special way we can approach the world. Thought, as Hegel takes it in the 
beginning of his philosophy, is a subject/object neutral entity whose inner instability generates 
the universal and necessary structure of the world. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have aimed to defend the claim that the primary modification made by 
Hegel to Kant’s philosophy is the shift from the transcendental unity of apperception as a 
condition on representations to Thought as a unifying force acting in reality itself, and that this 
modification is what allows Hegel to address the issues he raises for the Kantian system. In 
arguing for this claim, I have pointed to Hegel’s own explicit identification of Thought with the 
Kantian ‘I,’ including his direct claims to be taking that ‘I’ beyond the “finitude of consciousness” 
and making it into “infinite thought.”  Also of importance are the numerous theoretical 384
similarities between the two central concepts: their theoretical roles, the structure of 
dependence they set up, and the reflective element in each of them. Taken together, these point 
to a deep affinity between the concepts. Moreover, the apparent differences between the two are 
ultimately rooted in the difference in their ontological status. This difference is also how Hegel is 
able to respond to the problems he finds in Kant. Without the ontological shift I describe, Hegel 
would be open to the same charges of subjectivism that he brings against his predecessor. But 
with that shift made, Hegel is able to use the dialectic to derive the categories and explain the 
distinction between subjects and objects, and is able to set our knowledge of the world on a firm 
foundation. In sum them, reading Hegel as taking the Kantian transcendental unity of 
apperception and making it into a metaphysical principle, as opposed to a principle of 
384 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.47-48. 
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representations, is a reading that accounts for Hegel’s explicit textual claims, his criticisms of his 
predecessors, and ultimately, for his solutions to the problems of philosophy as he sees them.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In concluding this dissertation, I will spare the reader a restatement of what I have 
probably repeated too often already - that Hegel transformed the transcendental unity of 
apperception by taking it from a condition on representations to a condition on reality as a 
whole. Instead, I want to take a moment to reflect on broader points concerning my approach to 
Hegel and Hegel’s reception in modern-day metaphysics. 
It is no secret that Hegel’s writings are dense and obscure, nor is it any secret that he is 
often looked down upon by today’s metaphysicians. It is often hard to see what exactly his 
claims are, much less his arguments for them, and when he asserts that thought is necessarily 
self-contradictory, it is easy to simply dismiss him as having gone too far down some bizarre 
conceptual rabbit-hole.  As I have noted above, when today’s philosophers do come to Hegel 385
looking for insights, they often aim to sanitize some of his unusual claims so as to make them 
more palatable for today’s philosophical sensibilities.  This is how Hegel can come to be 386
treated as purely a philosopher of the mind, for example. 
Here I have tried to do justice to Hegel’s genuinely unusual metaphysics (and thus to his 
texts) while simultaneously aiming to present his claims in a way that is if not attractive, at least 
not immediately repugnant to a philosopher of today. Approaching Hegel through Kant is part 
of this strategy; Kant is a respected figure whose ideas are at least commonly understood or 
discussed. Seeing Hegel through the lens of a criticism of Kant can thus provide a useful 
entryway to his philosophy, in addition to being of historical interest. 
That said, however, I found myself struggling to present Hegel’s ideas in a way that 
would seem plausible or even, at times, comprehensible. This difficulty arose especially in 
385 Hegel,  Science of Logic , 21.40 
386 This is not always the case, of course, but it is a common trend. Various adherents to the 
non-metaphysical readings I have mentioned previously would fall into this camp. 
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relation to the dialectic, where the discussion of Thought’s self-contradiction and resultant 
transformation was quite difficult to put into language that did not seem simply false, or else so 
obscure as to be worth very little. At the same time, I myself could not shake the conviction that 
Hegel was getting at something quite profoundly  true . In my experience, struggling with trying 
to express something that feels undeniably true yet, it seems, cannot be put into words without 
appearing ridiculous is a common struggle for philosophers, and I experienced it directly in 
relation to Hegel’s dialectic. 
Although I did my best, I am not sure that I entirely succeeding in presenting Hegel’s 
dialectic in a way that is both metaphysically serious and palatable for the modern-day analytic 
mindset. But to some extent - and I do not say this merely to excuse my failings - this is a 
consequence of a deeper, more fundamental difference between the modes of reasoning 
accepted by Hegel and philosophers in the analytic tradition today. Hegel was not setting out to 
set up one metaphysical system among others. Rather, his metaphysics is at the same time a 
logic, which means it is meant to model not simply how the world is but how thought about the 
world works as well.  This means that, for Hegel, how one argues for claims, how one reasons 387
toward conclusions, all of these are modeled by the dialectic.  
We can see this in our everyday lives - when people encounter contradictions in their 
thinking, they do not simply sit down and stop, nor do they derive all sorts of fanciful nonsense, 
as one might if one were operating with a propositional calculus, as traditionally conceived.  388
Instead, people use these contradictions to revise beliefs, introduce new distinctions, redefine 
their concepts, and move forward with their theorizing and with their lives; in other words, 
contradiction is a productive, motivating force for thought. Hegel’s dialectic models these 
387 See Bencivenga,  Theories of the Logos . 
388 I have in mind here the fact that, according to many traditional logics, from a contradiction literally 
anything follows. 
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patterns of reasoning, as opposed to the propositional calculus modeled by the logical systems 
put forth by Frege and Russell at the outset of analytic philosophy.  
What is more, both views of logic have yielded their own metaphysics. On the one hand 
we have the metaphysics of Thought I have presented as Hegel’s, where a single entity 
complicates and redefines itself through contradiction until it comes to be the totality of the 
world as we know it. On the other hand there are the various systems of analytic metaphysics 
stretching as far back as Aristotle, where clearly demarcated categories hold static relations to 
one another in an ordered, structured, classification of the totality of the world’s contents.   389
Both of these views have their strengths and weaknesses. For me, the purpose here has 
not been to prove one perspective superior to another. Rather, in addition to the general 
historical interest of this study, part of the subtext has been my attempt to put these two modes 
of reasoning into a kind of dialogue. After all, the great joy and value of studying the history of 
ideas is in discovering different ways of thinking and placing them in contact with one another 
and with one’s own world. In Hegel we find some of the most richly developed and radically 
different ways of thinking there is in the history of philosophy. If my work can contribute in 
some small way to helping others find their way into that way of thinking, I will count this 
project as a success. 
 
 
 
 
 
389 This is of course a very broad brush with which to paint 2500 years of metaphysics, and many 
metaphysicians will not be properly characterized by it; it is meant to describe an overall ethos rather than 
any particular philosopher or school. Notable exceptions might include philosophers like Whitehead, 
Bergson, or Spinoza. 
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